Barry R. McCaffrey, General, USA (Ret.)

MILITARY HISTORY

July 2007

Source Documents:

Biographies; Senior Officer Oral History; Division Command – Lessons Learned; Company Command Oral History; "Military and the Media"; Vietnam Letters; Awards

Table of Contents

Barry R. McCaffrey, General, USA (Ret.) Military History

First Printing July 2023

Printed and Published in Seattle, Washington, United States of America

Barry R. McCaffrey, Publisher
Library of Congress Control Number: 2024913682
ISBN 979-8-218-45305-3

27 July 2007

Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BR McCaffrey Associates, LLC
2900 S. Quincy Street, Suite 300A
Arlington, Virginia 22206

TAB:	CONTENTS:
1	**Short Biography** – General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), 1 April 2007.
2	**Long Biography** – General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), 25 July 2007.
3	**Senior Officer Oral History Program** – Interviewed By Lieutenant Colonel (P) Conrad Munster, 2004.
4	**Division Command Lessons Learned Program** –Interviewed By Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence S. Epstein, 1992.
5	**Company Command Oral History** – Interviewed By Lieutenant Colonel Edward Broderick, 1982.
6	**Oral History Interview** - "Military and the Media" – Interviewed By Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence S. Epstein, 1992.
7	**Vietnam Letters** – By Daniel P. Garcia and Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA Ret., November 1997.
8	**Award of the Distinguished Service Cross**, 16 January 1967.
9	**Award of the Silver Star**, 7 February 1969.
10	**Award of the Silver Star**, 3 June 1969.
11	**Award of the Distinguished Service Cross**, 2 August 1969.

Section 1:

Short Biography

General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA

(Ret.), 1 April 2007

Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

Biographic Summary of General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.)

General Barry R. McCaffrey is President of his own consulting firm based in Arlington, Virginia (www.mccaffreyassociates.com). He serves as a national security and terrorism analyst for NBC News and writes a column on national security issues for *Armed Forces Journal*. The Washington Speakers Bureau (www.washingtonspeakers.com) exclusively represents his speeches.

General McCaffrey is also an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. From January 2001 to May 2005, General McCaffrey served as the Bradley Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies.

General McCaffrey graduated from Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He holds a Master of Arts degree in civil government from American University. He attended the Harvard University National Security Program as well as the Business School Executive Education Program.

In October 2004, General McCaffrey was elected by the Board of Directors of HNTB Corporation (www.hntb.com) to serve as the Board Chairman of a newly formed subordinate company, HNTB Federal Services. HNTB is a preeminent U.S. engineering and architectural design firm with net revenue of $500 million and 3000 + employees.

He has been elected to: the Board of Directors of DynCorp International, CRC Health Corporation, McNeil Technologies, The Wornick Company, Phoenix House Foundation and the Atlantic Council of the United States. He is also: a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; an Associate of the Inter-American Dialogue; a Principal for the Council on Excellence in Government; a member of the CSIS U.S.-Mexico Binational Council; Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Education Center Advisory Board; a Senior Executive Associate for Army Aviation Association of America and is a member of the Board of Advisors of the National Infantry Foundation.

General McCaffrey stepped down as the Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in January 2001. He was confirmed to the position by unanimous vote of the U.S. Senate in February 1996 and served as a member of the President's Cabinet and the National Security Council for drug-related issues. As ONDCP Director, he coordinated the $19 billion federal drug control budget and developed the *U.S. National Drug Control Strategy*.

General McCaffrey is active in national security affairs. He co-chaired the Atlantic Council of the United States NATO Counterterrorism Working Group, leading a delegation to Moscow, Mons, Brussels and Warsaw. In 2004 he addressed the "Security of the Americas Conference" in Mexico City and met with senior officials of the Mexican Government. In April 2004, General McCaffrey helped release the CSIS Bi-national Commission Reports on Migration and Border Security. In February 2002, General McCaffrey visited Cuba and participated in a small group session with Fidel and Raul Castro discussing U.S.-Cuba policies. His article on Cuba can be found at www.mccaffreyassociates.com. General McCaffrey periodically conducts political-military evaluations of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. His After Action Reports on all these trips are available at www.mccaffreyassociates.com.

Among the honors he has received are: Health and Human Services Lifetime Achievement Award For Extraordinary Achievement in the Field of Substance Abuse Prevention (2004); recognized as one of the 500 Most Influential People in American Foreign Policy by World Affairs Councils of America (2004); the Department of State's Superior Honor Award for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; The Central Intelligence Agency Great Seal Medallion; the United States Coast Guard Distinguished Public Service Award; the NAACP Roy Wilkins Renown Service Award; the Norman E. Zinberg Award of the Harvard Medical School; The Federal Law Enforcement Foundation's National Service Award; The Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America Lifetime Achievement Award; and decorations from France, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. In 2007 he was given the National Leadership Award by the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America. The Society of American Military Engineers (SAME) awarded General McCaffrey their "Golden Eagle" recognition in 2007.

Prior to confirmation as the National Drug Policy Director, General McCaffrey served as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces Southern Command coordinating national security operations in Latin America. During his military career, he served overseas for thirteen years and completed four combat tours. He commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) during the Desert Storm 400-kilometer left hook attack into Iraq. At retirement from active duty, he was the most highly decorated four-star general in the U.S. Army. He twice received the Distinguished Service Cross, the nation's second highest medal for valor. He was also awarded two Silver Stars and received three Purple Heart medals for wounds sustained in combat. General McCaffrey served as the assistant to General Colin Powell and supported the Chairman as the JCS advisor to the Secretary of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

Effective 1 April 2007

Section 2:

Long Biography

General Barry R. McCaffrey

USA (Ret.), 25 July 2007

25 July 2007

General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.)

I. GENERAL:

General Barry R. McCaffrey is an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the United States Military Academy. He is also President of his own consulting firm based in Alexandria, Virginia. www.mccaffreyassociates.com He serves as a national security and terrorism analyst for NBC News. The Washington Speakers Bureau exclusively represents his speeches. www.washingtonspeakers.com

General McCaffrey graduated from Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He holds a Master of Arts degree in civil government from American University. He attended the Harvard University National Security Program as well as the Business School Executive Education Program.

In October 2004, General McCaffrey was elected by the Board of Directors of HNTB Corporation www.hntb.com to serve as the Board Chairman of a newly formed subordinate company, HNTB Federal Services. HNTB is a preeminent U.S. engineering and architectural design firm with net revenue of $500 million and 3200 + employees.

He has been elected to: the Board of Directors of DynCorp International, CRC Health Corporation, McNeil Technologies, The Wornick Company, Phoenix House Foundation and the Atlantic Council of the United States. He is also: a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; an Associate of the Inter-American Dialogue; a Principal for the Council on Excellence in Government; a member of the CSIS U.S.-Mexico Binational Council; Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Education Center Advisory Board; a Senior Executive Associate for Army Aviation Association of America and is a member of the Board of Advisors of the National Infantry Foundation.

II. EDUCATION:

- Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass. (Secondary)
- USMA West Point, BS
- American University, MA (Civil Government)
- Harvard University
  - JFK School- - National Security Course
  - Business School -- Making Corporate Boards Work
- Western Behavioral Science Institute (Management and Strategic Studies)
- National Defense University (General Officer Strategic Course)
- U.S. Army War College (Strategic Studies)
- Command and General Staff College (Honor Graduate)
- Armor Advanced Course (Distinguished Graduate)
- Vietnamese Language Course -- Defense Language Institute (Honor Graduate)
- Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro, N.C. (Leadership)

III: HONORS:

- NAACP Roy Wilkins Renowned Service Award, 1991 (Life member NAACP).
- State Department Superior Honor Award, 1992 (principal negotiation team for the START II Nuclear Arms Control Treaty).
- Admitted to the Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.
- Admitted as an Associate Member of the Inter-American Dialogue, 1995.
- Decorated by the governments of France, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.
- Norman E. Zinberg Award of the Harvard Medical School's Division on Addictions, 1997.
- Founders Award, The American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, 1997.
- VFW -- Forty & Eight Annual Americanism Award, 1998.
- Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America -- National Leadership Award, 1998.
- U.S. – Panama Business Council -- Friendship Award, 1998.
- National Drug Prevention League -- National Leadership Award, 1999.
- The National Association of Drug Court Professionals -- Leadership Award, 1999.
- Honorary Doctorate, Norwich University.
- Honorary Doctorate, Providence College.
- Honorary Doctorate, Westminster College.
- Honorary Professor, Universidad Del Salvador-Argentina.
- U.S. – Panama Business Council – Ambassador of Good Will Award, 1999.
- The American Methadone Treatment Association Friend of the Field Award, 2000.
- The Order of the Lion, Lions Club International, 2000.
- National Association of State Alcohol & Drug Abuse Directors -- Leadership Award 2000.
- Southern Oregon Drug Awareness - Lyman Faulkner Award for Advocacy, 2000.
- The Federal Law Enforcement Foundation's National Service Award, 2000.
- The Republica de Colombia, Orden de Boyaca Grado, Gran Cruz, 2000.
- Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America -- Lifetime Achievement Award, 2000
- Central Intelligence Agency Great Seal Medallion, 2000.
- United States Coast Guard Distinguished Public Service Award, 2001.
- Health and Human Services Lifetime Achievement Award for Extraordinary Achievement in the Field of Substance Abuse Prevention, 2004.
- One of the 500 Most Influential People in American Foreign Policy by World Affairs Councils of America, 2004.
- James Cardinal Gibbons Medal (Highest Honor), Catholic University of America, 2004.
- Castle Memorial Award, West Point Society of the District of Columbia and National Capital Area, 2004.
- Outstanding Civilian Civil Service Medal, Department of Army, 2001- 2005.
- Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America -- National Leadership Award, 2007.
- The Society of American Military Engineers (SAME) "Golden Eagle" recognition, 2007.
- Selected Ranger Hall of Fame; Ft. Banning, Georgia, 2007.

IV: LAST MILITARY POSITION:

- Commander-In-Chief U.S. Southern Command (four-star General) 1994-1996.

- Responsible for 84,000 joint military personnel, and DOD civilians who operated annually in Central and South America.

- Managed an operating budget of $650 million and a counter-drug budget of $153 million.
- Coordinated U.S international security policy with foreign heads of government, ministers of defense and foreign affairs, and U.S. ambassadors in 19 nations of Central and South America.
- Advised President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State on U.S. Latin American international security policy. Created first Human Rights Council and Human Rights Code of Conduct for an U.S. Military Joint Command. Testified to U.S. Senate and House committees dealing with appropriations, national security, and foreign policy.
- Supported humanitarian operations for more than 10,000 Cuban refugees in Panama. 1996

V: <u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>:

- Most highly decorated and youngest Army four-star General at retirement. Three awards of the Purple Heart for wounds received in action. Four combat tours of duty during thirteen years of overseas service: Dominican Republic 1965; Vietnam 1966-67/68-69 (Vietnamese Airborne Division and 1st Cavalry Division); Iraq, 1991 (24th Mech Division).
- Twice awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (the nation's second highest award) for extraordinary heroism in Vietnam combat action (Vietnamese Airborne Division and U.S. 1st Cavalry Division).
- Twice awarded the Silver Star for exceptional valor in Vietnam combat action as a rifle company commander (1st Cavalry Division).
- Served as Lt. General on the JCS Pentagon staff as the J5 Strategic Planner and also as the Special Assistant to General Colin Powell. (1992-1994)
- Served as a Major General on the Army Pentagon staff as the DCSOPS strategic planner.
- Commanded 26,000 soldiers of the U.S. Army 24th Infantry Division Combat Team during Desert Storm. Awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for leading the 370-kilometer left-hook attack into Iraq.
- Awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge and Bronze Star as an 82nd Airborne Division parachute infantry platoon leader during the Dominican Republic OAS peacekeeping mission.
- Responsible for management of two U.S. military installations 1999-1992 (Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia) with 4,000 civilian employees and 19,000 military personnel. Trained 52,000 reservists a year. Annual budget of $200 million.

VI: <u>DIRECTOR -- NATIONAL DRUG POLICY</u>

General McCaffrey served as Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy from 1996 to 2001. He was confirmed by unanimous vote of the U.S. Senate for this position. General McCaffrey served as a member of the President's Cabinet. He was also a

member of the President's National Security Council for drug related issues. As Director, he had the following duties:

- Responsible by law to author the *U.S. National Drug Control Strategy*.
- Supervised the Federal Drug Control Budget (FY00 $19.2 billion) in nine separate appropriations bills. Developed the five-year (2000-2004), U.S. Federal Drug Control Budget.
- Principal architect of the five year $2 billion National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.
- By statute, implemented the $143.5 million Drug-Free Communities Program.
- Provided oversight to the $192 million High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program (HIDTA) which coordinated thirty-one designated HIDTA's throughout the United States.
- Directed by the President to act as Head of Delegation for the Permanent U.S. - Mexico High Level Contact Group to manage all aspects of our bi-national drug cooperation (Dept. of State, Justice, Defense, Treasury, Transportation, Health and Human Services, CIA).
- Responsible for the Center for Technology Assessment (CTAC) coordination of research and development relating to the drug issue.
- Board Member and United States Government representative to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) of the International Olympic Committee.
- Co-Chair of the White House Task Force on Doping in Sports.
- Co-chaired inaugural White House Task Force on Doping in Sports Meeting in Salt Lake City, December 2000.

VII: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE:

- Periodically conducts political-military evaluations (2005 thru 2007) of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. After Action Reports on all these trips are available at www.mccaffreyassociates.com.
- Co-chaired the Atlantic Council of the United States NATO Counterterrorism Working Group, leading a delegation to Moscow, Mons, Brussels and Warsaw, 2004.
- Addressed the "Security of the Americas Conference" in Mexico City and met with senior officials of the Mexican Government, 2004.
- Helped release the CSIS Bi-national Commission Reports on Migration and Border Security, 2004.
- Visited Cuba to conduct closed door discussions with Fidel and Raul Castro and other senior Cuban officials discussing U.S.-Cuba policies, 2002.
- Member of U.S Delegation to the Presidential Inauguration in Mexico, December 2000.

- Head of U.S Delegation to Colombia to demonstrate U.S commitment and discuss implementation of Plan Colombia/Andean Ridge with senior Colombian officials to include President Pastrana, November, 2000.

- Head of U.S Delegation to the World Anti-Doping Agency Executive Board Meeting in Oslo, Norway; Head of Delegation to the Oslo meeting of the International Consultative Group on Drugs in Sport (40 nations attending) November, 2000.

- Member of U.S. Delegation and United States Representative to the World Wide Anti-Doping Agency, XXVII Olympic Games, Sydney Australia, September, 2000.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to coordinate international drug control strategy, Beijing, Kunming and Hong Kong, China, June 2000.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to coordinate international drug control strategy, Hanoi, Vietnam, June 2000.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to coordinate international drug control strategy, Bangkok, Thailand, June 2000.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to the International Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport, Montreal Canada, February 2000.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to the inaugural meeting of the World Anti-Doping Agency, Laussane, Switzerland, January, 2000.

- Head of U.S. Delegation for U.S./International Olympic Committee negotiations, Washington, DC, December 1999. Negotiated with the IOC President the structures, powers and authorities of the World Anti-Doping Agency.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to the "International Drugs in Sport Summit" -- Sydney Australia, November 1999. Negotiated the text of the Sydney Declaration on Drugs in Sport.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to coordinate international drug control strategy with President or Prime Minister of: Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Curacao and Aruba, 1999.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to coordinate international drug control strategy with Presidents of: Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina, 1999.

- Head of Delegation U.S./Mexico Drug Demand Reduction Conference: (El Paso, Texas, 1998) -- (Tijuana, Mexico, 1999) -- (Phoenix, Arizona, 2000.)

- Member of the U.S. Secretary of State delegation to coordinate the annual U.S./Mexico Bi-National Commission -- Co-Chaired the Legal Affairs & Anti-Narcotics Issues Working Group with U.S. Attorney General, Mexico City, 1999.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to the International Olympic Committee World Conference on Doping in Sports, Lausanne, Switzerland, February 2-4, 1999. Negotiated the text of the Lausanne Declaration Against Doping in Sports. Chaired ten bilateral meetings with foreign governments and international organizations.

- Accompanied and advised the President during international meetings of Heads of State: Summit of the Americas, Miami, 1994; San Jose Central America Summit, 1997; Barbados Caribbean Summit, 1997; Summit of the Americas, Santiago, 1998.

- Accompanied and advised the President during State Visits, (1996: Thailand)(1997: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela)(1998: Mexico).

- Head of U.S. Delegation to United Nations ECOSOC Conference on Drugs, 1996. Member of U.S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem, 1998.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to EU Drug Monitoring Center. Lisbon, Portugal, 1998.

- Head of U.S. Delegation to United Nations Drug Control Program, Vienna, 1998.

- Bi-Lateral visits to drug control program – Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland, 1998.

- Principal Staff Assistant to General Colin Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and then Chief of Strategic Planning (J5) for the JCS, 1992-1994.
  - Acted as liaison from Chairman JCS to the National Security Council.
  - Acted as military liaison from Chairman JCS to Secretary of State (Sec. James Baker, Sec. Larry Eagleburger, and Sec. Warren Christopher).
  - Acted as JCS military advisor to U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. (Madeleine Albright).
  - Military advisor from Chairman JCS to President George Bush during Helsinki European Security discussions and START II nuclear arms control negotiations in Moscow, 1992.
  - JCS military liaison to United Nations Peacekeeping (Under Secretary Kofi Annan) during 1992-1994.
  - JCS advisor to Secretary of State Warren Christopher during European Bosnia discussions - London and Bonn, 1993.
  - Special representative for Chairman JCS during national security visits to Korea and Japan, 1993.
  - Special representative for Chairman JCS during national security visit to Israel, 1993.
  - Liaison from Chairman JCS to Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger for the successful negotiations of the Paris Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993.
  - Military advisor from Chairman JCS for Clinton-Yeltsin Vancouver Talks and also the Seattle Pacific Rim Conference, 1993.
  - JCS advisor to Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew during special envoy visits to Croatia, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia, 1994.

- Deputy U.S. Military Representative to Headquarters NATO in Brussels, Belgium, 1989-1990.

- Served abroad in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Panama, Germany, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Traveled extensively as an official U.S. representative throughout much of the world.

VIII: TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

- Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY; 2005– Present.

- Bradley Professor of International Security Studies, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY; 2001 – 2005.

- Lecturer at: Harvard University – Kennedy School; Business School; Medical School; Law School (Thru 2007).

- Assistant Professor and Executive Officer, Department of Social Sciences, West Point. Instructor - comparative politics, American government, economics of national security, and personal finance, 1973-1976.

- Managed all instructional courses at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia as Assistant Commandant (24 courses, 73,000 students per year, budget $498 million, faculty of 3,577 civilians and military). Personally taught leadership and tactics classes to Basic Course and Advanced Course officer students, 1986-1988.

- Faculty U.S. Army Armor School. Instructor in leadership. 1971.

- Adjunct faculty member, University of Kentucky. Instructor - American Government, 1971.

IX: MEDIA IMPACT:

General McCaffrey has appeared in over 6000 television stories and over 15,000 newspaper articles. He has met with over 85 editorial boards from major newspapers across the nation. Media coverage included the nation's most prestigious programs including *Meet the Press*, *This Week*, *Fox Sunday News*, *Nightline*, *Today*, *Good Morning America*, John McLaughlin's *One on One*, numerous feature interviews by Dan Rather on CBS Evening News, Brian Williams and Tom Brokaw on *NBC Nightly News*, Peter Jennings on *World News*, Jim Lehrer on PBS, Bernard Shaw on CNN, Montel Williams, Charlie Rose, Diane Rehm, and Ted Koppel and *C-Span Washington Journal*.

X: PUBLICATIONS:

- "Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Student Conference on United States Affairs," Department of Social Sciences, West Point, N.Y. (1973)

- "We Are Soldiers All: An Analysis of Possible Roles for Women in the Army," Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. (1973)

- "Assault Company," *Infantry Magazine* (March-April 1978)
- "The Battle on the German Frontier," *Military Review* (March 1982)
- "Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations," *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability*, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA (1993)
- "Good Vibes Between White House, Military," *Wall Street Journal* (April 6, 1993)
- Introduction to *Angels in Red Hats: Paratroopers of the Second Indochina War*, Harmony House Publishers, Louisville, KY (1994) (Library of Congress control #: 94079267)
- *Vital Speeches of the Day*:
  "So-Called War on Drugs" (March 15, 1996)
  "Prevention Programs Work" (November 15, 1996)
  "Hemispheric Drug Control" (May 1, 1997)
  "National Drug Control" (August 1, 1997)
  "Vietnam Veteran's Memorial Speech" (January 15, 1998)
  "Drugs and the Media" (August 1, 1998)
  "Methadone Treatment Our Vision For the Future" (May 15, 2000)
- "Human Rights and the Commander," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 1995)
- "Role of the Armed Forces in the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights," *Military Law Review* (1995)
- "Upbeat Outlook for Southern Neighbors," *Defense* (Issue 4, 1995)
- "A Former CINC Looks at Latin America," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring, 1996)
- "Vietnam Letters", *Army Magazine*, (November 1997)
- "Prevention Programs Work," *Drugs, Society and Behavior* (Spring 1998)
- "Make America Better by Reducing Illegal Drugs," *Five Hundred Ways to Make America Better*, George Magazine and Villard/Random House (Spring 1998)
- "Future Strategy," *Berkeley Journal of Law and Public Policy* (Spring 1998)
- "Cocaine: Will Congress Act?," *The New Crisis*, (September/October, 1998)
- "Efforts to Combat Money Laundering," *Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal*, (December 1998)
- Foreword to *The Eyes of Orion: Five Tank Lieutenants in the Persian Gulf War*, Kent State University Press, October 1999.
- "We Can Keep Our Kids Drug Free For Life," *Parade*, January 16, 2000.
- "The New Yorker's Revisionist History", *Wall Street Journal*, May 22, 2000.

- "Soldiering On: An Interview with Barry R. McCaffrey", *Retired Officer Magazine*, June 2000.
- "Lessons from Desert Storm," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 2000-2001.
- "Hollywood Is Ignoring a Valid Drug War Script", *Los Angeles Times*, March 15, 2001.
- "Conversations with the Olin Professor: A Compilation of Questions & Answer Exchanges between the Cadets of SS478 and General McCaffrey," Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, Spring 2001.
- "The Imperative of Ballistic Missile Defense," *Armed Forces Journal International*, July 2001.
- "The Drug Scourge as a Hemispheric Problem, "Implementing *Plan Colombia Special Series*, Strategic Studies Institute, The North-South Center, and the U.S. Army War College, August 2001.
- "Cutting Ground Forces is Dangerous," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 1, 2001.
- "Saddam: The Next Phase," *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 2001.
- "September 11th," *Revista Poder*, October 2001.
- "Dealing with Madness," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 2001.
- Conversations with the Olin Professor: A Compilation of Questions & Answer Exchanges between the Cadets of SS478 and General McCaffrey," Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, Fall 2001.
- "A Wary Eye on North Korea," *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 2001.
- Foreword to *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*, The Association of the United States Army, 2001.
- "Afghanistan: Denying A Sanctuary to Terror," *Armed Forces Journal International*, February 2002.
- Foreword to *The Great Raid: Rescuing the Doomed Ghosts of Bataan and Corregidor*, Talk Miramax Books, February 2002.
- "Castro Still Reaps Empowerment From "Enemy America," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 2002.
- "Challenges to US National Security," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 2002.
- Conversations with the Olin Professor: A Compilation of Questions & Answer Exchanges between the Cadets of SS478 and General McCaffrey," Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, Spring 2002.

- Foreword to *Aging & Addiction: Helping Older Adults Overcome Alcohol or Medication Dependence,* Hazelden Foundation, Spring 2002.
- "Crusader Essential to High-Intensity Combat," *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 2002.
- "The War on Terrorism: Protecting America's Land and Maritime Frontiers," *Armed Forces Journal International*, July 2002.
- Foreword and Book Chapter to *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment,* McGraw-Hill Publishing, September 2002.
- "Colombia: Drugs, Terrorism, and Crime," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 2002.
- "Saddam's SS," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 16, 2002.
- "How the War Might Unfold," *Armed Forces Journal International*, November 2002.
- "North Korea's Global Threat," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 12, 2002.
- "Armored Formations will Remain Essential in Future Command," *Armed Forces Journal International,* January 2003.
- "Nothing imaginary about mental diseases," *The Washington Times*, January 22, 2003.
- "E-mail Exchanges with the Olin Professor," *Assembly,* January/February 2003.
- "This cut will only add to the state's problems," *Pittsburgh Post Gazette,* March 20, 2007.
- "Gaining Victory in Iraq," *US News and World Report,* April 2003.
- "A Time to Fight," *Wall Street Journal,* April 1, 2003.
- "Commentary: Drug Treatment Should Be Just A Click Away," *Orlando Sentinel,* June 10, 2003.
- "We Need More Troops," *Wall Street Journal,* June 29, 2003.
- "Looking Beyond Iraqi Freedom," *Armed Forces Journal International,* July 2003.
- "Lesson Learned," *American Legion,* September 2003.
- "Rumsfeld in Denial," *Wall Street Journal,* November 28, 2003.
- "What Should Bush Do?," *Time Magazine,* April 19, 2004.
- "We must not overlook drug abuse treatment," *Austin American-Statesman,* August 2, 2004.

- "Keep anti-drug budget in place to offset the treat," *The Patriot News,* June 14, 2005.
- "Retired General Estimates 20,000 Militants are in Iraq," *The Washington Times,* June 22, 2005.
- "Failure is Not an Option," *Wall Street Journal,* June 27, 2005.
- "The War We're Winning," *Armed Forces Journal International,* November 2005.
- "Fixing Infrastructure Is Nation's Top Task," *ENR Magazine,* June 27, 2006.
- "One Approach to a Last Try at Stability in Iraq," *The Washington Post,* December 13, 2006.
- "Methadone Saves Lives, Restores Productivity: Drug's bad press shouldn't harm treatment for addiction," *The Charleston Gazette,* January 28, 2007.
- "McCaffrey Paints a Gloomy Picture of Iraq," *The Washington Post,* March 28, 2007.
- "No Choice: Stay the Course in Iraq," *Los Angeles Times,* April 3, 2007.
- "Texas Can Lead Nation in Dealing With Traffic," *Austin Business Journal,* April 20, 2007.
- "War in Iraq Taking Heavy Toll on U.S., Retired General Says," *Columbus Dispatch,* May 17, 2007.
- "Pacific Northwest and the Nation: At an Infrastructure Crossroads," *Seattle Times,* June 2007.
- "Oregon and the Nation: At an Infrastructure Crossroads," *Portland Business Journal,* June 22, 2007.
- "Ohio, Nation at Crossroads with their Rundown Infrastructure," *Business First of Columbus,* July 13, 2007.

XI: <u>RELATED BOOKS AND ARTICLES</u>:

- *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War*, James Kitfield, Simon & Schuster, New York, N.Y. (1995) (ISBN # 0671769251)
- *Current Biography*, volume 58, number 7, July 1997
- *A History of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team During Operation Desert Storm*, Major Jason Kamiya, Fort Stewart, GA (1991) (Library of Congress # DS 79.724.U6 K35 1991)
- *The Victory Book: A Desert Storm Chronicle*, Major Jason Kamiya, Fort Stewart, GA (1991) (Library of Congress # DS 79.724.U6 K36 1991)

- *24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team: Historical Reference Book*, Lieutenant Colonel Bantz J. Craddock, Fort Stewart, GA (1992) (Library of Congress # DS 79.724.U6 A16 1992)

- *24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team: Operation Desert Storm Attack Plan*, Lieutenant Colonel Bantz J. Craddock, Fort Stewart, GA (1992) (Library of Congress # DS 79.724.U6 U55 1992)

- *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War*, Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr., Black Star Agency, New York, N.Y. (1992) (ISBN # 0028811119)

- "A 'Czar' Among Bureaucrats: Gen. Barry McCaffrey Considers a Role in the War on Drugs", *Harvard Case Study*, 1997

- *The Generals' War*, Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, Mass. (1995) (ISBN # 0316321001)

- *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, Bantam Books, New York, N.Y. (1992) (ISBN # 038425848)

- *Triumph Without Victory*, U.S. News and World Report, Times Book, 1992, New York, N.Y. (1992) (ISBN # 0394239148)

- *Crusade*, Rick Atkinson, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, N.Y. (1993) (ISBN # 0395602904)

- "He's at the Front Lines Once Again," *Los Angeles Times*, March 6, 1996

- "A Dove Fights the Drug War," *New Yorker*, June 3, 1996

- "A Four-Star Approach to Curbing Drug Use," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 7, 1996

- "Plan of Attack: Formulating U.S. International Drug Policy," *Harvard International Review* (Spring, 1997).

- "The General's $1 Billion Gamble," *ADWEEK*, June 8, 1998

- "High Stakes," *Government Executive*, July 1998

- "An Officer and a Social Worker," *Economist*, July 18, 1998

- "America's Drug Warrior," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, July 24, 1998

- "Clinton's Good Soldier," *National Review*, May 3, 1999

- "Update on the Drug Wars," *National Journal*, July 3, 1999

- "Just Say Yes," *Capital Style*, August, 1999

- "Seymour Hersh's Gulf War Misconceptions" *Chicago Tribune*, Georgie Anne Geyer, Universal Press Syndicate, May 19, 2000
- ABC NEWS *THIS WEEK with Sam Donaldson*, Interview with General (Ret) Colin Powell, May 21, 2000
- "THE GULF WAR Probing a Slaughter A U.S. assault on Iraqi troops was 'a grouse shoot'—but was it an excessive use of force?" *Newsweek*, May 29, 2000, *John Barry and Evan Thomas*
- "Get it right or don't write", *The Washington Times*, David Hackworth, June 2, 2000.
- "The Real Gulf War Blunder The problem wasn't that Barry McCaffrey kept on fighting—it was that we stopped fighting too soon", *Weekly Standard*, June 5, 2000/Vol 5, Number 36 Mackubin Thomas Owens
- "McCaffrey Responds to The New Yorker", James Kitfield, *National Journal*, June 6, 2000.
- "Drug Czar McCaffrey Optimistic on War on Drugs", James M. Shevis, *Dialogo*, Volume 10 Issue 2, 2000
- "Man with a Mission and a Heart," *Crystal City etc*., Louise Bowen, Summer, 2000.
- "A Great Soldier: Attacks on McCaffrey are way off mark", *The Washington Times*, Michael K. McMahan, July 6, 2000.
- *Legacy of Disorder: Voices of the Vietnam War Era*, Gil Dorland, Brassey's (2001); (ISBN: 1574882155)
- "Interview with Barry McCaffrey '64," *Assembly Magazine*, July/August 2001.
- "Networks Enlist Old Soldiers for Expertise," *The Washington Post*, Howard Kurtz, October 10, 2001.
- "Television Networks Use Retired Military Officials to fill in the blanks in Afghanistan," *AP*, David Bauder, October 10, 2001.

XII: <u>LECTURER</u>: universities, think tanks, legislative bodies, international organizations, military colleges, private industry, and foreign governments including:

- American University, Boston University, The Citadel, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Harvard University (JFK School of Government, Law School, Medical School), Norwich University, Tufts University, U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, Universidad Del Salvador-Argentina, Northwestern University Medical School, University of Pennsylvania Medical School, University of Washington, Notre Dame University, Suffolk University, U.S. Command & General Staff College, U.S. Army War College, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Air University, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National War College, Westminster College, Washington & Lee University, North

Carolina State University, Virginia Military Institute, Newberry College, Providence College..

- Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institute, Heritage Foundation, Inter-American Dialogue, Meridian International Center, North-South Center (Miami), U.S. - Mexico Chamber of Commerce, U.S. - Panama Chamber of Commerce, U.S - Thailand Chamber of Commerce, World Affairs Council (Houston), World Affairs Council (Seattle), Commonwealth Club (San Francisco), North Atlantic Council, Town Hall (Los Angeles), World Affairs Council (Denver), World Affairs Council (San Diego), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (Tijuana, Mexico), State of Maryland House of Delegates, State of Kentucky House of Representatives and Senate, New York State Assembly.

- Kermit Roosevelt Lecture Series Great Britain, Mark Clark Lecture Series Brazil, Inter-American Defense College, Chilean War College, El Salvador Institute of Higher Defense Studies, Guatemalan Senior Service School, Honduran War College, Headquarters Japanese Self-Defense Forces, Colombian War College, Instituto Marias Romero del Estudios Diplomaticos (Mexico City).

- U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, United Nations General Assembly, Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Defense Board, Russian Federation Parliament, Ukrainian Parliament, Argentine Congress, Israeli legislators, Venezuelan legislators, Mexican legislators, Chilean Diplomacy Academy.

- National Governors' Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors; American Medical Association; National Convention The Elks; National Convention AMVETS; National Convention D.A.R.E.; National Convention PRIDE; Vietnam Veterans Memorial; Hispanic American Police Command Officer Association, College on Problems and Drug Dependence, American Council on Addiction Psychiatry, American Pediatrics National Convention, National District Attorney Association, National Convention 100 Black Men, National Convention NOBLE, VFW National Convention, National Convention American Society of Addiction Medicine, International Society of Addictive Medicine, National Convention American Red Cross, National Convention Legion of Valor, Michigan Drug Court Association, CARF, .

- Writers Guild of America, The Reiner Foundation, UN Special Session Media Workshop, Fox Family Network of Writers and Executives, American Association of Advertising Agencies, National Association of Broadcasters, Entertainment Industry Council.

- National Alcohol Beverage Control Association, Physician's Task Force, Arthur J. Gallenger & Company, Association on Corporate Growth, Blackstone Group, Goldman Sax, WATSCO, Textron, Manulife Financial, Real Estate Roundtable, Northern Trust, Greater Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, Robertson Stephens, Sandler O'Neill, Addiction Resource Council, ANR Pipeline, National Home Equity Mortgage Association, NAVSTAR/GPS, Capstar Partners, American Society of Military Comptrollers, Microsoft, Panetta Institute, General Sport, Merrill Lynch, Hansen Technology, ASIS, Wisconsin Chapter of the Young President Organization, Citizens Financial Group, The Sunrise Agency, Yakima Town Hall, Apex Systems, Fidelity Investments Institutional Services, Inc., National Association of Electrical Distributors, Institute for Defense & Government Advancement Dallas Association of Financial Service Professionals, Defense Intelligence Agency, Corning, Inc., MTC Technologies, John Hancock/Manuallife, Marietta College Perspectives Series.

Section 3:

Senior Officer Oral History Program

Interviewed By Lieutenant Colonel

(P) Conrad Munster, 2004

Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

SENIOR OFFICER ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

April 2004

Interview with General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Retired)
by Lieutenant Colonel (P) Conrad Munster

SENIOR OFFICER ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM
PROJECT NO. 2004-08 (April 2004)
INTERVIEWER: Lieutenant Colonel (P) Conrad Munster
INTERVIEWEE: General Barry R. McCaffrey, U.S. Army Retired

INTERVIEWER: This interview number one, of an unclassified Senior Officer Oral History Program interview with General Barry R. McCaffrey, which is being conducted on April 6, 2004, in his office located at 1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600, Alexandria, Virginia 22314. Sir, thank you very much for agreeing to participate in the Army War College's oral history program. I would like to start off by discussing your childhood and education. Would you please review your childhood, including family life, hobbies, interests, and secondary education?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Yes. Thanks very much for a chance to participate in the program. Hopefully, we will get some useful responses and capture some observations on the military history of my time and the people I served with. I was an Army brat. My wife is an Army brat. My dad was an Infantry officer commissioned West Point, Class of 1939. Depression era kid. Someone whose family once had a lot of money, but at the height of the depression, I remember him telling me that there was almost no furniture left in the house. His dad had an alcohol problem that eventually killed him. I think a lot of it may have been exacerbated by The Depression. They ended up with two paintings in the house, one of the Virgin Mary and the other of Franklin D. Roosevelt. I mention that because I think that era so indelibly imprinted that generation, the generation that successfully went on to fight the global World War II. They had a huge impact on the children of that generation, too. My dad was an Infantry officer, nine years in combat deployed in various campaigns around the world. We moved with him much of the time, except obviously during combat tours. Lots of time in Europe and Hawaii, an assignment at West Point, and Fort Benning. Just a terrific upbringing. I have one sister who married a Citadel graduate; he was killed in

action in Vietnam. He was one of four Ranger Battalion advisers who were killed in action on the same day in August 1964. I will never forget it -- that was a horrible month for our family.

I guess I would characterize it as a terrific life as part of the Army family. I think my own children probably felt the same way, that throughout our time growing up, wherever you were on the face of the earth, driving through the front gate of a military post always felt like coming back to your neighborhood regardless of where it was. Eating in a PX [Post Exchange] snack bar to this day, both my wife and I see as going to the neighborhood café.

Hobbies, interests, I don't think there was anything that was distinctive about me as a kid, except that I read all the time. I read like a book a day until I was a battalion commander then I started to run out of the energy to focus on reading. I played sports. I always loved to travel. At one point, I thought I was going to be a doctor. I had a lot of interest in going into medicine. A typical young guy's interest in a romantic profession of medicine. Secondary education, some Catholic schooling. At the Army War College at Carlisle, my dad was there on the faculty. I was a grade school student there for a couple of years. I loved that post. Army schools a good bit of my life, post schools. When we were in Paris, I spent my freshman through junior years at Paris American High School. I got early admission to Johns Hopkins University as a junior. At the time, I thought I was the world's smartest kid. I had started the process from being a shy boy, class president and all sorts of academic honors as a junior, and got admitted to Johns Hopkins to go to premedicine. I remember my dad looked at me one day and he said, "You look like you are 14, not 16; you act like you are 12, not 14. You are not going to college. We need to find you a prep school." I think that was a huge impact on me.

We looked at Andover and Exeter and got into Andover. It was quite expensive for an Army Colonel to send his boy to Andover. They had sort of an income

neutral admissions policy, so if you were accepted they would make sure you had scholarship money to attend. So, I went to Andover for my senior year in high school. By then, my dad had been reassigned to the Citadel as the Commandant of Cadets down there, working for General Mark Clark, who had been his WWII four-star commander. So, off I went to Andover on the train. That was a huge impact on my life. When I arrived, probably half the boys had been there for four years, and half of them had been there for two years. A couple of us arrived for senior year, although they didn't really accept post graduate or seniors only. So I roomed, for example, with a British exchange student from that year. It was an unbelievable growth experience for me. I couldn't believe people were calling me Mr. McCaffrey. I liked this pseudo-adult status of it all.

What was a big impact on me was I went from straight A's to the first semester at Andover nearly flunking math, having huge difficulties in a couple of other subjects. Andover, since it had such unbelievable teaching resources, pulled me out of math class and started me on individual tutoring. By the end of the first semester, I regained my footing. But those kids were so far ahead of me, I couldn't believe it. I also remember I started Spanish that year. I had been studying French out in Paris. And not very well, I might add, going to an American high school with sort of second rate French instructors. I started Spanish that year and went from Spanish I to essentially finishing three years of college Spanish in one year -- because of the teaching resources at Andover. It was a very remarkable place. It almost caused me a problem when I went to West Point because they had done so well, that it is almost the case of the first year or so of instruction at West Point had already been covered -- the math, the English, et cetera. But it was a terrific base in my view, for a lot of things that happened later on. It was a very supportive, good learning environment. Something I have had a life long sense of gratitude toward.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, growing up in a military family, how big an impact did your father have on your childhood?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, huge. Very strong, Catholic traditions, both my mother and my father. My dad was and is, he is now 92 years old, and I talk to him every night. We have dinner once a week. Up until a couple of years ago, we would occasionally go on trips together. I served as his driver, for example, and he went down and gave a speech to the 31st Infantry Association when they had a reunion when they got their Presidential Unit Citation for the fighting up around the Yalu River. So he and I have been close our entire lives, although the classic joke about it is amazing how much your dad learns between your age of 14 and 21. My dad is a very unusual guy. Again, some of it is his generation. His generation people served in the military. Dad is a very kind person. He is a terrific leader. People really admired that his entire life. He also had few doubts. Most everything in life for my dad -- there was a right way to do things and a wrong way. Moral, spiritual situations that were either black or white. There wasn't a lot of ambiguity in the way he views the world. You do the right thing. Whether that means from a family perspective or dealing with friends, honesty is a huge part of his viewpoint. I guess the other thing is, he served with the African-American infantry units in WWII. He also commanded an African-American infantry battalion, a 3rd Infantry Division battalion, at Fort Benning.

During WWII, he served with the 92nd Division. It was one of three black combat divisions. The only full division used in heavy combat. The other two, one was used in North Africa as stevedore battalions and the other one was parceled out around the Pacific. But the 92nd Infantry Division saw a lot of combat. For most of my early career, a lot of the black NCOs [noncommissioned officers] in the Army, the senior NCOs would come up and approach me because they knew my dad. He used to say he had been selected to serve in that division because he was sort of a white, liberal, West Pointer -- while most of the senior officers in the division were southerners who had been selected because they thought they knew how to handle that "class" of soldiers. So he had this life-long sense of commitment to, essentially, equal opportunity. He saw it as having a spiritual

dimension, also. I know when we were kids there was always a huge deal in the house about racial equality. You were told to always leave blank any poopsheet that said, what race are you? And of course if forced to answer it then to write down "Caucasian", never write down "white". I remember soldiers would come to the door when we were at Fort Benning and would automatically go to the back door and knock. He would order them to come around the front door and come in. A very strong impression early on in my life. A very strong home life that clearly -- made me think that being a soldier was a normal way to live and living on an Army post was where I was supposed to be.

INTERVIEWER: How big an influence did your mother have in your life, sir?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Big. She was part of a family that had four kids. Her parents, my grandparents, were very strong people. They were both Irish immigrants. My grandfather was a fireman who went from fireman to a Deputy Fire Chief in Taunton, Massachusetts. I have been back to his fire department when I was the Drug Policy Director -- went to his fire station and they presented me with his framed photo and the drill rolls from his early years in 1918. Their family didn't have a lot of money -- but they had regular jobs. So all the kids worked. Everybody handed their check to my grandmother -- she ran all the finances. There was no alcohol in the house, no smoking. There were pretty strict standards on how you conducted yourself. They also took in an orphan boy from a relative -- and raised a fifth child. So, all five of those kids actually went through and finished college during The Depression.

My mother was the oldest of the family, that obviously brought with it a sense of duty and morality that she had in her own family. I often say that my mother loved the Army as much as my Dad. She is still alive and in great shape at age 92. She was totally devoted to my dad. She was from a different era in the sense that although she worked as a librarian off and on half her life either full

time or part time -- there was no question that she was in charge of the home and that the first priority was to our family.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, I know that you are Catholic and attend Mass here in Alexandria. How important is your faith?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I am not necessarily sure this is a good thing -- but I would describe myself as a primitive Christian. I always say that when I retire I want to take some classes on religion and theology and ethics. I loved political philosophy in graduate school. So, I like ideas. But when it comes to religion, I never spent much time examining them. I sort of accept them at face value. So, there may be an X factor that I am missing. But I never went through a period of great rebellion against religious thought. I have always believed in the power of prayer. One of my soldiers asked me in Vietnam once when we were getting ready to go on an air assault, "Captain, I don't understand why you always look so calm getting on the aircraft." I said, "Well, the truth be known, once we get in the helicopter and there is nothing else I have to do, I have about seven prayers I am saying in a chain mindlessly, silently, and that is all I am doing. I have sort of turned over my faith to the Lord and I am not worried about it." Catholicism is very important to me. My kids are all practicing Catholics. My wife is a converted Army Protestant. She is probably ten times less interested in theology than I am. However, the ethics of the church have always been important to us, also.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, what were your motivations for choosing to attend the United States Military Academy?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I went off to Andover determined to be a doctor, maybe a missionary doctor. I had very romantic notions, and still do, of what the health community does. I very much admire the kind of people who are attracted to that. So I went up to Andover to do that. That was a year of great introspection

being alone and on my own up at Andover. One of my friends was writing me, telling me he was applying for the Naval Academy. (He was later KIA over North Vietnam as a Navy F4 pilot). Some of my friends had enlisted and were in the Marines. I think if anything, being on my own in a civilian environment sort of crystallized my own thinking that I did not want to leave that military life. I remember sitting there one night watching the snowfall and it just suddenly occurred to me, what are you doing? Where are you going?

My dad wouldn't help me apply to West Point, it was really very odd. He said he had seen his division commander, LTG Ned Almond's, son and son-in-law both killed-in-action in World War II. Ned Almond had encouraged both of them to go to West Point; he wasn't going to be responsible for that. I would have to do it on my own. So, my mother and sister helped me to get an appointment to West Point. But, I think it was basically like coming home for me. I got organized and was fortunate enough to get an appointment for an alternate for the Presidential appointments. I also got an appointment through South Carolina where my dad had been assigned to the Citadel.

INTERVIEWER: In your father's oral history he wrote, "I made up my mind I would never tell Barry what to do, where to go to school, or what branch of the Army to take." Did he live true to that?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Yes. He sure did. For that matter, from then on he would say, "I promise not to help you with your career if you won't help me with mine." I basically did the same thing with my son and one daughter, both of whom ended up in the Army. That I would not get directly involved. My son graduated from the University of Washington ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] Program. He had a terrific education and a great time. But I wouldn't get involved in that, either.

INTERVIEWER: How would you describe your experiences at the United States Military Academy? Sports, academics, other cadet activities?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I would say, the first two years I was monumentally immature but happy. A reasonably good cadet, reasonably alert. Part of the reason was I came from Andover with such advanced academic skills. I never felt threatened by West Point. I actually liked the military piece of it. I remember waking up in the morning and listening to that reveille music and the Hell Cats playing and just being thrilled to be part of it. The military piece of it I loved. The gym I loved. Squash, wrestling, boxing, summer military training. I actually liked parades, though I would pretend to bitch about them. The academic system was so good in terms of small group instruction, but it also allowed you to -- for a couple of years I am not sure that I did anything but go to class and stay awake. I wish I could do it over again. I liked the friendship part. The environment was terrific.

I started to grow up towards the end. I think because I met my future wife Jill and got engaged. So the last year at West Point I was starting to emerge from adolescence and starting to act like a young adult. It was a terrific four years. I think part of what West Point does, you take a 17-year-old boy -- I was barely 17 -- and you do end up getting poured into a mold and you come out with some things that are a lot better. I think this whole notion of the motto, "Duty, Honor, Country," actually does permeate. When it comes to a sense of duty, you look at a mission and you say, "I am going to do this, I don't know what is going to be entailed in it -- but we are going to do this." So that isn't even a question.

I was there for the speech by General MacArthur which I can remember to this day, every minute of it. This wonderful, frail, quavering-voiced old man got up there with no notes and gave a speech that I consider one of the finest three speeches given in English in North America. I have always kept a copy of that speech up on my office wall for years and years for inspiration. It was one that

was important for me. But, I was some kind of immature lad. I think the discipline of West Point was probably good for me.

INTERVIEWER: What was your favorite subject while there?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I loved anything to do with Latin America, political science, English. I was actually very grateful for the engineering studies. I did reasonably well at it. To this day, I am a great believer that you can't be an effective military officer without some notion of science, engineering, and math. I think engineering studies are a confidence builder. It is like going to Ranger School. Leaving West Point, I knew I could add up long columns of numbers and do calculus! I have some fundamental grounding in electrical engineering and fluid dynamics, civil engineering, that sort of thing. However, I think my natural inclination was political science, Latin American studies, and Spanish language.

INTERVIEWER: What leadership positions did you hold there?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I ended up the first class year as a cadet lieutenant platoon leader -- which is probably a miracle considering my undistinguished disciplinary record the first couple of years. I had some great leadership positions during the summer training at various Military parts of Army Orientation Training. I served as a "third lieutenant" in a mechanized battalion in Germany, which had a huge impact on me. I think practicing leadership is important. It is all well and good to talk about it and study it, but practicing giving and receiving orders and solving problems is essential. So for four years at West Point, you are really in a constant leadership laboratory.

INTERVIEWER: Do you remember where you ranked in your graduating class?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I don't. I was on the Dean's list most of the time I was there. I was probably something like 100 out of 800. We can look it up. Which

considering the dismal work ethic I brought to bear the first couple or three years was incredible. I think the last year or so I was doing tremendously well.

INTERVIEWER: What outstanding highs or lows do you remember about your time at USMA?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I don't think there were all that many lows. A very demanding environment. I think I was happier once I got through the first couple of years of immaturity. By the time I was a senior, a first class cadet, I had a lot more balanced life. A lot more focus on things that had long-term importance. The old standard, I hate to say it, I think it is entirely true -- the happiest day in my life at West Point was driving out the front gate having graduated. I don't say that because I hated West Point, I didn't. However, it was sure great getting out in the Army and having your responsibility and money. West Point is much better organized and rational today. In those days it was much more Spartan. Right up to the day of graduation. You weren't really gone from there much, almost never. The internal discipline was unrelenting. Not that I object to it, but it was certainly a relief getting out of there.

INTERVIEWER: Other facts concerning your formative years that you would like to discuss or that I have left out?

GEN MCCAFFREY: No, I don't think so. Basically, I am a product of the Army. So is my wife. Both of us grew up in the Army and never left it.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, at this time I would like to transition to your early career development. Why did you choose to be an Infantry officer?

GEN MCCAFFREY: During my Camp Buckner year, I really started to fall in love with the field army. Squads, fire teams, platoons -- Browning automatic rifles, M1 blanks, field feeding, ponchos, the whole thing just excited me. I sort of had a

flirtation with being a Marine. One of my platoon leaders was a wonderful man -- Frank Riesner, later killed in action, winning the Medal of Honor in Vietnam. He was a Marine Corps force recon officer. He had been an enlisted Marine three or four years. He was also my boxing coach. He had a big impact on many of us. I describe myself as an untalented and undefeated amateur college boxer. Mostly because of Frank Riesner. So I flirted with being a Marine and read the *Marine Corps Gazette*. But by graduation, I thought the peak of my life would be parachuting into combat as an American airborne soldier. That may not make a lot of sense to a civilian -- but that was sort of a romantic thought I had, that was what I wanted to do. So there really wasn't much question in my mind, other than I loved tanks, then and now.

INTERVIEWER: What were your career expectations then?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I don't think I had any. I wanted to go to the 82nd Airborne Division and be a platoon leader super badly. I thought that maybe in the dim future recesses of my life I would be a company commander. I say that, because I remember before I left West Point you get invited to consider coming back to various departments. I think I have been invited back to four or so departments -- English, foreign languages. What I really wanted to do was come back in military history. I ended up teaching in the West Point Department of Social Sciences -- political science. But I remember going over to the Department of Military Engineering and History -- and some major told us that "We normally invite people back as majors after they finish Leavenworth -- and we like them to have combat experience." I walked out of there and said, "That is the last time I am going to consider history because I will never be that old!" Being a Major was hard to foresee. I didn't have career expectations early on, except I dreamed of being a company commander.

INTERVIEWER: How was your first duty assignment determined?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I stood high enough in the class to get Infantry and I stood high enough in the class to get the 82nd Airborne. I couldn't believe my good fortune. I had been writing papers on the conflict in Indochina which had fascinated me. I read everything I get my hands on. We had a senior thesis paper of sorts that I had written about Indochina and Dien Bien Phu -- and the fighting of the French in the south – now Vietnam. I determined we were going to end up in war in Vietnam. I volunteered to go to the 82nd Airborne Division for that reason. As a matter of fact, when I walked into my first Platoon in the 2nd Battalion 325 Airborne -- I lined up the platoon and said, "Get ready. We are going to be in combat by the end of the year in Indochina." Little did I know we would actually end up in the Dominican Republic on a peacekeeping intervention -- which was also a terrific experience. But I volunteered for the 82nd Abn. Div. believing we would end up fighting in Vietnam.

INTERVIEWER: You attended the Infantry Officer Basic Course on August 1964 at Fort Benning, Georgia. What was your experience there? What was your assessment of the curriculum and training that you received?

GEN MCCAFFREY: You know, it is interesting. I didn't go to the Infantry Officer Basic Course. My West Point Class and perhaps one after it – the Army decided that they wouldn't send us to the Basic Course. You would go to Ranger and Airborne schools and then you would go to your division. The division was charged with doing an on-site basic course. So, I went to infantry basic course actually in the 82nd Airborne. XVIII Airborne Corps actually ran it. Maybe there were 40 lieutenants and we had to go to class for a couple of week's.

I remember I was so pleased and happy that I was number one in that infantry basic course at Fort Bragg. In later years the Army returned to demanding a formal Basic Course at Benning.

In fact, one of the continuing challenges for West Pointers -- and I really beat them up about this over the years -- is to stop focusing on being some kind of a fake intellectual. Shut your mouth, learn procedures, the Army is also a hand/eyes, skill job. It is not just intellectual challenge. You have to memorize; you have to know how to do things yourself; you have to know how to run generators. So it was important to have the West Pointers go through the mechanics of the Infantry Officer's Basic Course. I went to Benning for airborne school and ranger school and absolutely loved it.

Ranger school was the most important schooling impact on my military life except for the CAPSTONE Course as a new brigadier general. It was unbelievable. Thank God for Ranger school! Things never got tougher than Ranger school during combat in four tours. The only place I ever learned demolitions was in Ranger school. It was the first time in military training we carried ammunition in the field and did practical skills like how to cross water obstacles. I personally believe that Ranger School was a confidence builder. It was a techniques and procedures graduate school. It was a huge help to me as a combat leader. Basically, I got into combat right after I left Benning and didn't come out of it for several years. I was in and out of military hospitals for combat wounds or actually in combat for the first six years in the Army.

INTERVIEWER: How prepared did you feel for your first unit of assignment?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I actually thought I was pretty well prepared. I was a rifle platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne -- the 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne. I had these unbelievable NCOs, older men, tough men; good guys. There was a very effective coaching, mentoring process going on among senior NCOs. They liked lieutenants. They liked making sure we succeeded. They were fun to be around. I felt very comfortable in that company. As a rifle platoon leader, I thought I was extremely well prepared.

The whole Army accelerated about that time period. I remember going to Command Maintenance Inspection School. It was a four-day course -- we got a certificate. When you first got to the division, they put you in a bunch of these courses. I didn't really understand the significance of it. Then I got jerked out of a platoon and made a company XO [executive officer] and then out of a company XO, and just as the Division IG [Inspector General] inspection approached, I was made the battalion motor officer. The competence of the 82nd Airborne in those days to handle a bunch of broken down overworked wheeled vehicles was very poor. I learned that I didn't really understand maintenance. Then I got made a company commander for a couple of months -- which I did not feel well prepared to do. I was put in company command after we got back from the Dominican Republic. I had done extremely well in the battalion and they were all proud of me and happy with me and put me in command of a company for a couple of months. I think I was over my head. I wasn't old enough to do it. I didn't have all the techniques on how you outload. I wasn't a Senior Parachutist.

Fortunately, one of the great impacts in my life, I ended up in a company commanded by Lieutenant Herb Lloyd -- who had about nine years in the Army. He made E7 in the peacetime Army -- and had three years combat in Indochina already. He was a huge influence on my life then and in succeeding years. The 82nd Airborne was just a wonderful way to start life in the Army. I have been recommending it to lieutenants since then.

INTERVIEWER: What was your work environment, command climate, guidance from superiors?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Battalion commanders came and went way too quickly. They would serve for five or six months. We barely knew who they were. We had one of them, Hugh McDonald, who was a great hero in the Airborne. He went on to be Brigade Commander and Division Chief of Staff. He had a severe drinking problem. There was a lot of alcohol abuse in the division. To be honest,

we didn't do much real training. It was a bizarre situation. We mostly parachuted and walked back to garrison. We didn't take all of our equipment to the field because we didn't want to get it dirty. It was there to be inspected. We didn't dig foxholes. We didn't throw live hand grenades. We didn't fire live mortars except in weapons demonstrations. We did lots of demonstrations for VIPs that were sort of military shows. But basically, I loved it.

Then we got deployed to the Dominican Republic and we actually went into combat operations. It was a very jerky kind of deployment. There was a mismatch between mentally what we thought we were doing and what was actually happening on the ground. We went down to the Dominican Republic for six months. There was a lot of shooting going on. We slapped down the rebels and cordoned them off. Kept the so-called Dominican Army and insurgent groups in line. I think that was when in the 82nd -- we lieutenants sort of grew up. We turned into a combat unit instead of some show unit. But what made the 82nd for me were the sergeants and the soldiers. Our brigade commanders were also heroic people -- I have forgotten my brigade commander's name -- he was some unbelievably wonderful man. A big football player at Louisiana State University. The division commander, General York, was just a wonderful man. There are a lot of strong personalities around that division. Very flamboyant guys. They were heroes to all of us and they were fun to be around. The 82nd Airborne Division was a gas.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, in July of 1966, you served as a battalion advisor for the Vietnamese airborne division, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. What was that like? And how were the Vietnamese paratroopers?

GEN MCCAFFREY: When we got back from the Dominican Republic, about four of us jumped in a car and we drove up to MILPERCEN in Washington. The 173rd Airborne Brigade had been committed to Vietnam -- and the 1st Cav Division was forming up, believed to be soon going. So, we said, "We have to get to Vietnam."

We thought the war was going to be over in six months. I say this because I couldn't imagine anybody resisting an American airborne brigade.

I remember losing a little bit of confidence in my battalion commander, Hugh McDonald, who had been a First Sergeant in the Korean War, battlefield commissioned. Had three years of combat in Vietnam -- and I remember saying, "Well, sir, the 173rd is going in. The war is going to be over." He said, "Oh no, that is way too small a unit." I remember thinking, "God, I thought this guy knew everything." I couldn't imagine an entire brigade being opposed successfully by anybody. So we drove on up to MILPERCEN and some great major looked at me. I said, 'I want to go to the 173rd Airborne right now.'" He said, "Lieutenant, you already have a CIB [Combat Infantry Badge] and you have been a platoon leader in combat. Which would you rather be, a platoon leader in combat again or a battalion commander?" I said, "Well, I would like to be a battalion commander." He said, "Then, you want to go to the Vietnamese Airborne Division as an Advisor!" I said, "I do?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Sign me up boss."

I signed up for the MATA Course, the Advisory Course, and the Vietnamese Language Course. I remember calling my dad as a colonel and telling him how fortunate I was that I had just got one of these coveted Advisor assignments to the Vietnamese Airborne. He said something like "You stupid bastard. I can't believe you fell for that. You always want to go to American units, not to some peripheral activity." So, dad apparently didn't share my view of it.

I went through all of this training. I was the number one graduate in the Vietnamese Language Course. I say that because the Defense Language Institute was so effective. I probably spoke Vietnamese verbally almost as well as I did Spanish. I had accelerated Spanish at Andover and then three years of advanced Spanish at West Point. An unbelievable course for simple situations.

I went off and joined this outfit. Went to the Vietnamese 2nd Airborne Battalion, three American advisors. These advisory detachments were unbelievably professional. The Vietnamese airborne were probably the best kind of infantry soldiers in the world. Very courageous. Later on they took such heavy casualties that they started to come apart. In those years -- the Vietnamese Airborne rule was, no soldier or weapon will be left behind on the battlefield, even if everyone in the battalion has to get killed recovering it. A lot of their senior officers had fought with the French airborne or the French Foreign Legion. They were some kind of tough. Their battalion, brigade, and division commanders were also corrupt. They didn't really have joint operations or combined operations down very well. But they were courageous and smart, field craft. I loved it. I loved being around them. I spent a year, a lot of it out in the field. Got wounded twice. I saw some unbelievable combat with them. We spent half of the time laying around in some provincial capital, eating ice cream, drinking beer, screwing off, refusing orders. The battalion commander would say, "No, I work for the Vietnamese airborne two-star in Saigon. We don't take orders from the corps commander." So, we refused operations that were deemed casualty producing without a big reward. The reward was essentially if you killed a lot of North Vietnamese or VC, the division commander would come out to your battalion commander; give him an allocation of medals to pass out by order of rank. The battalion commander would get the biggest medal and then we would go on down to the lowest private in the battalion. He would also give them a cash payment of a couple of million of piasters. The battalion commander would keep half of it and he would give the company commanders half or what remained. At the end of the day, the private soldiers would get a big feast and three dollars.

So, if the Battalion Commander saw a chance to go out and have a big victory and gain honor for the 2nd Airborne Battalion, then they were some kind of tough troops. I learned a lot from them. I have a deep and abiding affection for the Vietnamese people, their culture. I liked their food. I loved the way they lived. It

was a terrific tour and it was unbelievable. We lived in air-conditioned rooms in Saigon and deployed out of Saigon on short notice. We would go up to the DMZ [demilitarized zone] in I Corps and it was like a sentence of death. The whole advisory detachment knew they were getting wounded or killed probably every time we ran out the door.

I got wounded twice in that outfit. I got pulled back and was an assistant G3 advisor, developing TO&Es [tables of organization and equipment]. That was sort of fun while we were recovering. It was a great tour. I learned a lot. I have a long standing sense of sadness at the way Vietnam ended. We left those poor people in the clutches of the Communists. They are only now beginning to emerge from the repression and lack of opportunity from the Communist years.

INTERVIEWER: After serving as the battalion advisor, you were selected to serve as an aide-de-camp for the commanding general, United States Army South, Fort Amador, Canal Zone. How and why were you selected?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I was in Vietnam in the 2nd Vietnamese Airborne Battalion and had volunteered to go to Ranger School as an instructor. I had asked for the Mountain Ranger Camp. So I shipped all my stuff, my wife had shipped the furniture. I think it had gone to Dahlonega, it was in transit. I got off the plane in San Francisco from Vietnam, there was a sign up that said, "Report to the Army ATCO -- whatever ATCO stood for? And, they said, "Call your wife and call General Chester Johnson." I called him, and he said, "Congratulations, I selected you to be my aide-de-camp in Panama. I am going to be U.S. Army South commander. I have already interviewed your wife. She said, 'Yes, you would be happy to go.' So, I will see you in Panama."

And he said, "By the way, I selected you primarily because you spoke Spanish." Which was really very odd, because the language instruction at West Point is very ineffective. I went through three years of advanced Spanish. Much of our

classroom conduct, almost all of it was in English -- conjugating verbs, etc. It was everything the Defense Language Institute wasn't -- what I spoke in Spanish, stunk. Of course, I think the primary reason he selected me was I had a great record in combat as a young officer. By then, I had received the Distinguished Service Cross in Vietnam for the first time during my first tour.

So, off I went to be Major General Chester Johnson's aide in U.S. Army South. He was a wonderful man, a West Pointer Class of 1938, I think. A prisoner-of-war captured at Corregidor. His whole life had been shaped by the experience that the Army had been untrained, badly equipped and the equipment was badly maintained. He and Harold K. Johnson had survived the war together. He worked slave labor in the Philippines; he was on ships that were packed at sea and sunk; he was almost starved to death in Japan, beaten and tortured. They were finally liberated in Korea at the end of the war.

He was a great guy. I gave the eulogy at his funeral at West Point. He is still like a father figure to me. I spent a year with him as an aide. His wife had died, so he married a beautiful lady who just passed away a year ago, Molly Johnson. She didn't know much about the Army. Jill and I really loved it. I traveled all the time with him throughout Latin America. His Spanish was terrific. He had been the Army Attaché in Mexico. He had a terrific political military sense about him. We still had 17,000 Army troops in Panama, never mind the sizable Army advisory military groups all over Latin America. It was a terrific year. I have always been grateful. I had a couple of junior aides who worked for me. I picked a secretary to work with who turned into a lifelong friend. The two of us just loved it.

<u>INTERVIEWER</u>: As you now had time to reflect on your career, did serving as an aide help expose you to what general officers experience in their careers?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Yes, no question. MG Johnson made a big point of seeing that I had a good educational opportunity. I was in every meeting he had. I remember that frequently the State Department or the CIA trying to throw me out of the room and he would say "No, he is here to learn." He actually listened to me! I found it to be a terrific growth experience. I think it is a real opportunity to learn and gain confidence in the senior leadership in the military.

INTERVIEWER: In July, 1968, you returned to Vietnam. What was that like?

GEN MCCAFFREY: The Tet 68 Offensive started. Here I was. I was one of two infantry captains in Panama at the time with the CIB. I say that because the whole Army was totally convulsed by Vietnam. This giant troop presence in Panama -- but I was one of two captains with a CIB. Everyone was flowing towards combat. At the time I had been selected to go back to teach at West Point, the Department of Social Sciences. I was thrilled about it. I was going to go to Harvard. I just thought this was terrific. I started watching Tet 68 unfold on Armed Forces TV [television], black and white programming. It grew on me and grew on me, and finally I picked up the phone. I called MILPERCEN and I said, "I want to go back to Vietnam and volunteer." Then I went in and told the General, who was really aghast. He loved me like a son. He did not want me killed in Vietnam. He said, "Barry, you have already demonstrated you can fight. There is no need to demonstrate that again. Your future is terrific – etc." I said, "Sorry, no sir, I have to go." It was just a sense of guilt of being safe in Panama while my friends were fighting in Vietnam. So, I volunteered and I told them I wanted to go to the 1st Cavalry Division with its terrific airmobile capability of fighting that war. I sent Jill home and I cleared quarters and off I went.

INTERVIEWER: What lessons did you draw from your experiences as company commander in combat? Please address your command style, soldier quality, manning, personalities, your effect on the remainder of your career.

GEN MCCAFFREY: There is an interview on company command.com, by the way, that may be of utility to you. It is on video. They have a wonderful website. They came up and wanted to talk about it. Also, there is some kind of an oral history that I had a military history unit do for my company. We get together every two years for a big reunion. It is going to be November this year; it used to be on Memorial Day. The last time they came there were 102 of them in my back yard. Almost without exception, by the way, they had Purple Hearts. 1968-1969 was the year of intense combat. The 1st Cav was shuttled around to try and stem the tide. It was just after Tet 68. We fought in I Corps and we came south to III Corps to the Cambodian Border. The North Vietnamese troops, in large numbers of them, lots of artillery, rockets, and mortars. They had fresh uniforms, clean guns. They were some kind of tough people. I was on my third combat tour. I flat knew what I was doing. My First Sergeant, Emerson Trainer, a lifelong friend to this day, was on his third combat tour. He had served with the same company in the Korean War and was badly wounded as a rifleman. So it was in many ways, one of the most important assignments. It was very difficult. We lived like animals out in the field. Sometimes we would go days, weeks even, without significant contact, but it was one bloody experience.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, you were discussing company command. As a war college student, you recorded those experiences. They are archived at the Military History institute. But, what effect did company command have on your life?

GEN MCCAFFREY: It had a huge effect. One was, it was sort of the final straw telling me that I loved being around American soldiers. A bunch of 19-year-old boys, the lieutenants were 20 or 21, two years of college. Courage, integrity, fun to be around. They came over, trained adequately on being infantry soldiers. They had all played team sports; they all had a tremendous sense of duty or they wouldn't have showed up in my company in Vietnam, there were other ways out -- Canada, medical excuses. They were just terrific soldiers.

A bunch of instant NCOs, almost no Regular Army NCOs in the field. The First Sergeant and I were essentially the only Regular Army troops. They were tough. We never backed off a fight. They took care of each other. They were fun to be around. So, that was one thing. The second thing, I trusted and respected my chain-of-command. People always talk about helicopters stacked overhead. My division commander was MG George Forsythe, Normandy Beach as a second lieutenant. Service in Korea as a field grade officer. He was terrific. He would land in my company and take wounded out in his helicopter, and ask me, "What can I do to support you?"

I guess the other couple of impressions were -- hard work saves lives. So, we worked like dogs all the time. We worked at camouflage, at digging-in, we lived like moles. We trained during breaks in combat all the time. Before we left the firebase, we would rehearse actions on the objective; actions in an ambush area. We did mortar training day and night, even on combat operations. We were extremely good at demolitions. We knew how to take care of our wounded, which we had a lot, unfortunately. Very little loss of life, fortunately, in my company. A lot of it was because we dug all the time. We had unbelievable security, operations security [OPSEC], signal security [SIGSEC]. We did lots of reconnaissance of the objective, frequently from the air.

The other thing was the enormous danger -- there were a lot of NVA out in the operations we were on. The potential to get clocked was out there. Having served with the Vietnamese airborne, I had basically been in charge of U.S. fire support. So, I really knew what I was doing with artillery in particular, but also armed helicopters and the Air Force. I thought the entire North Vietnamese Army couldn't overrun my company, even if we were on the move. I always had a fire mission on some FDC someplace. The artillery would come in, in a matter of a minute. I normally already had a round on the ground. My rule was a round on the ground, 24 hours a day. I always had some mission I was firing. A round every hour off the one flank, 2000 meters out, firing 600-meter height of burst,

with white phosphorus, marking rounds. So when we made contact, we had an SOP [standing operating procedure] that was hyper aggressive.

Essentially, by the way, I don't think my company was ever fired on first -- ever. We always picked up on NVA before they saw us. We moved fully camouflaged with vines and leaves all over us. We had everything tied down; there was no smoking, no talking, hand and eye signals. Three-man advance party, a shotgun, two M16 rifles. Normally, we moved on trails all the time. I would go up and sit down and talk to the point squad and say, "You fellows are going to get shot at within the next hour. The question is, do I ever see you alive, yes or no? If you see them and you fire first, we are going to be okay." So normally we would walk in the North Vietnamese units, walk into their sentinels. They would be screwing off. We would gun down the sentinels. We would then aggressively get on line. Lots of fire power. Masses of 105 mm artillery battery 6 x 6 on the objective and just knock the shit out of people. So, it was one great unit. The battalion was powerful. It was a bloody year, 1968-1969. It was very difficult on those soldiers.

INTERVIEWER: After completing company command, you attended the Armor Officer Advanced Course in August 1972, in which you were the Distinguished Graduate. Then, you headed to the United States Military Academy to serve as an instructor, and later Associate Professor and Executive Officer at Department of Social Sciences. Did you feel like you were heading home?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Some of those important years of my life -- I actually left company command on a stretcher, with my left arm nearly shot off. A very bloody fight. I don't remember the casualties. I think we had three killed and 25 wounded. So, I ended up at Walter Reed Army Hospital. I was there for a couple of years, off and on. When I was there, the Army was good enough to put me in graduate school. So I did two years at American University full time graduate studies – with frequent returns to Walter Reed to go back in for more

surgery. They saved the arm, I am very grateful. They put in a metal strut, bone graft, nerve hook-ups, skin grafts, physical therapy. I have such huge admiration for the Army Medical Service, for Walter Reed Hospital, for the way they took care of us. I am still in contact with my ward nurse, Major Mary Baker. She served in the China Burma India Theater in World War II; served in Korea, served in Vietnam; non-college graduate. I have her picture up in my study from 1941, when she graduated from nursing school as an Army 2LT nurse. I asked her a couple of years ago, "Mary, how come you never got married?" She said, "I was engaged to a young Marine. He was killed in World War II. I finally decided that I was going to be married to you boys."

So, Walter Reed is a huge supportive impact. It was one of the best units I ever served in -- Ward One, Walter Reed. We had a reunion three or four years ago, the Army Surgeon General sponsored it. There must have been a couple hundred of us there. While I was in Walter Reed, I started graduate school, two years political science, a huge developmental experience for me. I knew I was going to go back and teach at West Point. Toward the end of that graduate school, I was closing in on the course work for a doctorate. I think I finished most of the course work. I was asked to go to the Pentagon by my former division commander, George Forsythe, who was by then a lieutenant general in charge of the Modern Volunteer Army effort. I went down to the Pentagon for about 9 months and worked with a terrific collection of officers, Pete Dawkins was one of our colonels. This wonderful man, LTG General Forsythe, was leading the effort. There was a lot of goofy, crazy thinking going on. The Army was really on the edge of falling apart.

So they were playing around with ideas -- can we go to social sciences and learn something from the social sciences? The draft disappeared, Volunteer Army, booze in the barracks, long hair, rebellion, dope, a period of great turmoil. Fortunately, we had LTG George Forsythe in charge of the Modern Volunteer

Army effort. He was nobody's fool. Nobody had better combat credentials, leadership credentials, than he did.

I also got loaned to a special study mission that General Westmoreland put together. We went out -- ten teams. I was with Lieutenant Colonel Bob Elton who was the G3 of the 82nd. He and I and the sergeant major were one of ten teams to go out and teach the Army modern leadership. God was that badly received! We put on a three day leadership course for the battalion, brigade and division commanders of the Army, and their Sergeants Major. We went out and put on a three-day course on modern leadership techniques, how you deal with this new generation. It was interesting, from my perspective. I sort of had the value system of the World War II generation, but I was a captain in command with the new generation -- and doing pretty well and I liked them. A lot of our battalion and brigade commanders by that period -- many of these older leaders didn't trust these new soldiers, they didn't like them, and they didn't understand what was going on. We had lost in Vietnam. They didn't like the Army. My generation, the captains of Vietnam were dismayed by what was happening but determined to fight back. So, that was sort of the environment. Graduate school, Modern Volunteer Army office, on loan to the Westmoreland leadership initiative as a team member -- and then up to West Point.

Going back up to West Point was a terrific thing. I remember they told me I was number one in the infantry branch in order of merit. When I finished that assignment they told me that I was in the bottom of the middle third. So, it was viewed as "screwing off" by Infantry Branch. It still is. But it was two years of grad school, three years as a professor. It is the hardest I ever worked in my life, being a teacher at West Point, 18 hours a day the first year, even though you're teaching the same material that you had in graduate schooling. I taught American Government, comparative politics, economics and national security. So each night I was in a second graduate school -- staying ahead of the Cadets. I was on the secondary zone list to major when I went up there and I stayed on

the secondary zone forever. We didn't get promoted for over four years. So, I tell people the Department of Social Sciences was a lousy way to get to be lieutenant colonel, but a great way to train to be an effective Pentagon strategist. I loved the assignment. My wife loved it. My youngest daughter Amy was born there. I loved being around the Cadets. I had terrific family and professional experiences. I admired the other officers in the Department of Social Sciences in particular. Many among the faculty went on to be lifelong friends and advisors. It was just a great opportunity.

INTERVIEWER: What were you able to accomplish, specifically, back at West Point? Was there anything that you would like to highlight? Whether it was teaching the Cadets, developing the curriculum?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I was a captain promotable, then I got made the department personnel officer, then I was the department executive officer. I loved that. I worked for the Department Heads. I actually got hired by this wonderful man, Colonel George Lincoln, who was retired by the time I got there after graduate school. Colonel Amos Jordon was then the Department Head for a year. And then a superb guy, Colonel Don Olvey, Rhode Scholar, very gentle person, a distinguished economist, widely published was the Department Head.

So, I served as a department XO. I helped select a lot of the officers that came back. I loved being a teacher, particularly American government, probably the most of all. I thought it was so important for soldiers to understand how the government worked -- the policy process. I think the highlight for me was being a teacher.

But, I also liked working with the Department Heads as the department XO. The officers in that department were just spectacular. Bunches of them went on to play very distinguished roles in American business, intellectual and military life. Bunches of us went on to senior levels of service in the Armed Forces. I served

as our representative for the West Point Honor Commission. We were having some real problems with honor during that period of time. It was a bad time for the Country, a bad time for the Army, and sort of a difficult time for West Point. We were coming out of an era of black and white values from my dad's generation and the relativistic values, "what feels good". So, West Point was struggling during that period. But I had a great time. I think it was a huge education for me, personally. It was sort of like a five-year graduate education I went through, as opposed to a two-year course.

INTERVIEWER: You certainly were busy while you were at West Point. What memories did your wife leave West Point with?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Jill has been part of the effort the whole time we have been in the Army. Jill has had some pretty tough challenges, raising three kids during a period when I had four combat tours. I got badly wounded. I used to leave home and say, "Good-bye," and go some place, and, "I'll meet you at the next assignment". West Point was really a reward for her. Coming back together as a family. Our youngest daughter was born. Jill had a ball. Then we went off to Leavenworth, which is enormous fun, a terrific educational experience, just a great year, and then on to Germany. So Jill came out of that Vietnam Era, having been involved in it as much as I had. To this day, she despises Jane Fonda, won't see one of her movies. She has some real anger at the country for the way they treated the Army and by extension her. She is pretty unforgiving to people who she thought didn't treat our soldiers right.

INTERVIEWER: I have read that you proposed to your wife on the fourth date. Is that correct?

GEN MCCAFFREY: The fourth date is absolutely not right. I proposed to her on the first date. She had dated a classmate of mine up at West Point and I had seen her and admired her from afar. I had been lined up with one of her friends.

I took her out on a date and that first night I asked her to marry me. By the way, she was the first and only woman I ever asked to marry me. So, it wasn't a common dating ploy. By the way, she didn't say yes -- but she did say that she went home and told her mother, "I just met the boy I am going to marry." So from the start, a lot of good things came out of that first date. Among other things, after I met Jill at West Point -- I finally grew up. I had something I had to live up to. We have been great partners our entire life and both have been committed to our children and to the Army.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have any mentors in your early career?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I have always had terrific anxiety about that word. It has been overworked. One of the documents that I will give you is a series of "Conversations with the Olin Professor" excerpted from my recent teaching tour at West Point. These wonderful Cadets would get on-line, every night. About 11 o'clock at night, I go would get on my computer and go to our own website. We would then have really fascinating exchanges of views. I would describe myself as the "Ann Landers" of West Point because half the web dialog was not related to national security studies. It would be girlfriends, boyfriends, assignments, the Army, how do we relate to one another? I am going to try to turn them into a book when I leave West Point.

One of the cadet email exchanges was on mentoring. I remember when I was a lieutenant general in the Pentagon, as J5, a couple of hyper-aggressive, hyper-ambitious young officers were always calling me up and would say they wanted mentoring sessions. It turned me off. There is always an implication that mentoring is networking. Not that that is necessarily bad. However, I have always sort of gagged at the word. The biggest mentoring influences on my life were number one, the NCOs I served with as a lieutenant, captain, major, and lieutenant colonel. When I retired, all the key NCOs in my life were at the retirement ceremony at the Pentagon. My platoon sergeant from the 82nd, my

first sergeant from Vietnam, my Command Sergeant Major from battalion command and my Sergeant Major from brigade command (who was the Sergeant Major of the Army at the time) and my Sergeant Major from the 24th Infantry division. So NCOs had a huge impact on me, teaching me about the values of the Army, never mind its equipment and tactics.

My chain-of-command had a huge impact on me. I had some battalion commanders early on in the Army who didn't know what they were doing. However, our battalion commanders today are immeasurably, light years better than any time in our history. But in general my senior chain-of-command throughout my years in the Army was terrific. The division commanders I worked with -- I had nine division commanders, eight of them were unbelievably good. One of them was a terrific human being, but he just didn't know what he was doing in the nuts and bolts of the tactical Army. So, by example, my division commanders, were mentors.

But, I have always thought that mentoring meant two levels down you are supposed to teach officers their profession. So if you are a battalion commander, you ought to be teaching lieutenants about their profession, brigade commanders teach company commanders, etc. I clearly had some enormous good examples over the years. One of them was my dad. For him -- things are right or wrong, do the right thing; tell the truth; serve soldiers. I just had some unbelievable fine officers I have worked with. General Herb Lloyd was one of my first company commanders in the 82nd Airborne Division in combat. A terrific company commander, a lifelong friend. He has probably spent nine years, if I remember, in combat. Major General George Forsythe was an incredible example over the years. There are more beyond that. The officer I was aide to – MG Chet Johnson, I gave the eulogy at his funeral. I dearly loved and admired the guy and learned a lot from him about what was important in life. From somebody who almost starved to death, while getting beaten as a prisoner of the Japanese.

If I had to point out mentors, I would say First Sergeant Emerson Trainer, Platoon Sergeant Comar Johnson in the 82nd Airborne, Command Sergeant Major Jim Randolph in the 24th Infantry Division. Jim Randolph was 6 ft 2, twisted steel. He never used curse words. He didn't drink and was a natural born fighter who loved soldiers. He made a huge impact on me. Actually, he was much closer to being like my brother than anybody I ever met. Thanks to Command Sergeant Major Randolph, things were right or wrong. You were supposed to do the right thing, period. I served with lots of great examples as soldiers.

INTERVIEWER: Another word that is frequently used along with mentorship, is the word sponsorship. Your take on the word sponsorship?

GEN MCCAFFREY: You know, I think it is actually probably healthy in many ways. However, I was hypersensitive to being a general officer's son. I didn't want to get within ten miles of being seen as being part of somebody's clique. When I went to Vietnam as a company commander, I had several, later famous people, ask for me to come to their division because they admired my dad. I absolutely wouldn't have a thing to do with it. I was always leery and worried about being known as "somebody's boy" or following some senior officer from assignment to assignment. One of my early battalion commanders spent five years straight as an aide to a four-star general. He was my battalion commander and didn't know what he was doing. But, somehow he got to that rank. Then he was secondary zone to full colonel. So, I didn't want to be somebody's guy.

I did know a lot of senior Generals who I really admired. The Thurman brothers – both senior Generals. One of them was my Tactical officer [Tac], his brother was also at West Point at the same time. I stayed in touch with them my entire life. I admired them and liked them. Carl Vuono and Gordon Sullivan were also great examples over the years. You end up knowing nearly everybody as a senior officer. However sponsorship makes me nervous. I tell senior officers that you must focus on and develop – the really hot shot young people that you run into.

If you are a captain, I tell them, "Don't pay any attention to the general. Your future is going to be decided by your age group that you serve with, plus or minus a couple of year groups -- and even more importantly the battalion commanders who see you. Those battalion commanders are going to go on and be generals when you are a colonel." So, that is the bubble you are stuck in. The fact that you know the Chief of Staff of the Army or me as the CINC SOUTHCOM is irrelevant. We're around for two, three or four more years. I think what happens over time, when I look at people's records, I've been on lots of promotion boards -- you don't care whose name is on the OER line. What I always look for is the jobs. How well they do as a company commander; how well they do as a battalion commander.

And by the way, you get to be a battalion commander by having a set of jobs where people selected you to go to those jobs. I looked for evidence that officers throughout their careers had moved towards the sound of the guns. I just ran into a terrific young officer, a battalion commander. He said he had turned down being a Division G3; his wife had not joined him for his command assignment. He did a terrific job in command. He was going to take a staff job in Washington, because otherwise it would have been another couple years' separation. I looked at him and I thought in disbelief, "I could not imagine even if somebody cut off my right foot, turning down being a division G3." In addition, my wife would never have thought of not joining me for two years of battalion command with soldiers and young families because she had some crummy job in Washington. So, it is the key difficult jobs and how well you do them that define you in my notion. Not whether you served with some of the great officers and leaders of our time.

INTERVIEWER: In your father's oral history he wrote, "It's who knows you; it is not who you know." Do you believe that?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Yes. Sure. Again, who knows you may not be a four-star general, it is when you were a Captain at Grafenwoehr on a training exercise -- and some battalion commander came through your range and looked at you and said, "Boy, this kid works his buns off and has pretty good judgment," -- that is what is important about who knows you. But over time you start developing a track record, where I don't think it is how much you are liked and certainly not whether you are another West Pointer, or you share the same religion or the same race -- but over time if you bump into a bunch of hot shots who look at you and say, "This guy really makes things happen", that is what shapes your career opportunity. When they get in trouble and some shitty situation has arisen, they are going to ask for somebody who will get the problem done. And who will take care of soldiers while they are doing it. And whose word they can trust. Someone who tells you what is actually going on, as opposed to feeding you some obsequious stuff. So over time, I think the situation is very cruel and calculating -- can you deliver results? Yes or no?

INTERVIEWER: Sir, at this point I would like to go ahead and discuss your field grade years. Why and when did you decide to make the Army a career?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I always joke about this and say I probably never, ever thought that I would get out at the end of five years or get out. I came back from Vietnam and had been wounded twice in the first tour; then I went back on another tour, got wounded, and was med-evaced. I actually toyed with the idea of being a police officer. So I interviewed with the LAPD [Los Angeles Police Department]. The police captain sort of talked me out of it. He said, "You have been a company commander in combat. It won't be as much fun driving around in a patrol car, wrestling with drunks on Saturday night." I went down and interviewed with the FBI and that looked sort of stale. So except for those two ideas -- I am not sure I had a conscious thought that I would get out, although law enforcement interested me. But when we went to Leavenworth, I remember I was debating whether or not I would buy a blue mess uniform and my wife

looked at me and said, "What are you doing? You are staying in the Army for a career; go find a blue mess uniform and stop dilly-dallying around." I said, "Yeah, I guess you are right. I guess I am in this for a career." That was the first time I ever consciously knew I would stay for a career -- because I had been too focused on combat and jobs and day-to-day life. So Leavenworth was when I decided to make Army a career.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, what did you consider a successful career to be at that time at Leavenworth?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, again, I think there may have been something lacking for me. I can honestly say I never formed a notion of General Officer service probably until my astonishment when I got picked to be a brigadier general. I dearly wanted to be a battalion commander. I knew that for sure. So, at Leavenworth I probably said to myself, "I would like to be a battalion commander. I want to go back to the field army." I had been away from the field army for grad school, West Point, Leavenworth.

I was a major, Battalion XO in the 2nd of the 30th Infantry in Schweinfurt, Germany, and just absolutely loved it. What a growth experience. I refused to be the Brigade S3 to the anger of my brigade commander. So for two years, I was a battalion XO. I finally left the battalion to go be the DPCA [Director, Personnel and Community Affairs]. Then the officer slated to take command of 2-30 Infantry had a huge problem on the earlier command list. I was thrilled to be accelerated a year and sent back to the same battalion as a major promotable to command -- which I did for two years.

About that time, I started to hear all the time, sort of an assumption on the part of senior officers that I was going to be a general. I actually thought it was silly when I heard it. First of all, I didn't necessarily believe it. I couldn't see it was relevant to my life. I couldn't understand how they could make that statement,

since it was a hundred years off. Later on as a more senior general, I started to realize that yes, you can make those judgments. But, at the time it made me uneasy. So, I would hear all of the time sort of an assumption that "Oh, you are going to be a general officer." I would think, "What does that mean?"

If I could have frozen life and stopped it and been in an endless Groundhog Day loop – I would still be either a battalion XO or a battalion commander. I would still be making the rounds to Grafenwohr, Hohenfels, Reforger -- that is where I would be in life. Although I sure liked what happened from then on, also. But that is the definition I thought a successful career would be.

INTERVIEWER: Concerning history, I want to be very clear on something. After completing Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in June 1976, where you were the honor grad, you headed to Germany for five years. You talked about battalion command and DPCA, but can you please articulate your five years in Germany what you specifically did?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I got there and I was supposed to go to 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry (Send Me), in Kitzingen, Germany to be the battalion XO and I was thrilled. Meanwhile, Colonel Bob Elton and Major General Shy Meyers, who was just leaving as the division commander, had fired the G3 operations major at division. The colonel called me in and said he wanted me to go interview with Lieutenant Colonel Ed Leland to be his G3 Operations and I said, "Oh, shit, sir. I want to go to an infantry battalion." He said, "All I want you to do is go talk to him. I am not telling you that you have to do it, I just want you to talk to him." So with heavy heart, I went up and talked to LTC Ed Leland, the G3 of 3rd ID who went on to retire as a Lieutenant General. He has been a lifelong friend, from whom I learned a lot. He had commanded with great success a tank battalion. I went back and saw the Chief and said, "Yes sir, of course I will do it." So I went on upstairs and work seven days a week, eighteen hours a day as G3 operations -- which was the best thing that ever happened to me.

We had Major General Pat Crizer as the 3rd infantry division commander -- who had spent his entire life with tank (mech) divisions. He wasn't terribly bright; but he knew more about every major job in the division than the incumbents -- all of it, signal, maintenance, and logistics. He was a crabby man. He used to call me that "fucking military intellectual McCaffrey who has never been in a motor pool". He was not a gentle soul. Everybody was terrified of him but me and LTC Ed Leland. I tell you, I learned a lot -- and I had a ball being the G3 operations of the division! I worked with two G3s -- both of whom went on to be three-star Generals. Jack Galvin was our chief-of-staff later on. He was a wonderful man, who I greatly admired. He went on to four-star command at SOUTHCOM then SACEUR.

Then I finally escaped and went down to be Battalion XO in Schweinfurt, Germany -- the 2nd of the 30th Infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Larry Dacunto, who has been another lifelong friend since then -- a New York City poor kid. He was the same character as my dad -- everything in life was right or wrong. There are no ambiguities. He was a very devout Roman Catholic. A very devoted family man. His dad had died early. He was intent on being a good father. I was his battalion XO for two years straight. He was a greatly admired man. He is now retired out at Tacoma, Washington. I make a point of seeing him every year and we are in email contact.

Those were the years when the Army turned around, while I was a battalion XO and a battalion commander. We went from being on the edge of collapse -- and we finally got the Army back under control. It was a terrific experience. I only spent a couple or three months as the DPCA, which I really loved. Every day I would go to work and I couldn't believe the problems I ran into. How am I supposed to go about this union problem? Personnel? Abandoned wives? PXs? I had a ball. My end-of-career ambition from that tour was to end up as a full colonel DPCA of a major installation in the United States. Later on, as a

brigade commander at Fort Lewis, I used to look at these full colonels and see the enormous difference the military guys made in installation leadership. That's why I hate civilianizing these positions. After a short time as DPCA -- I was right back in battalion command of 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry. Right back on the circuit – Reforger, Hohenfels, Graf gunnery, Wildflecken, it was terrific.

INTERVIEWER: What was it like to take command of the battalion that you had served in as a major?

GEN MCCAFFREY: It was just unbelievable. When you are the battalion XO, it is arguably a better job than being a battalion commander in some ways -- except for in the field. The XO runs everybody in the battalion who did real stuff -- the PLL clerks, the cooks, the recovery crews. All these key guys worked for the battalion XO and the support platoon. You are a problem solver. It is a very informal working relationship with the warrant officers and NCO's.

Early on as a battalion commander, I had some supply clerk come up on an "open door policy" to bitch about the low standards of his A Company supply sergeant. It was the first open door policy I had as a battalion commander. I very carefully had him seated next to my desk. It was really informal, and I was taking notes, and trying to exude that I was interested in his "open door" problems. Basically, he was saying that "the supply sergeant doesn't care enough and was not organized." "The IG was coming and he didn't want to be professionally embarrassed because they weren't going to do well." I finally stopped him and I said, "Did you go see Captain Sabo?" the Company Commander. He said, "Oh, no, sir." I said, "Why didn't you see Captain Sabo?" He said, "Sir, I can't do that, he is the commander." I said, "What the hell do you think I am?" He said, "I am sorry, sir." I said, "No, no. Sit down." He then said, "Captain Sabo is in command."

So, my standing inside the battalion was that Major McCaffrey is everywhere. He is always helping us do stuff. He is in the mess hall at 4 o'clock in the morning. He is policing up mired tanks in the snow and mud. So, to go back as a commander was just a joy. We were there for over four years. When we left, my wife and I both, it was the saddest day of our entire lives since then. The 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry was part of our lives.

INTERVIEWER: What was your assessment of the 30th when you rejoined it? Basically, the same as when you had left it?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I was only gone for a few months. However, there was a huge difference between when I got there as a battalion XO and when I left as a battalion commander. In those four plus years, the Army went from pathetically disorganized to much better. As a battalion XO, I observed Larry DaCunto, an absolutely moral; undeviating, uncompromising high standards guy. He was also a screaming asshole. He couldn't believe what the Army had sunk to. We had gang rapes in the barracks; we had officers assaulted. We carried loaded weapons on SDO [Staff Duty Officer]. As the battalion commander, I used to give a welcoming talk to every new soldier we got. They would come in groups of five or six, ten, or twelve. In the battalion conference room -- the sergeant major and I taught them literally a two-hour class on how you are going to succeed in this battalion. You'll be offered an education, you'll meet German girls, you'll have standards, and it was all very positive. At the end of it, I would pick up this infantry blue painted ax handle with the regimental crest of the 30th Infantry. I showed them this ax handle and said, "By the way though, to keep order and discipline in this battalion, if I have to, I am going to use this ax handle and break your skull." And I meant it! I would tell them that.

So getting that Army under control, their disgusting behavior off duty, indiscipline, was dramatic resurgence. Fortunately – the Army had never completely

collapsed. The worst of the years, probably 1971, 72, 73, 74, 75 – were before I got there -- it was worse then when I joined them as the battalion XO.

So when I finally left Germany in 1981 -- the Army was back. I got to see that, participate in it. We didn't back off an inch. We battalion commanders got the "Chapter Five Discharge Authority". It was the greatest thing that ever happened to the Army. The company commanders and I would meet on a Sunday and work all day and process immediate discharges. We would have a battalion formation on a Monday morning. We would call it "The Night of the Long Knives." It was a take off on history, obviously. We would stand in front of the battalion and would read off the names of the soldiers -- and put them on a truck -- and have the truck pull out of the assembled battalion assembly area for the discharge point. The full battalion would cheer to get rid of these bums.

To this day, I tell classes at West Point, the basic course, our advanced course, when I talk to them, "Don't you ever let the Army get in a situation that we did." It was a flipping nightmare. And bringing it back was a miracle! During the period when I served as battalion XO and battalion commander is when we came back.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, what was your philosophy of command then?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I always laugh about new commanders who assemble their officers and they stumble through some stale show with quavering voice about "I have three priorities: training, maintenance, and leadership." Sometimes I wonder about "philosophies". I prefer "mission statements". Over time, you get forced to write it down and to articulate it.

I have great confidence in the Army. I think the Army can do anything. The current Army, here we are 2004, the best one I ever saw. I just went over and spent a week in Iraq for General John Abizaid. I went to every division. We never had a stronger, tougher Army. We never had more grounded leadership in

our entire history. Whether it is combat or maintenance or technology or training -- this is the peak of our national military history.

This Army is doing a lot of things that I believe in. Number one, you have to be an expert at what you are doing. If you don't know what you are doing, you are hopeless as a leader. You have to be certified to drive and maintain an M113 track -- a 50-caliber machine gun. You have to know how to personally do that as a platoon, company and battalion commander. You have to go first. A commander is supposed to be standing in the middle of the most difficult situation in the battalion or company. If there is a fight -- that is where you are supposed to be. If it is in motor pool on a Friday evening because you are working to get ready for a Monday inspection -- that is where you are supposed to be. When there is a good deal, you are the last one in line. For food, for new socks, for whatever.

As division commander in 24th ID, I made a big point of saying, "This is an army of serfs commanded by a serf." The soldiers got every good thing that came to the division -- DCUs, new boots. We made a huge point of this. (This came from my dad talking about Korea in 1951during the winter...All the parkas and winter clothing came from Army level and disappeared before they got to the rifle platoons). I think company and platoon commanders are supposed to get up first, go to bed last, be in the food line last, and be in the first helicopter into combat.

I also think you have a responsibility, prime responsibility, as a leader to develop a plan. Nobody else can do that but you. I know this is saying something obvious. But, you have to have a plan; you have to have a concept. You have to issue the concept. You have to issue it early. You can't have perfect plans. So, you have to get stuff out there, early on.

I think another thing I strongly believe, I tell cadets now in their senior year, (teaching up at West Point as the Olin Bradley Professor) "Don't you make a decision on whether you stay in the Army until you have commanded a company. The chances are 90 percent you are going to be good at it, extremely good. You are strong; you are educated, good values, smart. You have good leadership practices. You are going to be a good company commander. Then, you ask yourself, "Did I like doing this?" If you didn't like being a company commander – then get out of the Army." If you did like being company commander, for God's sakes, don't get out of the Army. You will never find in civilian life that kind of experience. So, you are the kind of people we want to keep.

So, I guess the other philosophy of command I would have is, you have a responsibility to tell people what an honor it is to be in the Army. I hate change-of-command speeches, where the guy gets up there and bumbles on and on about what a sacrifice, what a difficult thing it is to be a soldier. "You managed to put up with combat – or you managed to go through four terrible tours in the National Training Center." I tell people, "Hey, if you don't like doing this, get out, because this is what the Army is."

We came back from DESERT STORM -- we were back at Fort Stewart, Georgia, I think we got back in May or June. We tried to think through, how are we going to get recocked and get ready to fight again? So I asked for the first appointment to deploy to the National Training Center. The division chaplain came in to see me, a very fine full colonel. He was a good man, but he said, "Sir, this division is going to quit on you if you send them back to NTC in September. They have been away from their families; they had been gone for 11 months; they have been in a war; yadda yadda." I looked at him and I said, "Chaplain, anybody who doesn't want to go to the National Training Center is in the wrong business and ought to get out. That is what we do. So if you don't like going to the NTC, you need to find a new line of work!"

One of my funny lines to the Ft. Benning infantry course is "Look. What we need out of you as an Infantry officer is -- you are sleeping on a ridge line in the freezing rain; your crotch is ripped out of your uniform; you haven't eaten in 24 hours -- at 2 o'clock in the morning, a bunch of machine gun rounds start snapping, cracking by your ears. You must be the kind of officer to get up and stretch, and you roar out to the troops -- 'Man, it doesn't get any better than this.' That is what we expect out of you as a rifle platoon leader in combat. So, I guess the other philosophy of command is, "You ought to be grateful you are in uniform -- you get to do this, to be part of this institution with its incredible integrity and capability, and you ought to be proud of it."

INTERVIEWER: What were the most important lessons that you learned during battalion command?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I learned, for sure, to go mechanized infantry! I had spent a good part of my early life crawling around in the mud with a M16, shooting it out with people 20 feet away, and throwing hand grenades at them. We were good at that. We never lost those fights. We are team players. We are tough. However, in 3rd ID as a battalion XO and battalion commander -- I learned the power of that tank-mech-artillery-Apache team and the speed it could react at, and how much hard work it took to make sure that machinery worked.

I remember some German general, a Wehermacht veteran, talking to us, and he said, "They (the Germans) had the best tank in the world at the time, Leopard II". Our stuff was pathetic by comparison, the M113s, M60A1s. But he said, "The real key to this whole business is training. If you can get your battalion to train above 50 percent effectiveness, you ought to consider yourself a success. Fifty percent means you go to a platoon and you ask them, "Do you guys actually know how to do all your combat tasks?" On a piece of equipment like the Leopard II, if you can operate that thing at 80 percent capacity, you will win every war you fight. But normally people have a piece of equipment like the Leopard II,

and they can operate it at a ten percent level of capability. So one of the things I got out of battalion command was figure out how to keep your equipment operating at 80% of capacity. If you don't, you got nothing. Secondly, you have to train to the capability of the equipment. That is in a variety of multi-level training opportunities.

I also determined a lot of what is vital to Army training is hand/eye skills. Our battalions in 3rd ID, around 1981 to 1986 were incredibly good. But I would say, if you stopped training for 90 days, this thing would fall apart on you. The mortar platoons won't work. The maintenance recovery people will not know how to pull tanks out of muck. So the training capability can go from an A plus to a D minus in three months if you don't constantly work at it.

Then also, something I got out of that tour and subsequent tours was that lieutenants and captains are always running around saying, "We have to do less stuff; we are trying to do too many things. We have to concentrate on a few things and do them right; set priorities." That is nonsense. You have to be able to do all of it. You can't decide to do three of the 25 things extremely well. It is better that you do all of them at a C plus level.

One of the other things, as a battalion commander was I discovered how rewarding it is to be in command. I tell people that. Binnie Peay, one of my great friends, when I took command of a brigade he was the DIVARTY [division artillery] commander. He grabbed me just before the ceremony and said, "Barry, remember this is the easiest job you will ever have in your life."

Command at battalion, brigade, division and higher levels actually isn't that tough if you have great experience and follow fundamental principles." At the end of the Desert Storm Gulf War, Michael Gordon, the New York Times, reported as saying a lot of of laudatory things about me and what a great job I did. All of which was true, I might add -- but I said to him, "Michael, let me be blunt about

this. If I had a heart attack the day before this attack started, there are 15 General officers in the United States who would have jumped on a plane and come over here and done just as well as I did. The reason is this team we have is powerful." John Van Alstyne, my Chief of Staff, actually ran and integrated all the pieces of the division combat team. He is the best soldier I encountered in 32 years in uniform. I was only in charge of three fighting brigades and an armored cav regiment -- setting priorities of fire -- and leading from the front.

I think the other thing battalion command taught me is to see down two levels, but command down one. When I was a battalion commander I always knew where my platoons were. I knew everything about what platoons were doing -- but I was only about giving orders to company commanders -- period. At every level, the chain-of-command, if you command down one level and see down two levels – it is not very hard to be effective.

Some colonel grabbed me years later. I was the strategic planner for the Army (DAMO-SS). I will never forget his greeting. He had been around for about six years in the same job. He said, "Yeah, general, we are glad you are here. You have a great reputation; we look forward to working with you. I want you to know though, this thing works pretty well right now. You are joining a group that just does a good job. They are going to do a good job, no matter what you do. If you are really good at this, they will do a little bit better."

Anyway, battalion command was just a joy to me. It was such an honor to go back to the same unit I had served in so long. I knew every last soldier in the battalion, every piece of equipment I stood on. And it was terrific.

INTERVIEWER: After completing command, you attended the Army War College. Was it the best year of your life? More important, what has your Army War College experience meant to you over the years?

GEN MCCAFFREY: That one year at the War College, really is a great year of your life in everybody's book. (Following Leavenworth, which I thought was an unbelievably good year for me, learning about DISCOMs and COSCOMs and the SPO [Support Operations] and maintenance.) The War College was to me -- what I thought my two years at American University were going to be like in graduate school. I loved the Army War College! Interacting with the classmates -- all these different backgrounds. This beautiful post with a single function. The library was incredibly good. The librarians were positive and supportive and would get you anything you wanted. Jack Merritt was our Commandant. A superb officer. You talk about the adult in charge of the family.

I worked my buns off at the Army War College, too. The speaker's program was unbelievably good. The last half of the year, Jim Harding, my lifelong friend and I wanted to learn something new. We had spent all our lives in combat in Southeast Asia or serving in Europe. We said that we wanted to do a study on the Middle East -- and oil -- and the next war in the Middle East. We decided we were going to do it at a Top Secret [TS] Compartmented level. The faculty was not pleased with the idea. They wanted us to do our paper at an unclassified level. We said, "No, we are not going to do a study which people dismiss saying if you only knew what we knew, you wouldn't have written this garbage." "So, we are going to do a TS compartmented study."

The two of us were allowed to redefine much of the whole educational year. I don't think we were at the War College much the last half of the year. I didn't do that last week special study thing. We were working on our paper to support the RDJTF [Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force], the predecessor to CENTCOM. We tried to get into Iran and Saudi Arabia and we didn't pull that one off. But we did get access to the National Command Centers and the Joint Staff. We wrote a 300-page plus TS encrypted paper. We also got thrown out of the RDJTF commander's office. He was so furious when he read the executive summary of our paper. He couldn't believe the effrontery of these two LTC's being critical of

existing war plans. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Harding, Armor, he was pretty sarcastic -- more so than I was -- and I was extremely blunt. We were very critical of the warplans for Iran and Saudi Arabia. But, it was an unbelievably educational year. Harry Summers was one of my professors. The international students were terrific and the seminars we had with them. I went from there to be a division G3 in 9th ID at Ft. Lewis.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, we left off with your speaking about your year at the Army War College. And you heading to Fort Lewis to serve as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3. What was that like?

GEN MCCAFFREY: It was a terrific assignment. Before we went, I remember I got together a group of people who had already been a division G3. There must have been five or six of them. One was John Miller who went on to retire as a three-star. I asked them to give me a multi-hour tutorial on being a G3, which was extremely helpful. Jim Harding was another one who had already been a G3. I had been hired by the Division Commander Bob Elton who had been on the Army leadership team for Westmoreland...then Lieutenant Colonel Bob Elton. He was now the division commander, and wanted me to come out to Ft. Lewis. I went out there on TDY and looked around at division. It was the high technology light division. They were in a test phase. The mission was to take off-the-shelf technology and infuse in into the Army! It was a very interesting assignment.

I was first the G3, then division chief of staff, and then a brigade commander -- all in the same division.

I worked for two division commanders, Bob Elton and then General Robert RisCassi, who was an absolutely superb leader. He went on to be the Eighth

Army commander in Korea -- and then went on to be the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

When I first visited 9th ID, when I went out there on TDY -- Hugh Shelton was the G3 I was replacing. I have always admired Hugh. I went out in the field to see the division during a huge training exercise going on at Yakima Firing Center. I went over there and spent 36 hours with Hugh Shelton and Dick Roberts, the G2. One night we stayed up all night with the two of them talking about the former division commander (not Elton but his predecessor) and some of the funny things that go on in the Army. A lot about Yakima Firing Center, amongst other things.

One of the things Shelton had told me was, as G3 he had this collection of absolutely deadbeat majors. I wrote MG Elton a letter -- and said I wanted Major George Close (who was a battalion XO and headed to be the Brigade S3) to be assigned as the Deputy G3. I said, "If I don't get Close as the deputy G3, I won't come to the division." He wrote me a note back and said, "Okay, Major Close will be reassigned to work for you. P.S. [Post Script]: Stop giving me fucking orders until you get out here."

Luckily, I got George Close (who eventually retired as a Major General). I think there were 12 majors in the G3 Section at one time. Ten of them were eligible for lieutenant colonel. When the lieutenant colonel list came out -- one of them got selected and nine didn't. MG Elton came down to see me in my office and he said -- "Oh, this is terrible; that nine of your majors did not get promoted -- what are we going to do?" I remember telling him, "Do? Sir, the system works."

It was the end of Vietnam group that had bumped into their upper limit of competence. Essentially they were uneducated lieutenants who were now majors. It was unbelievable. Major Lyle Testerman, who was superb, was the only guy who did make lieutenant colonel.

So, that G3 experience in 9th ID was a huge responsibility with all we had going on. I say that because there was so little help, compared to later years. In those years -- we would only get six, seven, eight majors out of Leavenworth every year. That was it for the division. So, four or five of them would go to battalion, and a couple or three of them would go someplace else. The senior officers of the division would fight like wild animals over a scrap of food to get one of these Leavenworth majors. Being a G3 was hard work, but again, a terrific job, and I loved it.

We had a lot of tension during those days in the High Technology Test Division. A lot of the Army didn't understand what the high tech division was doing, didn't support it. Colonel Charlie Ostodt, the division chief of staff, went on to retire as a three-star. I don't think he supported it, either. Lots of field time; lots of contractors; lots of defense industry. We accomplished a lot. The concept of the Combined Logistics Battalions like the FSB (forward support battalion) and MSB (main support battalion) came out of that era. We reorganized the division into brigade combat teams. We organized a division reconnaissance company. We organized deception detachments. We did new tactics such as "deep strike".

We came out of Germany and the Cold War years. Talk about an Army which lacked of imagination. The Army war plan in Germany was five U.S. divisions, twelve German divisions, all lined up shoulder to shoulder. There would be one division, theater Army Reserve. Where were the officers -- a strategic genius like MacArthur?

One of my memories at Ft. Lewis was going to a giant computerized simulation training exercise -- when our corps commander (who will remain unnamed) tried to fire me during this simulation exercise. I Corps notionally was in defense. There had been a big North Korean notional attack and now we (I Corps) were going to counterattack. The Corps Commander plan had seven U.S. Army divisions lined up shoulder to shoulder -- with frontages of ten or fifteen

kilometers -- attacking through cross-compartmented mountains toward Pyongyang. Say, what are we doing here? There was absolutely no maneuver, no deception, no surprise, no mass – no imagination.

However, a lot of new Army doctrine as well as technology came through the filter of 9th ID and got out to the Army.

MG RisCassi came in -- and I was his chief of staff -- and later on a brigade commander. RisCassi was just unbelievably good. Leadership by "indirection". Leadership by "wandering around". RisCassi was also really funny, I don't think he ever directly told me to "do -- or not do – anything". I would take some ferociously complex problem in and I would show him how I would analyze it. I would say "There are three options," look at him expectantly. He would look at me and say, "Well, Barry, you will know what to do." Frequently he would tell people, "Don't make me make a decision. You people sort it out." So through the leadership environment of this brilliant MG RisCassi -- where everybody thought they were in charge -- all sorts of good things happened. It was a very positive environment to work in.

INTERVIEWER: The 9th Infantry Division was certainly a high technology test bed for FORSCOM, TRADOC, and Combined Arms Center. Do you believe that Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, SBCTs, at Fort Lewis have allowed Fort Lewis to remain an assignment of choice for soldiers? What are some similarities that can be drawn?

GEN MCCAFFREY: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team is the high tech brigade resurfacing 20 years later. With almost the same equipment. We tested a very similar vehicle, it was a U.S. variant, a little bit more effective than the Canadian model we have now. I think the Stryker Brigade is going to prove its mettle in Iraq for sure. It is speedy, light armor. We have to put some money into it. We need an assault gun system. Right now, there is no stabilized weapon at all in

Stryker. That is a little bit of a problem. It is clearly not the weapon of choice for high intensity combat.

We will need a full "common operating picture of the intelligence system". I don't think the brigade commanders or battalion commanders of Operation Iraqi Freedom knew anything at all about what they were facing throughout the entire campaign. Zippo. There was zero intelligence. They only knew what the reconnaissance units bumped into -- and what their own armed choppers were reporting.

But having said that -- the Stryker Brigade is a terrific concept.

Fort Lewis was one of the most wonderful assignments imaginable. Terrific training capabilities, both at Fort Lewis and at Yakima Firing Center. It is a terrific place to be. But thank God for the Stryker Brigade. The Army has always lacked some mid-range option. We had a light option sending in a bunch of 82nd Airborne troops stumbling off the end of a C-130, with anti-tank rockets and M60 machine guns. Or you could deploy something that essentially had to be delivered by ship -- which is a high intensity combat force, Abrams/Bradley/Paladin/Apache team. We had nothing in between.

We are not actually going to fly brigades of Stryker anywhere in the world. But you definitely can get a package in on the ground now by C17 quicker. Company, battalion-size Stryker Company teams can operate with light forces during the intervention. On a lot of these peacekeeping operations, having motorized/light armor Stryker units is a terrific capability that we have lacked our entire military history.

INTERVIEWER: Are there any additional issues or personalities related to your field grade experience that you would like to discuss?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Being a division G3 had a huge influence on me. I had been a captain division G3 junior officer in the Vietnamese airborne. I had been a major G3 operations in 3rd ID. Finally I was a lieutenant colonel G3. It was a huge experience base for me to have in subsequent assignments.

INTERVIEWER: After serving as a G3, you served as the 9th ID division Chief of Staff. Can you share some thoughts on that?

GEN MCCAFFREY: MG Bob Elton selected me to be the chief-of-staff. A little bit of a challenge – I was selected over several more senior brigade commanders. They were good guys. Many of them went on to be general officers. I was selected to be chief-of-staff by MG Elton against the wishes of the Corps Commander -- who was still upset at me for having ruined one of his corps simulation exercises. (They had all quit at 5 o'clock and gone off for cocktails. So when they went off for cocktails -- the 9th ID crew worked until midnight, submitted all our computer cards and the next morning when the operations started, the computer allowed 9th ID to punch through the enemy defenses). The corps commander thought I had ruined his training exercise by hard work. What a crazy situation.

Anyway, I was the chief-of-staff notwithstanding the corps commander's strong opposition. Then MG RisCassi came in, who I did not know -- and he said, "No, you are going to stay the chief-of-staff." I formed a lifelong sense of respect and trust and friendship for General RisCassi. (Which is important for the chief of staff, the G3, and the CG's aide!)

The CG has to have a team that he trusts totally. And I sure liked working with MG RisCassi. I loved being the chief of staff. The first day RisCassi was here -- he had quarters right next to mine -- my wife, who gets up very early -- she gets up around 0430 hours -- went to the window and looked out. (I don't like getting up early in the mornings) She came back and said, "You are screwed. Your new

division commander is out there weeding his lawn after just getting back from his run!"

Basically, MG RisCassi went to work at 5:30 in the morning. I started going to work at 0530 and then I had to stay til 10 or 11 o'clock at night to keep this division going. It was killing me. I finally told the general, "Sir, I am not coming in at 0530. You can come in; you like doing work by yourself. I am coming in at 0630 or 0700. I am going to be there later because I have to wrap things up." "Fine, Barry, whatever you think is appropriate."

I stopped drinking and smoking that year. I was having some health problems. Just exhaustion. I went in and got my annual physical and the old, experienced contract physician said, "You better stop smoking. You just can't keep this up." I came to the big realization that year that I was no longer young -- all this happy partying and carrying on. So, I really focused in on that job. I loved being the chief-of-staff and I loved working for RisCassi. We did some unbelievable things.

The division CG created a great, interesting relationship between me and the brigade commanders, the corps chief of staff, the corps G3, the ADCs. I learned how you work with an ADC. We have an odd system in the Army where one of the most powerful officers in the division arguably is the Division G3...some really junior lieutenant colonel. On a day-to-day basis most of the divisions I had seen -- certainly the one I commanded -- the officer actually running the division is the chief of staff. It has to work that way. Otherwise, the division commander has his right foot pegged in his headquarters. So, I liked running a division. Terrific command climate. RisCassi was a great example to me.

INTERVIEWER; In March of 1984, you assumed command of 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, (Motorized). What was that like? And did your command philosophy change from when you were a battalion commander?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I had been very fortunate. I was on the secondary zone on major to lieutenant colonel and then also to full colonel – then I immediately got command. I was promoted to full colonel and went down to take command of the 3rd Brigade, which was our test brigade. I had terrific battalion commanders. The workload was astonishing. We were deployed all the time. I had never been in the desert in my life until I got to the 9th ID. I had always been in jungles or Europe. Then I never got out of the desert from 9th ID on. Yakima Firing Center; high desert; Fort Bliss; Texas; National Training Center -- we had lots going on. We had experimental operations in the NTC that were terrific. We spent three months straight in the field at Yakima Firing Center once. I got people home for a couple of five-day passes -- but essentially we went over and spent 90 days in the field. We did lots of work on: extended battlefields, deep strike, air ground operations.

One of my fellow brigade commanders – said "there is a Korea Team Spirit deployment coming up and I don't want to go." He said, "It is going to ruin my training schedule." He was very much into training management. I asked for and got his brigade's "Team Spirit." I had never served in Korea. I had been there a couple of times TDY. I said -- "Team Spirit, I would give my left arm to go to Team Spirit." He said, "Well, golly. That is wonderful. You volunteer, and I will say, yeah, I will defer to you."

Actually, I didn't get to take the brigade over there. However, I did two recons of the battlefield with all my chain-of-command. We had a JEEPEX [Jeep Exercise]. I ended up getting promoted to BG and left before the brigade got deployed. That was a terrific opportunity. I would say tactically, that brigade command experience was incredibly important to me. I deployed the brigade to a variety of field experiences and distant deployments. We trained hard and moved by road, ship, and air. We operated extensively in a desert environment.

INTERVIEWER: What were your greatest challenges as a brigade commander?

<u>GEN MCCAFFREY</u>: Normal field operating things. How do you motivate people to do complex tasks? How do you take care of machinery in a demanding field environment? We had some added challenges. We always had a ton of contractors following us around with some very complex test equipment. I came out of there with the absolute rule that if you tell me you have a new technology -- and I look at it and I say, it is immensely desirable, I want it badly -- If you won't give it to me early enough for me to have a series of individual training sessions on how individuals operate the equipment -- if you then won't let me integrate it into the unit so that I can operate in the field during a train up environment -- then I refuse to accept the equipment at all.

We should never accept new systems as we depart for a major exercise. Stuffing equipment into units at the last minute with people reassuring you it is going to be okay is a bad idea. In every case, you have to think through the training implications and the maintenance implications. How is this new system going to change the way you operate? If you don't have time to integrate new equipment properly, don't take it into combat.

Later on as the 24th ID commander, I felt the same way. Some of the things we did in 9th ID (HTLD) didn't work out but basically, it was an unbelievably exciting time.

When the Brigadier General list came out, four out of the five of us who were commanders got picked up on that BG list.

<u>INTERVIEWER</u>: How did the exercise of command as a colonel differ from earlier commands as a battalion commander?

<u>GEN MCCAFFREY</u>: Just as rewarding, but a lot easier. Again, I borrow that line from Binny Peay when I took command, "it was going to be the easiest thing you

ever did". Every level of command has tremendous responsibility and hard work involved and skills. One of the things I strongly believe is that being a brigade commander or division commander has a lot of similarities to being a good company commander. Have a simple plan, articulate it early, give people authority, hold them accountable.

As a brigade commander, I would normally be in the field with five or six battalions. (Maneuver and support). Dealing with battalion commanders is pretty darn easy. If you can't get battalion commanders to do the right thing, there is something sadly wrong with you. Paul Mikloshek was one of my brigade S3s. He went on to serve as the Army IG -- a three-star general. A wonderful man. I was able to identify and bring aboard some key people who were terrific officers. Helped train them and get them to the point where they knew exactly what they were doing. So lots of field time, lots of big deployments, lots of work with the Air Force. Lots of innovative communications and automation technology.

INTERVIEWER: In January 1986, you reported to Fort Benning, Georgia, to serve as the Assistant Commandant for the United States Infantry School. Did you feel like you were heading home to Fort Benning?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I was thrilled with the assignment. Major General Ed Burba, who had been the Assistant Commandant, (my new job) was now the two-star general. I had known Ed for years. Really respected him. He was very introspective, intellectual, thoughtful, kind person, with lots of tactical time. He loved tactical issues. One of his major contributions to the Army was to conceive and develop the Javelin anti-tank missile. He personally conceived of it and stuffed it through the Army, a step at the time.

When I went down there, I really didn't know what to expect. I had not been at Fort Benning, except for Ranger School and Airborne School. I had been there TDY over the years, however I didn't know what was really going on.

It turned out Benning was unbelievably fun and demanding. A terrific growth experience. Being at Fort Benning was a joy. I always would jog down to the Airborne School and the OCS area – all the young soldiers would be outside polishing boots -- talking big about what they had done that day. The environment was so positive it was unbelievable. The OSUT [one station unit training] Infantry brigades were terrific. These kids, if you went down there, you were looking at America's high school track and football teams. I never seen such unbelievably physically fit, positive young soldiers in my life.

I think there were 38 battalion commanders on post. I was the senior rater for most of these battalion commanders, also a bunch of brigade commanders. So, that part was enormously enjoyable. Then there was the doctrine and combat development pieces. Two separate worlds. Then there was also a huge international component.

Everybody in the world goes to Fort Benning to learn how the U.S. Army organizes itself. Ed Burba, who absolutely was one of the most admirable persons I ever met -- he basically had a rule that if any general officer or equivalent came to Fort Benning – that a general officer had to greet or do something with them. There were only two generals on post! Me and him. I finally went to him after about six months and said, "Sir, this is killing me. We can't do this." National Guard generals, Army Reserve generals, Ministers of Defense -- it was constant...Congressional staffers.

MG Burba said, "Barry, the policy stands. My predecessor, who was a terrific soldier, had two German corps commanders here and neither one of us saw them. They spent two days here. The Commandant was on leave and in his quarters hiding out; he had three days off and his daughters were home." My excuse was that "I, as the Assistant Commandant, was working to defend Bradley -- and there were some key Congressional staffers here." The bottom

line is that for the three day visit, these two German three-star generals didn't get to see either one of the two Benning Generals. They got in a huff and left post. Burba told me by the time we got finished answering all the inquiries, it would have been easier to just spend a few hours with them."

That was actually a very good lesson -- that if you are in charge, you have to personally be the face of the command. I just told my son (who is going back to command a battalion at Benning, the 507th Airborne) that for the better part of two years -- it was a rare day where breakfast, lunch and dinner weren't spent with some infantry student course or visitors. It was a seven-day a week job, but it was a real joy.

I think the only thing that bothered me was the amount of time I was not at Benning. The two Generals were gone way too much. Out to Leavenworth, Army Materiel Command, TRADOC headquarters at Monroe. The Army one-stars at these branch service schools were extremely good. But, you had these giant military installations with a huge civilian work force -- with thousand of family members and thousands of soldiers. I said, "For God sakes, if you are going to put us in charge, you have to leave us here to be in charge of this damn post!"

Two years ago, I was down there and the Benning Commander, MG Paul Eaton was gone. The assistant commandant also wasn't there. Eaton was headed over to Iraq. I called the Vice Chief of Staff, Jack Keane, and raised cain with him. I said, "You have to get somebody in here." This wonderful post chief of staff blew the whistle to me on the whole system. He said, "The generals are never here." So being in charge of the installation was a huge responsibility.

My first assignment as a general officer was at Benning. William "Gus" Pagonis and I were always in a little bit of trouble. He was the one-star at the logistics school. Both of us were viewed as creative but causing trouble. I cancelled a

hundred million dollar program of training simulations for machine guns. What a crazy program. We were downsizing programs and money -- and I had to go review all these programs.

I tried to cancel this program and got a load of shit, the likes to which I couldn't believe. A full colonel who had thought of this idea at TRADOC had since been hired by a defense contractor to push the idea. They went after me in the damnest way. They went "open door policy" to the vice chief of staff of the Army. They hired West Point classmates of Burba to lobby him. It was unbelievable.

I called a two-star at TRADOC, the combat development staff officer -- Major General John Corns. What a wonderful man. He had been around a long time. He was an older guy. I said, "Hey, sir. Walk me through this. I am getting a reputation down here as causing problems and the Vice Chief of Staff is hearing about me under open door policy for abuse of authority." All of it was about the money! A hundred million dollars of money. I had also confronted an unnamed retired three-star and told him he could no longer come and stay in the VIP Marshall guest house and fly his three-star flag, and then lobby my majors in combat developments as a contractor at the Officer's Club! I threw another general off post who came in totally inappropriately lobbying.

Anyway, I asked General Corns, "Am I doing the wrong thing? Should I back off these issues?" He said, "Hey, general. We promoted you to take responsibility and to do the right thing for the Army. Grow up. This comes with the territory!" [laughter] So, to this day I share that story with a lot of new generals and say, "Grow up."

It is better being a battalion commander in a lot of ways -- than being a general. The reason I stayed in the Army was the rewarding experiences I had as a company, battalion, and brigade commander. It was an honor being a general, being in charge of the Army. But in some ways it was less fun. It is nice flying

around in planes and having a flag, and stuff like that -- but you miss the direct contact with the tactical Army.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, in January 1988, you proceeded on orders to Europe to serve as the Deputy, United States Military Representative, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee, Brussels, Belgium. Do you believe the Army prepared you for this assignment?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, when I got those orders one of my friends who was a major general serving in the Pentagon said, "Boy, have you screwed up. You know that job as Deputy Military Representative NATO is a dead-end assignment. You have long suppers, five nights a week, with international people. It's a complete waste and everyone retires from the job." "The MILREP job isn't much better." I thought, "Well, maybe there is still some lingering resentment of all the energy I brought to bear down there at Benning." I went in and saw General RisCassi who by then was the DCSOPS of the Army. I said, "Sir, do you know where have I gone wrong? What did I do to screw up?" He said, "Hey, joint is in -- Goldwaters Nichols has passed -- you got to do joint -- this is a terrific job, shut up and go do it." (He didn't actually say "shut-up". He is such a kindly man -- I would have said, "shut-up".)

So over I went to work for a four-star admiral, actually for two four-star admirals in a row. Jack Merritt, my former Army War College Commandant, had just left. Admiral Powell Carter, nuke submariner, introvert, intellect, triple languages, brilliant, good man, was the mil rep. He was later replaced by Admiral Jim Hogg, extravert, sunny disposition, Navy surface warfare.

It underscores the difference in personalities among very senior officers. Here I am a one-star working for two Navy four stars – my first joint assignment. It was a terrific assignment, I had a ball. NATO was in the process of changing, trying

to struggle to deal with the end of the Cold War. It changed dramatically the two years I was there. It was my first joint assignment. I remember, while we were there they asked us to code our own positions as joint duty required yes or no? Admiral Carter was there -- he said, "If you code it joint duty required you'll get your joint duty designator" and if you say, "it's optional" -- you won't get it." Admiral Powell Carter coded it "joint duty required" because he wanted to be a CINC and that was a prerequisite under Goldwaters Nichols. I coded it "not required" because I didn't ever want to go back to a joint assignment

By the way, I almost never got out of joint assignments again from then on -- except when I was in command of something in the Army. It was such an education; it was so interesting to me. General Jack Galvin (my former 3rd ID C/S) was the SACEUR. He was a man I had known for years and respected greatly. Dealing with that international community on a professional and personal basis, dealing with the defense intellectual issues of Pershing deployment to Europe – it was fascinating. The whole notion of nuclear deterrence and dealing with the Russians – it was really complex.

Working for two Navy four-stars was also good because I knew the least of all about the Navy. I tell people that I am alive because of a Navy cruiser in Vietnam that supported me in the Vietnamese 2nd Airborne Battalion. These two Navy four- stars were terrific guys. I found out what an unbelievable war fighting service the Navy was. Admiral Jim Hogg couldn't go more than a month without being on a Navy ship or he'd go into deep depression. We spent three days on the U.S.S. America carrier battle group out in the Mediterranean -- and also went to an Aegis cruiser off the shore of Norway

I developed a terrific sense of respect and admiration for my NATO colleagues, the DEPMILREP'S, and the MILREP'S. The MILREP'S were frequently gone a lot so -- I was often acting MILREP. I took delegations of NATO European parliament representatives all over Europe. NATO had joint exercises and I'd

take delegations to Sardinia and to Antwerp and to up in the artic circle in Norway. it was just terrific. I had to work issues back into the Pentagon, which I thought was fun and interesting, I hadn't done a lot of that before. I had taught political science in the Department of Social Sciences -- so on one level I knew an awful lot about international politics and NATO issues. I'd also lived in Europe as a high school boy. My dad worked in SHAPE headquarters in Paris. I had been in Germany for five years with the 3rd Infantry Division and liked being in Europe, so it was a terrific assignment.

INTERVIEWER: Do you consider NATO viable today?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Sure, it's changing. I just took an Atlantic Council delegation to Europe. I'm a Director of the Atlantic Council which is a terrific opportunity for me -- and also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. I do a lot of work with those two groups in particular. I am chairing a study for the Atlantic Council right now entitled "NATO and Terrorism". We've been working on it for a year and half -- and I re-engaged on NATO issues. Dick Clark, the counter-terrorism czar has been my co-chair of this study. I just took the Atlantic Council delegation to Moscow. Spent several days in Moscow dealing with Russian defense intellectuals both in uniform and out. Then on to Warsaw for a couple of days. Then to Brussels for NATO headquarters discussions. Then to Mons, Belgium for SHAPE. So, I'm locked back into NATO issues again.

I went down and spent a very interesting day with ACT [Allied Command Transformation] in Norfolk. Had the Canadian three-star deputy come up and teach a class for my National Security Seminar at West Point. I have a guest lecture up at West Point every week. I run a once a week, three-hour seminar on defense issues.

So, I've been working NATO again. It's in the process of transformation. There are some huge challenges, but I remind people that the purpose of NATO was

'not to fight wars, but to keep the peace'. The purpose of NATO was to keep the United States and Canada engaged in Europe so that war wouldn't break out. Now the purpose of NATO is expanding to bring in the former Warsaw pact. Indeed "NATO at 20" means -- the Russians in NATO council.

The Russians are involved in a lot of the deliberations, even though they don't have a vote. How can we ensure that NATO continues to have utility as an operational element? It's the only military alliance on the face of the earth that actually has agreed military standards NATO STANAG [standardization agreement]. NATO has equipment and common command and control. How do we get NATO involved in these new threats for out-of-area operations? They have a mission to Afghanistan. In the next three years they'll have a mission in Iraq if we don't screw it up.

As much as I support President Bush in the intervention of Afghanistan and Iraq, which I do, and much as I think Colin Powell is a national treasure and one of my personal heroes – however, we seriously screwed up when we went into Afghanistan and didn't take NATO with us. They wanted to help us. I think NATO is still viable. It's vitally important to our future national security. I have a personal commitment to being supportive of having NATO evolve into a useful future role.

INTERVIEWER: Much has been read concerning Germany and France not sending soldiers to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF], your thoughts?

GEN MCCAFFREY: We need a national dialogue to think through this. Former Ambassador Wendy Sherman, a very admirable public servant who works for the Honorable Madeline Albright, was a guest lecturer at my class at West Point. She told the cadets that we're at the worst years of international animosity toward the United States in our nation's history. Certainly wasn't because of any love of that mass murderer Saddam Hussein. So it's worth having national dialogue and

trying to sort out why are we so widely despised even among governments that support us -- the Poles, the Italians, the Spanish, the Columbians in Latin America, the people adamantly oppose apparently our foreign policy.

Now, some of it's our own fault, Secretary Rumsfeld's rhetoric is muscular, direct, and offensive. He is arrogant, and uses demeaning language to our Allies. When I give speeches now days to business groups, I tell them, "Who among you as a businessman would excoriate your clients in public and then privately try to ask them to do tough things for you? It doesn't work as a father -- or as a company commander -- or in business. Why would you think it would work dealing with the Russians, or the French, or the Germans?'"

So to some extent, we have a real challenge. President Bush is in many ways a good man. I've been supportive of some of the objectives he's trying to carry out. However he drives many in the international community crazy with anger and loathing. So some of it's our fault. For years in NATO our allies might say "We don't like the Americans, they are arrogant, ill-educated." Everybody would say "we don't like the Americans all that much -- but we hate each other a lot more -- and the Americans are great organizers -- and they are principled people -- and we can trust them". "Why don't we put the Americans in charge." That's essentially why NATO worked.

Now the Soviets are gone as a threat. There isn't a requirement generated by this massive external threat to cooperate with the Americans.

Finally, we shouldn't underestimate, in my view, the damage that the French did to us -- and the Germans. The German government was more obnoxious in some ways then the French. The German opposition comes from a pacifist history, stretching back to World War II. The French have been trying to run us out of Europe for 45 years. They finally saw a chance and they went after it.

They are very clever people. They didn't quite pull it off, but they did immense damage to us at a point of great vulnerability.

Now I think the French have over-reached themselves and the rest of the Europeans are pulling back saying, "Do we really want to entrust the future of Europe to French dominance?" That's essentially what the French were trying to do. The Germans out of guilt complex were complicit -- you the French can run Europe -- we'll be your partners -- the rest of Europe will fall in line. Nobody in his right mind is going to turn their foreign policy and economic policy over to the French.

If the U.S. stumbles badly in Iraq and Afghanistan we are going to damage the entire world. Dealing with the French and the Germans though, now this isn't a time for personalities or hard feelings, it's a time for pragmatic thinking. We need NATO. NATO is vital for European security. We need to work toward the future. I think there is a growing realization of that. Secretary Powell understands the whole situation -- he is a master of international relations. When you deal with foreign countries in public -- you have to speak nicely. You have to listen to their ideas. You have to then find things that you genuinely do admire, publicly talk to those issues -- and then in private make demands on them -- and do so in an insistent manner and a clever manner. You can't do it the other way around. You can't batter foreign leadership in public, and then privately ask them to do tough stuff.

So, being insulting to the French and German in public which Rumsfeld and others have done, it's just simply counter productive. Yes, we do want allies, even if they don't have advanced F16s and night vision devices. We tried to spurn them on going into Afghanistan, we said, "It's too much trouble to deal with you guys and gain political consensus -- and we don't respect your military capabilities anyway." Then we ended up in Afghanistan and almost every NATO country had some element of their armed forces there. Because of that we had

immense more power going in. So allies are important -- and I think this government's now learning that.

INTERVIEWER: After serving in Europe, you preceded to Washington, D.C., to serve as the Director Strategy, Plans, Policy/Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Joint Affairs, United States Army. Who did you work for and what were you able to accomplish during your tenure?

GEN MCCAFFREY: It was a great assignment. I was the Pentagon Army staff joint guy. As you know, the way that the system operates -- you're the Army G3 internally, and then externally you are the Army Rep in the tank. There are three people: the principals (chiefs), the deputy (three star), and the two star Dep Op Dep. The chief or the Vice go as the principals, the three-stars go as the OPSDEP's. Then there are the two-star DEP OPSDEP's that do a lot of the practical work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their collective role.

One of the reasons I so much enjoyed it, was I had three colonels and a small office that were the joint cell. LTG Gordon Sullivan, then LTG Denny Reimer, and the Chief, Carl Vuono, were our joint team. Internally, as a strategic planner, we had a continuing responsibility to keep the Army engaged world-wide. There was a lot going on.

We took down the Noreiga government during those years. Before the operation started, I went down and walked the ground with Bill Hartzog who was the J3 in Panama. Then I got to go back two weeks after the take down and have him show me what had actually worked. I did lots of work in Latin America, there were a lot of issues and a lot of work in the Middle East. Internally, we were trying to reshape the Army – right size the Army. General Powell was the Chairman, he's been a long time friend and somebody I'd learned from and admired. I saw a good bit of him in that assignment. During that period we started basically restructuring the Army as part of the joint force.

I remember, I was sent over to deal with General Butch Saint in Europe. Butch Saint wouldn't tell us how he was going to downsize U.S. Army Europe -- and the Chief was unwilling to tell him to do that. So, I went over there and basically, I was supposed to trick Butch Saint into telling me how we would downsize the Army. I had a session with him and he said, "Barry," he looked me in the eye and he said, "I did not come to Europe to destroy the Seventh United Sates Army." And I looked at him and said, "Yes sir, you did. You're over here to restructure the entire thing. That's actually what you're supposed to be doing."

You know, General Saint was one of my heroes. When I was a battalion commander, they sent him down as a one-star general to run Grafenwoehr Seventh Army Training Center. He took that place from a C minus to an A minus in the space of about six months. I've always been a great admirer of his.

He was trying to get people to break with what had been -- and to shape a new force for the future. That's what I was part of. I played a role in shaping the Army during that period with our Chief, our DCSOPS and with the Chairman and the joint staff.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think the job prepared you for what you were going to do next, to serve as the commander of the 24th Infantry Division Mechanized at Fort Stewart, Georgia, in any way?

GEN MCCAFFREY: No, completely unrelated. The only thing, I would say was that I did a lot of work with President Bush 41, Paul Wolfowitz who was the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Steve Hadley was his assistant. I worked with them in a very close relationship. Had great admiration for them. I had come to a gradual realization that we were going to go to war with Iraq. It was just a matter of time. I went in and essentially made sure the Vice, General RisCassi, and others knew that I keenly wanted command of the 24th Infantry

Division, not some of the other options. I figured we were going to war with Iraq and the 24th was going. So I was thrilled when I came out on orders to command 24th ID. Took it over from MG Pete Taylor. Pete tried to drag his feet on changing command. I tried to get him out of there as rapidly as I could blow him out of there.

The day I took command, I went on closed circuit television and taped for the post cable TV. It would be interesting to try and get that video -- I'm sure it exists somewhere. I told them we are going to be at war in 90 days. I actually put out this strong message because I wanted to galvanize the division to get ready to fight. The division needed to get out of a peacetime mentality that all we do is go to the National Training Center with two- battalion brigades. I was thrilled to go there.

INTERVIEWER: How many soldiers did you command in the 24th?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, the peace time division itself is 18,000 troops, the reinforced division is 26,000 troops. At the height of the four days of fighting in Desert Storm we had the armored cav regiment attached -- and I had four brigades of artillery -- and two engineer brigades. The last 36 hours of the ground war, the 101st was doing some supporting actions, mostly with aviation -- but essentially the only fighting going on in XVIII Airborne Corps sector was 24th ID. We had the entire corps slice working with me, so me, 6,000 soldiers plus attached artillery brigades, engineer brigades, logistics groups and an armored cavalry regiment.

INTERVIEWER: Please share with me your thoughts concerning DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and did your previous combat experience help?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, one of the great things about the Army is that by and large you end up in a career track where you get prepared to do your next job.

I've been very fortunate almost my entire life. I stumbled from one job to the next job where everything helped me get ready. Certainly 24th ID fell into that category. Much of my life, I'd been doing operations or command. I had lots of times in mechanized or motorized units. Lots of time in a desert environment.

Before I went to command 24th ID -- I got to design a quick pre-command course for myself. Went to Fort Sill, Fort Rucker, Fort Benning and Fort Knox. I said, "I'm not here to learn galactic thinking or talking about philosophy of command -- I'm here to learn the current mechanisms of your business." So, I flew an Apache helicopter, I had a 4.2" mortar platoon live fire. I fired every weapon in the division. I drove an M1A1 tank. I did all the crew positions in the tank. So, I got to design my own pre-command course.

When I finally got to the division -- I had again captured the technology of the division. Then fortunately, after taking command I had two brigade deployments to the National Training Center before we deployed to Saudi Arabia. I got the feel of the division. We were in the field and had several division map exercises.

Then General Schwarzkopf, who I've known much of my life, had an operation "Internal Look" at Fort Bragg. We went up and joined basically the entire CENTCOM team that would fight in DESERT STORM. We had a terrific CPX with most of our command and control vans and equipment and communications on Fort Bragg. We worked our way through the defense of Saudi Arabia. When we actually finally deployed into combat -- the maps on my Div TOC command vans were the same maps that we had used during "Internal Look". I learned about five or six crucial lessons out of "Internal Look." One of them was that we initially had defended too close to the port. Thanks to "Internal Look" we had unbelievable preparation to go to war against the Iraqi enemy on Saudi-Kuwait terrain. We were ready to go.

INTERVIEWER: So, you thought your soldiers were definitely ready and confident in your ability.

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I'll tell you what wasn't ready. Do you have our after-action reports from that war? I'll get you a copy of the yearbook we put out. There is a four-volume set done by Lieutenant Colonel John Craddock and Major Jason Kamiya. When we got back from Saudi Arabia, the Saudi's paid to put this four-volume set out. You ought to have one collocated with my archive because Jason is now a two-star general en route to command United States Army Southern European Task Force [SETAF] and Craddock is now the three-star Assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld.

They put the 24th ID combat history together. We captured the division operation order. We captured related documents. The yearbook is the fifth volume that I'll make sure you get. There are some number of copies of it (a red book). There are four black volumes, volume I through IV that are the division archives -- and then this yearbook. We got a high school yearbook company to crank this Red Book out, lots of pictures and personalities and some lessons-learned.

As we got ready to deploy, the tank and mech infantry battalions were an A plus. Rick Sanchez was one of my tank battalion commanders. One of the infantry battalion commanders was Rick Olson.

Colonel John Van Alstyne, later the chief of staff. He said: "The 24th ID has had a higher promotion rate of people to general officer than any since George Marshal. A bunch of those majors were world class -- like Bob Dale. This unbelievable logistics major was the DISCOM S3. He is now a two-star out at TRANSCOM. Incredible chain-of-command, incredible talent. Tank/mech battalions were terrific. The artillery battalions knew how to shoot.

The problem was there were a bunch of units that had never ever been exercised, except as a slice of the NTC deployment. So, the military intelligence battalion got force-fed a ton of brand-new equipment on the docks, which they didn't know how to use. They had never operated at a division level as an intelligence collector. The division long-range reconnaissance unit was completely ineffective. They spent all their time parachuting in trees at night, and practiced night fighting, instead of how to run AM radio networks [high frequency radio networks]. The logistics unit had never operated as a DISCOM in the field over extended distances.

So, a lot of the things that I'd seen as a major and lieutenant colonel on REFORGER in Germany and TEAM SPIRIT in Korea -- the 24th ID had never seen. The mindset was that 24th ID sent separate brigades to the National Training Center -- that's what we do. The artillery system existed only at battalion level. (The last night of the Gulf War, I actually had four brigades of artillery firing for me!) Well, fortunately we got to Saudi Arabia and we had six months to put this division together. There was frantic training and experimentation and work that went on. When the war actually started, we knew how to run the digital AFATD system and how to mass effective fire. We knew how to maintain aviation units in the field.

I would hate to think what it would have been like if we'd fought a week or two after arriving in Saudi Arabia -- and been asked to conduct offensive operations. The division level of training readiness and the interface with Corps was a very tenuous thing. Fortunately we had time to fix it before the war started.

INTERVIEWER: How did the soldiers that you led from the 24th ID differ from the soldiers you led in Vietnam?

GEN MCCAFFREY: You know, my Vietnam company reunion is coming up here in November and they'll all be back. They were terrific kids, terrific fighters,

draftees, great at small unit drills. The soldiers from my company in Vietnam, first of all, they were 100 percent draftees. The armed forces at the height of the Vietnam War was 14 percent draftees. That meant the Air Force and the Navy were manned by draft avoidance in the Army. At the height of the war in Vietnam we had a half million troops in country, I think 35,000 soldiers max were actually in company level direct combat units. When you looked at those units, they were all draftees. When you looked at my company in combat, the NCOs were instant NCOs. They come out of Fort Benning. The honor graduates were promoted to staff sergeants -- (the first top three graduates of every instant NCO course). The lieutenants were all draftees that agreed to serve for a third year and went to OCS. Most of them had two or three years in college. They weren't college graduates.

The Vietnam soldiers were terrific fighters, very responsive, fun to be around, tough. But I bet the median years of service in the company was probably one year in the Army. Occasionally, a lieutenant would come through who had a Ranger tab on.

Then you flash forward to the 24th ID. The power of the Bradley fighting vehicle, of the Abrams tank, of the 155 artillery gun, of the MLRS, of the Apache helicopter. 24th ID was a combat team of sixteen hundred armored vehicles, 5,000 wheeled vehicles, and 26,000 troops.

You know, once a week I'd spend a day with a captain company commander during the seven months of DESERT SHIELD. Once a week, I'd spend a day with a staff sergeant from some unit in the division. It was sort of fun for me to listen what they were up to. By the way, mostly I was listening to them. I used to tell people and it was only in half jest, but captains and sergeants were absolutely confident they knew what they were doing. They were up there to see if I knew what I was doing. The tank commanders, Bradley squad leaders, the staff sergeant NCO level were superb. These NCO's would have six, seven,

eight years in the Army. They had been to NTC 15 times. They had qualified tanks or Bradley's 30 times. They were awesome. So were the soldiers. The technology was awesome.

I tried combat both ways -- with a 24th ID juggernaut: blitzkrieg, fire power intensive armored force -- and crawling around in the mud as an infantry company commander fighting people at 20 feet range. Believe me, DESERT STORM with a tank-mech force is the better way to do it.

INTERVIEWER: What was your relationship with your higher headquarters in the desert and who did you report to?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, my corps commander, LTG Gary Luck, (PhD in ORSA) was sort of a central casting for what a soldier in XVIII Airborne Corps would want to be. Very unaffected, loved soldiers, very popular among his subordinates including division commanders, very decentralized. I used to joke with people that if you had an option of working for Gary Luck or me -- you'd pick Gary Luck every time. Very admirable guy, took a corps that had never left Fort Bragg -- and never thought it would ever leave Fort Bragg -- and didn't like being gone from Fort Bragg. They had huge problems understanding what they were there for. They all wanted to go home.

The sense of the corps staff was that they wanted to deploy home and get replaced by somebody else. I remember working the CG of the 82nd Airborne Division saying -- you want to take the best light infantry in the world back to Ft. Bragg? You will miss the biggest war we've had since World War II -- so you can be better prepared to send one battalion to Costa Rica?

Gary Luck was a terrific leader. He had been badly traumatized by desperate circumstances in Vietnam. All of us as Vietnam vets had been markedly influenced by our background -- and all of us in different ways. Gary Luck had

seen huge casualties. He thought he'd been ill-used by career senior officers. He wasn't going to let it happen to his soldiers.

I think the other thing that happened was that we looked at the Iraqi Army as if they were the Soviet Army. We had been studying fighting the Russians for 40 years. The Iraqis had the same equipment, a lot of the same organizational structures. Even though we knew they weren't Russians -- we ascribed to them a similar order of magnitude capability.

Two of us -- Binnie Peay and I -- knew better. General Powell and Secretary of Defense Cheney came over just before the war started and talked about the coming battle. I went up there to brief the two of them. I remember Secretary Cheney asked me a question at the end of my briefing. He said, "Oh, that's a great briefing, thanks very much, but what are you worried about, general?" I told him, I said, "You know I've had three combat tours, been wounded three times, my son is a lieutenant in the 82nd Airborne, I'm an incredibly cautious person when it comes to combat -- and I'm not worried about a thing." I said, "These people are like tethered goats out there, we're going to take them down in 10 days to four weeks. We're going to have modest casualties, which I'd thought was 500-2,000 casualties in my division." I said, "That bothers me, the casualties, but nothing else does. We're fully trained and we got all of our equipment, the logistics are in place, we are going to take these people apart."

That attitude permeated the 24th ID Division Combat Team. The XVIII Airborne Corps staff was filled with foreboders and anxieties -- which by and large the division commanders didn't share. All of us were confident that we were just going to kick the shit out of these people, starting with hour one of the war.

INTERVIEWER: If you had to do anything differently as the commanding general of the 24th what would it be?

GEN MCCAFFREY: It is hard for me to imagine an outcome more spectacular than we had. The Division Command Sergeant Major, Jim Randolph, and I concluded that on the last hour and the last minute of the war, we should have taken off all our equipment, thrown it on the ground, and walked away from it, and said we quit. We wanted to exit at the apogee of our personal satisfaction on the face of the earth.

You know things went wrong, I suppose you can diddle around. I'm a worrier. I tell people I get scared earlier than most people I know -- and I stay scared longer and I remember why. So I worried all the way out to the start of the war. Even though I had absolute confidence at the ultimate outcome. It is hard for me to imagine anything being done better than the performance of the team that ran the 24th ID during the war.

INTERVIEWER: Are there any issues or accomplishments concerning your command of the 24th that you'd like to discuss?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I thought there were a bunch of things, some of them minor some of them major, and they are documented in some detail in some of the studies we did. I mean, there were lots of equipment issues, communication interfaces, structural issues. They include a strong belief on my part that the division has is crucial as a command element.

The current discussion going on is can we do away with the division level chain-of-command? I think it's absolutely insanity. I've already talked about the notion that when we went into Saudi Arabia our training system for echelon above brigades at the NTC had been inadequate. There were lots of after-action review insights into that. I think it was clear that our Army divisions are too fat in some ways. There is too much equipment. I hate this arms room concept for infantry mech squads. A mortar M113 track is supposedly going to have an 81mm mortar, 120mm mortar, 60mm mortar -- and you pick the one that you want to

employ. We have way too much junk and equipment. We have to slim these things down.

I think we are also losing track of Army aviation. The 11th Aviation problem at Karbala in Iraq during OIF when they lost all their aircraft, damaged, or shot down was one of our worst operations. By the way, that happens in combat – it just happens to all of us, people get tired and they get too aggressive. I think when you are in too much peacetime -- you start losing track of what's really important. I was privileged recently to visit 3rd Infantry Division and I gave a battle leadership seminar to all their battalion, brigade, and general officers before they deployed to Iraqi Freedom. I talked bluntly about how to put together command and control that works for a division commander in an actual war. These division HQ's were never organized for mobile high-intensity combat. Division commanders aren't in wars, there isn't decent combat training for division level and corps exercises.

It's easy to forget some of the non-tactical brigades don't have brigade headquarters that actually work. Artillery, engineer, and logistics brigades only have a couple of guys in HMMWVs. Well, these CSS brigades had to run a TOC just like any other unit. So, there is a lot learned out of it.

I had a bunch of majors, Major Jason Kamiya, Major Bob Dale, Major Ben Freakly, Major Walt Holcomb, Major John Batiste (now commanding 1st Infantry Division in Iraq). I couldn't believe the capability of these officers, never mind the brigade commanders, most of who went on to be general officers. They were incredibility competent leaders. The battalion commanders were extremely good. So, here I had this huge complex piece of machinery and soldiers spread out. But the power of the chain-of-command, their intelligence, their dedication, their good judgment, their leadership, their courage was so immense -- that you know it was just remarkable.

One of the things, I did notice though, when we first got there, the different mindset of getting out of the USA and getting in Saudi Arabia. At first it was hard for some people. The older you were the harder it was. Although it didn't affect me at all -- and it didn't affect fortunately, my key Asst Div Commander -- BG Terry Scott. BG Scott is the best combat leader I ever encountered. People had a lot of trouble adjusting to the fact that there was a war. We were trying to get ready to go. There were equipment shortfalls. I was buying things on the US market with open contracts. I think I spent 40 million dollars in three weeks before we deployed. It was a big joke I said, "If this war gets cancelled, I'm going to jail." I started using the line, "General, this is war -- its war I tell you." I was calling people at 2 o'clock.

Thank God for General Edwin Burba who by then was FORSCOM commander...a four-star general. I'd call people -- and I remember a three-star General had called me and was raising hell. He just found out that I just issued 16,000 flak vests for the division out of the war reserve stocks. They were seen as riot control gear and they were held centralized around the U.S. I said, "Hey, screw that." I want every soldier in this division to have blast glasses, a Kevlar helmet and a flak vest. He called and he said, "Are you aware that these things cost 180 dollars a piece and demand accountability?" I said, "For God's sake, we must issue them – we're going to war!"

Because I believed in flak vests. I tried to use them in Vietnam when we were on a firebase. Every soldier in my battalion in Germany had to wear a flak vest -- by the way, they are great in Armored Personnel Carriers to prevent broken ribs and stuff like that.

I was combat loading 24th ID assault ships to deploy the division out Port of Savannah. There was a huge uproar that I was putting ammunition on ships. I said, "Wait, I know how to do this." We had tanks uploaded in Germany years ago. I said, "I've studied the battle of the Falklands and I'm not going to Saudi

Arabia and get there and find out we lost our ports and I have to fight ashore with no ammunition. I'm going to also put 500 fully armed soldiers on every transport ship." They said, "There are no places on these ships to put port-a-potties."

I finally won and got 100 air defense soldiers with weapons on each transport ship. They sent some three-star Coast Guard admiral down to see what I was doing in the Port of Savannah. There was such an uproar going on. There must have been 70 agencies telling me what I couldn't do. I finally said, "Hey, get screwed, I'm combat loading going to war. If you don't like it call the President and tell him to order me to not do it this way."

Thankfully some brilliant Coast Guard three-star came down and sorted it all out. I explained what I was doing. I said, "We are extremely conscious of the safety implications of how we're out loading." "We also know what we are doing, we know how to handle ammunition."

The biggest challenge of going to war is in the mindset of the participants. You have to make sure you're prepared to be flexible in logistics and operations. The XVIII Airborne Corps had never come out of their Ft. Bragg fixed installations until a war started. They had to be driven up to the frontier with whips. When we got to Saudi Arabia -- I moved the whole 24th ID (mech) division to the deep desert -- I said, "I got to get out of this port." So, I positioned 24th ID 150 kilometers out in the desert spread out -- and then we were ready to fight. I said, "The secret to this division is maneuver."

My DISCOM was operating out of fixed installations back at the port city of Ad Dammon. They were 150 kilometers away from my maneuver brigades. I told the DISCOM Commander, "Now you must displace DISCOM forward to the division support area [DSA]." They couldn't believe it. The DISCOM commander asked me to come back to give me a big briefing. My G4 said, "Well sir, they are

going to give you a big briefing on why they can't and shouldn't move out of the fixed city port area out to the field to join you."

I arrived and they had this whole briefing set up. There were about 30 people in the room. The DISCOM commander was a good man -- but he was subject to his own fears. His staff had been working on why the DISCOM couldn't move out in the Desert. I said, "Well, you know I'm looking forward to this briefing. I'm sure I'll learn a lot from it. But tomorrow morning at 6:00am you're going to begin the fucking deployment out to join my division, one way or the other. I better not hear one word out of any of you that argues with that outcome."

You know, you have to watch the mindset when war starts. That's got to dominate every element of your thinking.

INTERVIEWER: Switching to Washington now, in June 1992, you returned to Washington, D.C., to serve as Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, were you looking forward to working for General Colin Powell, who was then serving as the chairman, and what has he meant to you over the years?

GEN MCCAFFREY: When you look at the talent of a given year group by the time they reach brigade command -- there are maybe 100 people in each year group that all know each other. They're all going to be the general officers that run the Army. Every time I was on a BG board -- which I think was only twice -- you easily get down to 200 names from which you have to select 30 or so Brigadier Generals. I used to tell people you could randomly select the 30 BG's from these 200+ officers -- and the Army wouldn't be any worse off. Talent discrimination at that level is pretty hard. Everybody is doing the right job. Everybody's got a lot of energy – they are good people. Occasionally there is somebody who is clearly better than everybody else in the year group. Wes Clark, somebody like that -- Rhodes scholar, movie star good looks, whatever.

But Colin Powell was better than everybody -- plus or minus two or three years. We all knew that for years. We all liked him and admired him. So he was just a national asset. He was politically attuned He's just an unbelievable asset to the armed forces. I remember, when he was selected for Chairman most of us were pissed. We didn't want him to be chairman. We wanted him to be the Army Chief. Later on, I realized, hey, better he was the Chairman. Better he was the Secretary of State.

So, I was really excited about going to work for him a three-star Special Assistant. The job was an odd one, it was a three-star with a tiny staff -- three full colonels, three enlisted guys, and a secretary. That was it. I was his representative for the National Security Council and his representative when the Secretary of State traveled. So, I worked for Secretary of State James Baker, then Secretary Larry Eagleberger, then Secretary Warren Christopher. In one sense, I was again ideally prepared for that job. I taught political science at West Point. I'd been the Army's strategic planner. I had just got back from the Gulf War, so I had an appreciation for what the tactical forces looked like.

I tell you, I got there and my wife still thinks it's amusing when I say this. I got there and one of my duties every night was to go upstairs at 1900 hours. General Powell and Secretary Cheney had a daily meeting at the SecDef office round table. I was to sit next to Powell and take notes for him. John Jumper was against the wall as a two-star as Cheney's assistant. Secretary Cheney and General Powell acted like I was part of the conference -- but it was the two of them talking about what they were going to do. They are great friends. About the fifth day, I came home and told my wife. I said, "I am screwed. I don't know what these guys are talking about. I don't know if they are talking about the first name of some Ambassador -- or a new nation." The world had changed so dramatically in the three years that I had been gone from the Army Staff. The bust up of the FSU [former Soviet Union] had changed the political-military map of the world.

So I had this wonderful full colonel that was my executive assistant -- and he gave me a "geography 101" one Saturday for about eight hours. I say 'geography', because we sat there with a series of maps. He'd been the NATO liaison officer, he'd been in the Pentagon for six or seven years straight. By the way, there is an argument why everybody shouldn't follow classic career paths. He'd been doing political military assignments most of his career. He'd been the assistant to two of my three-star predecessors. We sat there at a map and he gave me a tutorial about the splintered pieces of the former Soviet Union -- the names of the U.S. ambassadors -- the foreign leaders who were involved.

If you're just reading diplomatic cables -- or just listening to the cryptic conversation of Dick Cheney and Colin Powell, you'd never get it. I was a guy that liked this pol-mil stuff and had done it my entire life, but I was completely overwhelmed by the changes in the world. It took me some period of time to get back in the bubble. I was also in charge of nuclear arms control. I was the arms control guy for the joint staff. So it was just an unbelievably complex, fascinating experience. You're on duty seven days a week, 24 hours a day. Encryption phone at home on all floors. Two in the morning -- the phone would ring...Major Rock Savage calling from Korea, the CINC's going to call you! I used to joke about these majors -- "For God sakes, don't call me and tell me the great man is going to call me -- just call me when he is ready to get on the phone." So, I would have to sit there at the phone until the four-star got on the phone.

I went on to be the J5 by the way. I think I had too much energy to have only four subordinates. So I ended up with 240 plus brilliant people in J5 working for me. We worked around the clock. There were 20-30 of us in the inter-agency policy area who were key to the national security policy of the United States. I was sort of the number three guy for the joint staff on the international world. So the chairman, the vice chairman, and then, normally, either the CJCS Special

Assistant or the J5 were the uniformed people who went to all of these crucial national security meetings, both here and abroad.

INTERVIEWER: So, with all your energy the following summer in May 1993, you assumed the duties as the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5. Could you please share with me the primary duties as the J5?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, the CJCS Special Assistant was a three-star who was on the road all the time. I would be gone 90 percent of the time, traveling with the Secretary of the State or the President, or over in the White House, or over in State Department, or CIA, or you know, to try deal with nuclear arms control. To educate myself -- I went to every place where there was a US nuclear weapon -- looked at it, its delivery system -- and got an on site tutorial on our submarines, ICBMs, B-1 bombers, B-52 bombers. So when I was doing arms control negotiation with the Russian minister of defense, I would reassure this former Russian paratrooper that I knew what I was talking about. My effectiveness was enhanced because I had taken my whole arms control negotiation team to these tutorials also. So I was gone all the time.

J5 -- I wasn't gone. J5 -- I was in the building with 240 people. Three of whom were civilians. I was the Chairman/Vice Chairman's guide on political military affairs, and had brilliant people working for me. I had this huge crowd of superb young officers who had stumbled in out of the operating forces -- Air Force F15 squadrons -- and off ships. Many of them had no joint time. They'd never been outside their Service. But their Service had sent them there to get jointed -- so the talent level was unbelievable.

I was the lead JCS guy for the Interagency Process. If you were working an international foreign policy or security policy or intelligence issue -- you called the JCS J5. At the United Nations -- Kofi Annan was the peacekeeping guy for the United Nations -- and he called me 15 times a week. Admiral Skip Bowman, my

one-star Navy guy who did peacekeeping, got called at home by him all the time. Skip is now the four-star head of the Navy nuclear program. Being the J5 was enormously interesting and frightfully important. I worked with some incredibility talented people. We formed very tight bonds of trust in the interagency community -- State, Defense, CIA, Justice, Treasury, White House, etc.

INTERVIEWER: As the J5, you had to interface daily with other directors on the joint staff. Please describe the working relationships that existed on the joint staff?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Difficult.

INTERVIEWER: Whom did you enjoy working with the most?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I liked the whole thing and I had great respect for all of them. But the joint staff, those of you who read this in future years, was in one sense the worst military staff I ever saw. The culture was left over from the old days when the chairman wasn't in charge -- the Chiefs of Services were. The whole structure was odd. General Powell from his years in Washington despised leaks and kept things very compartmented. International affairs were all my responsibility. But I remember when we went after the Iraqis with a Tomahawk shoot -- until the day before, the J2 Intel guy didn't know what the J3 ops guy was going to do. The J3 ops guy was forbidden from telling me the J5 what we were going to do -- even though I'd be the guy that'd have to explain to the Saudis, and the Iranians, and the State Department.

There were many three-stars from different services. The director of the joint staff, the Assistant to the Chairman, the J3, the J5, J2 is a two-star, but we were all inadequately coordinated. The Chairman is rarely there, he is not the squad leader of the Joint Staff. It's not like a division commander. The Vice Chairman spend a lot of time in the interagency process, so it was a very difficult

environment. Jack Sheehan was the J3, was a personal friend. He is one of the most talented people I ever met. Big, tough, super athlete basketball player -- just a wonderful Marine. But it was difficult working issues with him.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, in February 1994, you assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, what did this mean to you and how much had Panama changed since you were last there?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, it was a huge honor. I was then serving as the J5, which I loved. I had started off as the General's Aide-de-Camp in Panama years ago. I had visited every country in Latin America multiple times over the years. When I was a Cadet at West Point -- we only had three electives. Two of my three electives were on Latin America -- Latin American politics, history of Latin America. I had studied Spanish. For years I was in and out of the region many times. By the way, when I was the Aide 1968-1969 to CG USARSO -- we killed Guevara in that period. It was a successful US Army special operations mission. So I'd seen the days of dictatorship and Communism and the struggle.

The situation in Latin-America was so much immensely better when I went back as CINC. I was thrilled to be back and part of it. My CINCSOUTH secretary, I had hired, when I was a Captain. I got a max OER as the general's aide, because I replaced this crotchety, uncooperative bureaucrat -- with this gloriously beautiful, intelligent American. She was still there. Now, she was the CINC's secretary, so Mary Coffey was a point of continuity, between being a young captain, between Vietnam tours, and being back as a CINC.

Since I had been the JCS Assistant to the Chairman, and the J5 -- I had been intensively working OAS issues and Latin American issues. I had also worked as the Army's strategic planner. I'd been helping work the annual Conference of the American Armies over the years. So I never really lost contact with the region

over time. Jill and I got to go through several weeks of Spanish Language training -- because I had to wait for months to be confirmed. Finally, I got down there. George Joulwan had raced on off to be SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe]. There had been an under lap -- been some extremely lazy Air Force two-star, had done not a thing but play golf in the interim. Things had started to come apart.

So, I was convinced, then and now, that the Americas are vitally important to the U.S. future from an economic, political, and national security perspective. It's not really likely to be a war fighting theater. Although when Jack Sheehan would tell that to me, I'd say -- "What about Panama, what about Haiti?" So, there were a range of missions we had to be prepared to carry out, ranging from potential war fighting missions. What if Cuba comes apart? What if there is an attack on the Panama Canal? You name it -- on through humanitarian operations and peacekeeping.

We stopped a war between Peru and Ecuador -- we played a huge part in an inter-agency State, Defense, and SOUTHCOM mission. We saved thousands of Cubans out of the ocean. They were dumped on me in Panama with little notice. We put humanitarian camps together. Our scheme was -- we want to create conditions so that your grandmother or your great grandmother would have been proud to be part of it -- if they had immigrated to the United States.

There were a series of issues going on in SOUTHCOM when I was there. The most important strategy was "engagement". You can call it by whatever name you want. It was clear to me that a lot of life at the galactic international level is still based on personal relationships – Involvement, mutual training, and mutual respect, practicing communications and cooperation, having common plans. So I said that "engagement" was the most important thing we were doing. We were in a period of draw down from a permanent presence in Panama. I almost succeeded in reversing that. Had the Foreign Minister of Panama lived -- Gabriel

Luis Galindo. Had the President of Panama not wanted to run for a second term against the limits of the Constitution and elected to take on the American presence as a nationalist issue -- we probably would have stayed in Panama with four or five thousand US troops. We would have retained Howard Air Force Base, a small Naval/Marine presence, and maybe the Jungle Warfare School. But it didn't work out, so we were restaging in theater to try and continue an engagement policy.

We did the planning for the move of the SOUTHCOM Headquarters back to Miami against massive interference. The political system went into a paroxysm of "pork barrel" greed. Senator Trent Lott tried to get it into Mississippi. Congressman Spence tried to get it into Charleston. Congressman Newt Gingrich tried to get it into Atlanta. There was actually some guy who tried to get it into Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. He had an empty post. It was just outrageous.

USLANTCOM tried to eat the headquarters. General Jack Sheehan, USMC was the greatest struggle I ever had. I told him, Jack the chances of me not keeping SOUTHCOM as a separate joint command are zero. I said, "The reason is because Dr. Bill Perry, the Secretary of Defense, is a civilian, he doesn't care about service parochialisms, he has a doctorate in mathematics -- and so he will only listen to logical arguments." I remember telling Jack this is a rare point in a public policy dispute where, in my judgment, there is not one shred of logic on the side of doing away with SOUTHCOM and folding it under LANTCOM -- and a hundred good arguments for doing the opposite. So, I said, "You can rest assured that we'll achieve that purpose". And we did.

We changed the Unified Command Plan [UCP] dramatically also to give SOUTHCOM a logical air, land, and sea AOR. I think the US is going to be better off because of it. Although they continually go back to re-visit the issue. This guy Rumsfeld is again looking to roll SOUTHCOM into NORTHCOM. I'm sure if there is a second Bush term, he'll try it again. I thought engagement was

vitally important, so the two years I was down there, I again got to every country in Latin America except Cuba multiple times. Surinam, Guyana, you name it -- we were there. I had a terrific Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine component team. General Charlie Wilhelm, USMC, later to be the CINC, SOUTHCOM was my Marine component commander. Later on, General Pete Pace, USMC was. Some really wonderful operations, tremendous involvement by the National Guard and Reserve. We put 60-80,000 Reserve component troops through the theater each year -- primarily in Central America or the northern tier of South America -- but sometimes down in Argentina and places like that. We did real world operation cooperation with the Columbians, Ecuadorians. We did huge counter-drug missions though Bolivia and Columbia specifically, but also others.

I was fortunate enough to work with two fine chairmen. But the Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry is absolutely the finest public servant, in my judgment, we've had since George Marshal. It's almost impossible for me to over-state my admiration for this person, his personal life and his professional life, his intellectual capability, draftee, Army Buck Sergeant, scholar, businessman, public servant.

Secretary Perry and I were actually interested in getting Mexico into the SOUTHCOM arena -- so he became the first Secretary of Defense to go to Mexico -- and I became the first SOUTHCOM commander to ever set foot in Mexico. This was vehemently opposed by everyone in the United States government except Secretary Perry and I. "It would be a disaster, it would rupture relations between the U.S. and Mexico." Of course nothing of the sort happened. We got down there and dealt with this wonderful new Mexican President Ernesto Zadillo and started a process of dialogue with Mexico that has accelerated over the years. It's still not easy, but we tried to get them out of their 1920's mindset to understand NAFTA and the future – and cooperation of the U.S.

So, a lot happened during that tour. My wife and I thought it was just unbelievably fun living on Quarry Heights, serving in SOUTHCOM, and working with the joint community. We love Latin Americans, in general. My wife dearly loves being around Latin Americans and their families. I used to tell people it's the only culture in the world where the grown children, teenagers, line up to kiss guests as they arrive to welcome them. We liked the common workingman in Panama -- the people that worked around our house – their dignity, their hard work. My wife and I really thought it was just a terrific tour and a great opportunity to enhance U.S. cooperation with the region.

INTERVIEWER: What was your charter from the SECDEF and his guidance?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, first of all, it was the same as the other area combatant commanders, global CINC's -- PACOM, LANTCOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, etc. I think number one was to be prepared to fight in the region, if required. SOUTHCOM also had a whole series of actions that might spring from subordinate supporting roles to other CINC's.

We came close to having a war with Korea, while I was SOUTHCOM commander. I tell people we were 21 days from war in 1994. Secretary Perry called us all in, all the joint commanders, the service chiefs, a couple of civilians. We walked the final time line to war with North Korea. We were going to take them apart in a six months campaign. I was confident we'd do it. Fortunately it didn't happen – it would have been an appalling tragedy of enormous proportions. But SOUTHCOM had a role in what we would do to support the war in Korea. What would the Chinese do? What would others do? What would I do in terms of the Canal? What assets would I give up? So we had to be prepared for any war fighting mission.

We had enormous responsibility on counter-drugs, which Secretary Perry was supportive of. Some of his predecessors and successors have been less

supportive. But he wanted me to work that. He wanted me to work on a relationship between State Department and Defense Department in the region. Over time these CINCdoms had drifted in various directions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Foreign Services Act are actually complementary and effective laws. These laws define how the Ambassador and the CINCs relate to national security policy. These laws are not in conflict with one another.

But we had a situation develop over time in SOUTHCOM that Ambassadors thought they were in command of deployed U.S. military forces. As J5 before I went to SOUTHCOM, there were a couple of really big problems that developed in Colombia and Bolivia in particular. Two very determined, strong U.S. Ambassadors -- good guys, one of them a retired Navy officer who seen a lot of counter terrorism -- and the other one actually an admin officer, foreign service administrative branch who was a brilliant Stanford graduate -- a big handsome guy -- he'd been to the JOINT CAPSTONE course. They basically had taken charge of the military forces in country. Before I went down there, I saw Secretary of Defense Perry and Secretary of State Christopher and said, "I got to get this thing back in sync." I told Perry before I went down there I'm going to pull every military unit out of Colombia that's operationally deployed down there. The Ambassador had them under some unbelievably bad and dangerous circumstances -- and the same with the Ambassador in Bolivia.

That started a huge war between these two Ambassadors and I -- with others jumping aboard ship. The Ambassadors were so clever, very intelligent people. They started this long process to get me to modify my behavior. They jerked my POLAD [political advisor] out and sent me somebody as a State Department "spy" to get me under control. She immediately became one of my life long friends and cooperated with us. I went in and saw Secretary Perry, and said, "Sir, this is a matter of federal law and civilian control of the armed forces. You and Secretary Christopher must decide how you want this to turn out -- but I have no intention of negotiating the limits of my command authority as a commander."

I said, "I want these Ambassadors to wake up in the morning and say, "Aren't we lucky that we got a smart boy like Barry who spends seven days a week worried about these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines -- and who is so competent at what he's doing and who will listen to us intently." "That's what I want the Ambassadors to wake up in the morning and do. And I'm not negotiating any formal limits on my command authority."

It's always curious to me that why these two ambassadors were in open rebellion. A couple more thought I would be going down and sent outrageous cables off shooting at me from the sidelines. The upshot of it was both Ambassadors got fired, soft firings as is the normal way. To this day, I'm sort of amused just from a political view point, why would these two Ambassadors think they could take me on with an ego struggle – which was in contradiction of two Federal laws that were pretty clear – never mind the logic that military forces had to be under unified military command. Even more strange -- didn't they understand that I had been selected by the President – he had nominated and sent me down there. I had been working with the new Administration. I'd been the traveling companion to the Secretary of State. What were they thinking of? So, the last year of my time in SOUTHCOM -- it was a lot easier to deal with State Department because the Ambassadors got a good clue saying, "Hey, this guy can help you a lot." A very interesting tour, very informative, very rewarding.

INTERVIEWER: You talked about the engagement strategy, what other vision of what you wanted the organization to accomplish did you translate into action?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, first of all, there were some practical things. We were doing important counter drug cooperation that we had to achieve and we did. Over the several years in SOUTHCOM -- and the Drug Czar job to follow, we drove down drug production dramatically in Latin America. A lot of Americans just aren't aware of it. We almost eliminated drug production in Bolivia and Peru. Made significant process in Columbia. I unabashedly supported that action.

One of the things I thought was very important was to help transform Latin-American militaries. I said, we have huge credibility in the region among the military because they basically all want to be like us. Their Air Forces want to be like the United States Air Force. Their Navies wants to be like our Navy. We have such credibility, so we have to try and shape the development of the Latin American armed forces into something that supports democracy, that makes military sense, and that supports human rights and the rule of law. I said, "Who better to do it than us?" Theses Latin-American militaries look up to us as having had immensely successful combat experience.

At general officer level, starting at the top, we worked on trying to reshape Latin American military forces. Not to do away with them. Not to imply it wasn't legitimate to have a defense. We knew they had to serve to defend the nation's land and sea and air borders. But we said -- "Why don't you shape your military and naval forces in a sensible way?" I think we made considerable progress. We worked closely with the State Department. I'd have regional conferences of the U.S. ambassadors, human rights advocates, etc. I think we started to take hold.

Plan Columbia is probably a good example, although that came out in later years when I was the Drug Policy Director, not when I was a joint CINC. The Columbians and Venezuelans are two of the most dramatic examples of success. Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela -- we worked intensely with those nations. We had to work in a very careful way, we had to be diplomatic in the best sense of the word. We said, "We want to help you see a way in which you can spend your scarce resources on defense and get more out of it."

The Columbians are a good example. They've got a sea-going Navy – a third-rate sea going Navy. I said, "The Russians are gone, you can't possibly fight the

U.S. Navy. You're paying for a bunch of machinery that has almost no utility to you. You don't need it to defend yourself against the Venezuelans. They are not going to attack by sea, they don't have a navy, either. Your Marine Corps has an assigned sector and likes to practice amphibious landings with their tiny capabilities. However, what you really need is a "riverine force". Your navy needs to look like the U.S. Coast Guard. The Columbians, when I started that tour, it must have been 1994 -- had 20 Army helicopters -- but 1,400 artillery weapons and mortars. If you talk to them in their War College secret deliberations, they're worried about Venezuela, that's actually what they are worried about.

And the same with Venezuela. I'd tell them you just got this thing back assward. You have no road network on two thirds of your country. You need riverine forces and helicopter-borne forces. You need modern communications, you need reconnaissance units. So we tried to help shape their thinking on not wasting money on military power that actually didn't contribute to their security. Security at large, meaning defending their borders, yes. But also internal security operations in support of democracy.

INTERVIEWER: What was the most difficult challenge or constraint you had to operate with as Commander-in-Chief, SOUTHCOM?

GEN MCCAFFREY: There was almost never a "most difficult thing". There are a bunch of things you are trying to achieve with limited resources, limited leadership capability, limited time, other actors who are opposing your will. There were lots of challenges. The sensitivity of the Brazilians was just enormous. They make the French look humble by comparison. They were always looking for slights to them as a huge power touching almost every nation in Latin America. Like all nations, they want to be dealt with with respect and consideration -- but they are hyper sensitive. I worked on establishing relations with Brazil before I left Washington. There was a superb Brazilian Ambassador,

Fleche De Lima, here in Washington. I said, look, the first trip I make I'm going to go to Brazil. I won't do another country on that trip because I want to show that I understand Brazil is the super power of South America. I'm not going to take any personal security. I will say -- I don't need personal security, I'm in the hands of the Brazilian armed forces.

We made huge progress in having a good working relationship with the Brazilians. Yet right up until the end, if I used a few wrong words -- I would be in trouble. My predecessor, General Joulwan had almost been declared persona non-grata in Brazil. He made some minor speech in Puerto Rico. He talked about the fragile democracy of Brazil. The Brazilians killed him for it. They never let him in the country again.

You had to be extremely aware of national sensitivities. It's real and it's not silly. You have to give enormous public deference in each nation -- to the flag, the music, the President, the customs, the military awards, the way they receive you. I swear arriving ceremonially in foreign countries -- the only thing I haven't done is ride naked on an ostrich! All of Latin America have very different traditions. Their colonial backgrounds are French, Dutch, Portuguese, British -- you have to pay attention to that.

The other thing you have to do occasionally, is shut the blank up and listen to foreign leadership – and learn. Places like Peru. President Fujimori with his unchecked power became politically untenable. Fujimori did enormous good for Peru. We were always trying to teach him how to act. I finally persuaded a lot of the inter-agency community, why don't we shut up and listen to what he's doing. He lives there. Too bad he let arrogance and authoritarianism ruin his political effectiveness.

We never had enough resources in SOUTHCOM -- so my team always whined about resource shortfalls -- the intelligence team in particular. Because there

was always some higher priority effort which would get all our assets jerked to go some place else.

The Balkans started to break out while I was at SOUTHCOM. We ended up with 45,000 troops and a couple billion dollars a year going to the Balkans -- completely crazy. There wasn't a shred of national interest at stake over there. The Europeans had a lot at stake. The Balkans absorbed huge amounts of resources. And yet the JCS Chairman General Shalikashvili would be up in arms worried sick about the 500 troops and six aircraft we had supporting and keeping the peace, (the five power peace efforts) between Peru and Ecuador. So there are never enough resources.

A lot of what we did in nation building and engagement was done by our superb US Reserve Components. It is a huge challenge to use them because their planning time frame is three to five years. If you want them to build a school -- they may take eight "two week deployments" to do it during one summer. The reserve components must plan an operation for three to five years to try and get it set up. So you can't screw around with the National Guard at the last minute. You must listen very carefully to their concerns. I really admired the work that our Reserve Components did for SOUTHCOM.

INTERVIEWER: Is there anything that you wish you could have done better, or, if you had more time?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, one thing is that I would have rather stayed there for five years. I think in some of these theaters, the CINC ought to stay for five years. I think two years as an area Joint Commander is way too short. You must get to know the people. You must stay in contact. Now to be fair, the senior military people in Latin America turn over every year. Most of the international military world turns over much more frequently than we do. A lot of Latin Americans are in office for a year and go out. One year is the normal tour for

many of these Latin American chiefs of services. But to get a feel for the places, to have a set of relationships you can build on, so you can pick up the phone and call people, it takes time to develop that. It's further to fly to Buenos Aires from Panama than to fly to Moscow. I should have been there longer. I think the US Joint Commanders ought to stay in office longer.

The joint system works pretty well. That's why Dana Priest's superb book is still worrisome. She questions and worries about these military senior Generals, who bear such huge area global responsibilities. She questions why they should play a key role in foreign policy. The answer is -- it's by default. The Joint Area Commanders are so effective -- they have loyal staffs, disciplined staffs, money, planes. They have representatives in each nation. All over Latin America, the MILGROUP commanders work for the combatant commander -- not for the Ambassador. Our U.S. joint theater commander, when he shows up in a nation -- he's a big deal. People like dealing with the US Joint Commander. They trust him. They think they are dealing with people that have connection to the US national government – and we do. I think that the US Joint Combatant Command system works pretty well for the United States -- and for the international community. It certainly is responsive and loyal to the Secretary of Defense – and the Secretary of State.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, let's spend a few minutes on strategic leadership, since you're well-versed in that subject. In your opinion, how should strategic leaders be identified, trained, and managed?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Very difficult question. One of our challenges is we're not very sophisticated at seeing different sets of skills as not necessarily being interchangeable.

I actually started seeing it in brigade commanders. We pick the best people in the Army to be brigade commanders almost without exception. We think some

day they're going to make general officer. Almost without exception they have integrity, good judgment, good leadership. But I found that many of them, half of them weren't tactically competent. They weren't great commanding brigades in the field. They haven't done enough troop time. If you spend thousands of hours in S3 and tactical commander field responsibilities -- you're better at it than if you only had brief exposures.

I think there were some people who are better at strategic planning and thinking than others. So we try and pick the most wholesome, holistic people of all to be our General officers -- but these officers are not necessarily that good at being strategic planners. I've also noticed that I've seen a lot of our four-stars or most senior officers (and we ought to be proud of this in one sense) -- when you look at them -- their central skill was leadership. A lot of them are incredibly energetic and focused -- driven. Many of them have unbelievably attractive personalities. Carl Vuono, Sullivan, spring to mind. But occasionally you'll look at a senior General and say -- if you gave this guy an IQ test -- he'd be in the top of the middle third. When it comes to sheer creativity, Ralph Peters who retired as a lieutenant colonel, is hands down is one of the most creative people I ever met in my life. However, our promotion system barely got him to the grade of lieutenant colonel.

Peters makes a good example of somebody who doesn't have a Harvard degree, wasn't a War College graduate. However, he was one of the most well educated and creative people I ever met in my life -- besides being an incredibly brilliant and prolific writer. I borrowed him when I was the Army strategic planner for a mission in the Balkans. I borrowed him when I was the JCS J5 for a mission in the Balkans. I borrowed him when I was CINCSOUTH, for a mission to devise an Andean ridge counter drug strategy. I borrowed him when I was the National Drug Policy Director for a strategic reconnaissance of the U.S. Mexican frontier. I sent him into Thailand looking at opium production. He was immensely valuable as a strategic planner.

First of all, we absolutely need to educate people on strategic thinking and logic. I've been very fortunate because of our superb General Max Thurman. When he was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, he grabbed a few of us and put us in his own private development program. He sent me off to the School for Advance Management and Strategic Studies in La Hoya, California. It was the beginning of "online asynchronous teleconferencing". Two weeks, twice a year, we were in residence for strategic planning and management. The program lasted five years. So, you do have to try and educate your senior leaders.

But you also have to assemble a strategic team. National Security is a "team sports" activity. I always knew from the time I was a battalion commander -- I wanted an incredibly strong G3 or S3. I'm very self confident, very assertive, I know I'm in charge. I've always known I'm in charge, but I needed somebody to counter balance that. Someone who's willing to strongly advocate creative courses of action. I think when you get into strategic leadership involving qualitative understanding of regions -- you need to bring in the talent. You must educate and create the talent that you need to understand the international situation fully and sensitively.

I was fortunate when I went to Latin America. I knew tons about Latin America. It was a life long avocation and interest. Had you put me in CENTCOM, I would have been somewhat less qualified. We sometimes encounter three- and four-star officers who see themselves as visionaries, as transformational actors, when in fact they're not. I used to tell people, the reason I ended up as a four-star general is because I learned how to listen to Staff Sergeants carefully -- and I was a good organizer. I'm an organizer, and objective -- not a visionary. So, I need to have young creative people on my team who are visionaries. I have to borrow those kind of mental skill sets.

INTERVIEWER: What are the confidences necessary for strategic leadership?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well , one of the problems of responding to that question, is you know -- there are a dozen four-star generals in the Army at a given time. They are what they are. We do not pre-select them based on some theoretical sense of strategic leadership. A man that I greatly admired was General Jack Galvin -- multiple books, historian, witty, delightful, intellectual, quick, nuanced. Personally, I think he was a terrific four-star General. People loved working for him as a division commander. As a full Colonel, I thought he was a lousy division chief-of-staff.

We loved him as 3rd ID Chief-of-Staff. I was a major G3 operations working for him. We had a brute of a division commander who was actually a great teacher and a great commander -- but a real brute. Galvin wasn't a big organizer. He was a visionary and an intellectual -- and had terrific leadership qualities. The Army ends up with the leadership that we create and nurture. Ralph Peters is a genius -- but the chances are good, he's not going to end up as a four-star general.

The Generals are like bingo balls when they come through the machine. Sometimes there's no reason why they are there -- that's just what the air blast popped up to the top of the heap. So you end up with these assorted three- and four-stars. We must create a training and education program -- but then we must also package them carefully in teams. Wes Clark is one of the most brilliant people I ever met in the Army. He is a visionary. He has a special intellectual capacity. I think you just have to make sure that you assemble a balanced leadership portfolio when you put together the theater team.

By the way, I might add, being just a great visionary is not enough. Again these are sensitive comments -- but one of the earlier SOUTHCOM commanders, General Woerner, who was in SOUTHCOM during the lead up to the Noregia take down, was the first and last four-star FAO [foreign area officer] that we're

going to have as a CINC until they forget his legacy. I actually hadn't known him until he was retired and I was the CINC SOUTHCOM. I got to know him and had great respect for him. He is a genuine intellectual. Hands down he was the most intellectually qualified four-star we ever sent to SOUTHCOM. Language skills, area skills. He was a miserable failure, because he didn't understand U.S. politics or how to deal with a thug like Noregia. The whole armed forces got in a rage at him. He told former President Carter and President Ford when they were down there to observe elections that he couldn't safeguard them. He made some errors in judgment that slowly worked us into a worse situation.

So, there it seems to me, I would have argued not that General Woerner was the wrong guy to make the SOUTHCOM commander -- but that you had a responsibility to make sure his deputy, his chief-of-staff and his J3 had the organizational skills --and perhaps the hard-nosed line of thinking that would make this leadership team more complete.

One of my battalion commanders in the first Gulf War I really admired and loved. He used to have this wonderful card with big red artillery stuff splashed all over it -- the slogan was "Ordinary soldiers doing a hero's job". You know, that's sometimes what the Armed Forces gets in three- and four-star Generals that are at the pinnacle of strategic/national security thinking. Sometimes they aren't necessarily visionaries -- that's not why we selected them.

INTERVIEWER: You retired from active duty on 29 February 1996. What lead to your decision to retire?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I retired because President Clinton asked me to be the National Drug Policy Director. It was some kind of sad day in my life -- and my wife's life. I couldn't sleep for weeks before that. I had finished my second year in command in SOUTHCOM. I thought it was 99 percent likely that they'd want me to stay on for a third year or more. Perhaps even as long as four years so I

could move the headquarters from Panama to Florida. That's certainly what I would have argued for. I thought there was some likelihood I'd have another four-star joint position -- or be Vice Chief of the Army or something like that in future years. So I didn't want to leave the Army.

The National Drug Policy Director quit suddenly. He was a wonderful man with a PhD in criminology and several books to his credit. He had been the Police Chief of three major cities. He had been disgracefully handled by the incumbent Democratic Administration and by the Republicans in Congress. He essentially quit three years into the first Clinton term. President Clinton was in trouble in the polls at the time. There were probably three or more issues that President Clinton thought were going to get him unelected.

The elections were a year and a half away. So they looked around for somebody to replace the incumbent who'd walked away into the dark. By the way, he kept his mouth shut out of loyalty to the President. But he quit. He just walked away. Went off, and got married and quit. So, they looked around and they came up with me. The reason they came up with me was I could be rapidly confirmed by the Senate. It's sort of funny. I didn't have a girlfriend. I didn't have a "nanny problem". I didn't have a drug problem. I was capable of instantaneous confirmation by the Senate. I was seen by the Clinton Administration to be a war hero which would add a certain note of toughness for their leadership image. They knew me because they had worked with me, by that point, for three years. They had seen me as General Powell's Personal Assistant -- and the J5. So the White House leadership knew me and they liked me. Then I was the CINC SOUTHCOM -- and we briefed the President three or four times a year. So they all knew who I was. Finally -- they said, "Well, this is a good political move."

Now, I think the President actually was more serious about it by far than that. He said, "No, I want you to do it, because the only people in Washington who can do planning are the military." He said, "This is disorganized and screwed up and I

need somebody like you to develop a workable strategy and move ahead." The Vice President was supposed to deliver me as the Administration sale. I spent four hours with Vice President Gore on a Saturday afternoon at his house. At the end of the interview I said, "Sir, I don't want the job. Here are the names of three people who are better qualified to do it than I am. Here's an outline of a way to move ahead and make it work better -- and I don't think I'm the guy for the job." He said, "Well, I don't agree. I'm more convinced than ever that you are the right man for the job."

Then Secretary of Defense Bill Perry talked to me and said, "Barry, I want to explain to you why I asked the President to strongly urge you (Perry is such a gentleman) to accept his request to serve as the Drug Policy Director." He said, "I want you to take the job even though I wouldn't tell my worst enemy to take this job." Then, he went on to say, "By the way, you gave these people a ten point plan if I remember, for straightening out the mess of the drug policy business." "By doing so, you sealed your fate." "Because what they're going to tell you when you go to the White House is they'll agree to every one of your demands." So that's what they did.

I didn't want the job. I wanted to stay in the Armed Forces, I wanted to stay in Panama. My wife didn't want me to do the job. But I got a long letter from Gloria Magruder, the wife of LTG Lawson Magruder, my U.S. Army South component commander, a life long friend -- the two of them. She went up to Jill and she said, "If Barry has decided that he's not going to take this job (because they knew I was sort of struggling with this issue) then don't give him the letter. If he has not made up his mind yet, give him this letter." Hopefully, the letter is somewhere in my papers. It was a long beautiful argument as a mother -- and why she wanted me to take on this job. I tell people what finally sealed it, was my dad called me and said, "Hey, shut your mouth and do what the President asks you to do." And that's how I ended up as the Drug Policy Director.

It was the most useful thing I ever did in my life for five years – I loved it. I got immense cooperation out of a Republican Congress and Democratic Administration. The President of the United States was supportive of me throughout. I worked for, law enforcement, educators, health professionals, parents, coaches, mayors, and community coalitions. The 5.1 million chronically addicted Americans, were my constituency -- and the people that provided drug and alcohol treatment to them. By and large all these communities were supportive of having an Army general who showed up and suddenly made drug prevention and drug treatment his high energy business.

I told Secretary Bill Perry I won't go over to the White House unless I can take 15 military officers with me. I think I went over there with 11 military officers. It was an Agency in disarray. There were 40 or 50 demoralized employees. I built it into a 250 person agency. We got the basic law rewritten. We ran the drug-related budget from $13 billion to $19 billion. We put huge new resources into drug treatment and drug addiction research. We organized a billion dollar five-year national media campaign. We know we did some enormously useful things. Even though I know you can never replace life in the Armed Forces in terms of sheer personal reward -- still being the National Drug Policy Director was the most useful thing I ever did in my life.

INTERVIEWER: So, you retired the next day and you assumed the duties?

GEN MCCAFFREY: That's it. Talk about an education. I had been a political science professor who was tutored by General Powell in the ways of Washington. I was not exactly a new boy on the block. But even the confirmation -- there was such nonsense going on. I was held hostage. Any nomination gets held hostage for unrelated activities. The Senate tries to beat the Administration out of trading material. They kept holding me hostage.

At one point I said, "Well look, I've got a job. I've been confirmed by the Senate and I'm a serving four-star joint commander. If you guys screw around with me, I'll just say -- I won't do it." I'm going to walk away and go back to SOUTHCOM. So the Senate finally, on short notice (meanwhile there was no incumbent), confirmed me.

Once I learned of the sudden unanimous vote, then there wasn't much time for retirement. I had a retirement with Secretary Bill Perry and the Chairman officiating. I had every NCO from my command tours in the Army, along with all my family and a very small number of friends. The Army was having a four-star conference at Carlisle that day. I flew back to Panama and had a decent set of farewells, parades, etc., to make sure I disengaged in a professional public manner in SOUTHCOM. But essentially, the day following my retirement from the Army, at 10:00 in the morning I got sworn in by West Point classmate Gene Sullivan, who was Chief Judge of the Military Court of Appeals. Then that afternoon, I was again sworn-in publicly by a Justice of the Supreme Court at the White House -- with my wife and son there. Our two daughters couldn't come. So, there was a break in service of eight hours overnight.

INTERVIEWER: So, the Old Guard has never given you a retirement ceremony over at Fort Myer?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, they asked me, but I said no, because it would have been after the fact. I needed to get to work. Secretary Perry is again, the most admirable public servant I think I ever met. I went over and had a luncheon in the Army/Navy Club downtown with all these wonderful NCOs and a few close friends. My first company commander General Herb Lloyd (Retired) was there. Then I got to work.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, let's see if we can go ahead and shift focus from your role as the drug czar now to being retired. What use has the Army made of your experience?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I told each chief, Rick Shinseki and now Peter Schoomaker, that I'm still one of their soldiers. When 9/11 happened, I wrote a bunch of pathetic letters to the President and the Secretary of Defense, saying that if they wanted somebody to go wreck the Iraqi Army or the Taliban -- I was their guy and I'd welcome recall to active duty.

The military is behind me, but I got an offer to teach from the Head of the Department of Social Sciences, Colonel Russ Howard, up at West Point and the Dean, BG Dan Kauffman. The Dean and I had been young officers together in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point 28 years earlier. So, they offered me the teaching position as the Olin Professor of National Security Studies. It's now morphed (since the Olin Foundation finally ran out of money) into the Bradley Professor of International Security Studies. I was thrilled to be teaching back in my old department at West Point. The position has been around 20 years -- retired four-star General Jack Galvin and retired Admiral Stanfield Turner and others. My wife said, "Hey, take the job, how else will I get to live on an Army post again?" So, we got an apartment in North Apartments. We're living with a bunch of young majors and their families. I have a seminar once a week, I told them I'd be up there a day or two a week. Sometimes I'm up there for a week at a time. Jill loves going up there. I leased a car to drive back and forth the five-hour drive. I also have a web site, a virtual classroom -- so that four days a week that I'm not there, I'm in communication with the students or the faculty.

I bring in lots of speakers. Basically, my course has a speaker a week. I give an hour lecture. There are student presentations, student papers. It's been a real joy to stay involved working with these distinguished people like LTG Bill Lennox,

the Superintendent (with his PhD in English, from Princeton) and his predecessor, LTG Dan Christman. Dan Kauffman, the Dean, is one of the most brilliant people I ever met. So, West Point has been the most significant thing that I do. Partially because of the chance to teach cadets -- partially because I continue to write, speak on TV and radio.

I write for The Armed Forces Journal, the Wall Street Journal and Podera Magazine -- and a few other publications. I do a lot of pro bono work in the Armed Forces.

I'm on the internal military speaker circuit. I think I've talked to almost every Capstone Class – (our new one-star Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) for probably nine years in various capacities. I've kept my contacts with NDU as Drug Policy Director -- in the last three years I've still talked to every CAPSTONE Class. Now, I talk about the interagency process, "how do you get the United States government to do the right thing?" I talk to the Leavenworth classes about "Combat Leadership". I talk to many of the service schools: infantry, armor, artillery, intelligence, transportation. I do lots of lectures and listening. I talk to the Foreign Service Institute. Tomorrow I go to the Center for Naval Analysis.

I stay very active in the Atlantic Council, the Council on Foreign Relations, the CSIS, the U.S. Mexican Cooperation Study Group. I do a considerable amount of continuing engagement with the joint community in NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM.

General John Abizaid asked me to spend some time in Iraq and Afghanistan. I went to all the divisions, the international forces, the Ambassador Gerry Bremer, LTG Sanchez, the council of economic reconstruction. I'm going to do Pakistan, Afghanistan, here in a few weeks.

I do lots of Washington Speakers Bureau paid speaking – mostly business groups. I'm still very much involved in the international security community -- writing, speaking, and direct engagement. I've done some work with the Columbians -- not much, for a variety of reasons. But I'm still pretty supportive of what the Columbians are trying to achieve as well as the Peruvians.

Finally, I run my own consulting firm with a small number of employees. Basically, I work with the CEOs of large companies, much of it in investment opportunities, developing value in technology or defense industry. In those roles, I'm able to continue to support the efforts of the current national security leadership. Issues of weapons of mass destruction have been a life-long professional interest and engagement, so I am still involved in nuclear arms control and that kind of thing.

Then finally, I continue to try to stay supportive and engaged in some aspects of the retiree community. I give private coaching to senior officers as they come out of the military. I have helped place many senior officers in civilian industry -- that's up through the four-star level. I developed a book I use on "how to act in civilian life". I coach senior people leaving the Services -- it's not galactic thinking -- on practical stuff. (Go spend 3,000 dollars on civilian clothes, get an accountant, get a lawyer.) So I try to be supportive of these wonderful senior military men and women. A lot of them that are now retiring, are one- or two-star officers who have worked for me when they were majors! I'll say, "Well, let's have lunch -- and I'll give you a two hour class on your next life."

INTERVIEWER: What drives you and to what do you attribute your success?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I'm very grateful that I can contribute in a lot of areas. I tell people I'm actually almost embarrassed at how happy I am. The overwhelming loves of my life were the United States Army, my children and my wife. Now I get to choose who I work with. People will ask me to work with them. I'll say, "Well,

first I must listen to your ideas, meet your people and then we will decide. I'll write the CEO a letter and say, "Whether or not you want to work with me ought to be dependent on what you think after you read the letter I sent you."

So, there is a lot of choice in my current life, unlike service in the armed forces, where essentially you're working for the protection of the nation. You have a duty that you can't back away from. So, I'm still working seven days a week -- but it's discretionary activity -- and a lot of diversity. I've really enjoyed working with NBC news on TV. They're terrific people, they've been very supportive. I work with a variety of high technology firms. I really enjoy being on the speaker circuit. I like going out there and trying to help people understand and interpret the new national security challenges. I still directly interface with many of the people in the government in Congress and the executive branch. People like Senators Chuck Hagel, John Warner, Jack Reed. As the Drug Policy Director there were almost no governors, mayors or Congressmen that I didn't work with -- and they are all still in office. I still support many of the Governors directly. I spend a lot of time directly interfacing directly with people like Robert Bonner, the Customs and Border Protection Chief, and Secretary Tom Ridge, his Deputy Jim Loy, and Paul Wolfowitz, who I see a lot. Steve Hadley in the National Security Council. And on occasion, I work with Mark Grossman, Under Secretary of State. I'm still supportive of anything Secretary Powell does. I occasionally get nice notes from the President or from the Chief of Staff at the White House.

There is one glaring exception. The Secretary of Defense has enormous disagreements with me -- and probably some level of personal animosity. I have been very critical of his incompetence and arrogance. But mostly these guys in this government are friends of mine. They know I'm trying to support them and the war of public diplomacy and public ideas.

INTERVIEWER: Is there anything in your military career that you weren't able to accomplish?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I think if I had another 10-15 year shot at it, I'd probably get to where I wanted to be. There's almost parallel lives that I would have loved to have done. I'm one of the few people I ever met that actually hoped I'd get to go to Recruiting Command. I remember during the War College year a Recruiting Command two-star came out and gave us a lecture and knocked our socks off -- and I thought that'd be fun. There are just a lot of things out there to do in the Army, you'd have to have a couple to three lifetimes to get to all of them.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, you are a prolific writer and you have written many articles, I would like to spend some time on why you wrote the articles, specifically what was your intent? "Cutting Ground Forces is Dangerous," published in the Wall Street Journal on August 1, 2001, your intent?

GEN MCCAFFREY: You know, as I look at the military today, and I have a lot of visibility of it from various perspectives. I see the Army in the field -- and in Iraq -- and my son is still in uniform. My daughter served in the National Guard as well as on active duty. So my belief is the people in the current ground combat forces are the best we've ever had. They're tough, they're smart, they're well trained. There is one huge problem we face: the Army is too small. The armed forces are too small in special operations, Army conventional forces, Marines, and USAF airlift.

Secretary Rumsfeld likes to say high-demand, low-density forces means where you didn't put the right number of forces in force structure. That's not totally true. You've got to have a nuclear deterrent force and you hope you never use it. That doesn't mean you can move those forces to being civil affairs guys. There are some aspects of the armed forces, Air Force security police, C-17 aircraft, that are grossly in short supply. The Marine Corps have an inadequate end strength. They're supposed to be a war fighting force from the sea. The Army at 480,000

people or 500,000 with the current active duty Reserve structure, is grossly inadequate for the task that had been given. It was designed for a two limited war capability -- who knows what that means.

I helped shape force structure with General Powell. We had a good conceptual framework to hang stuff on. How many Naval carrier aircrafts should we have? How many Marine battalions? How many Army tank/mech forces and light infantry battalions?

Force structure, money, and leadership are the only realities. The Army is too small. Seventy-three percent of our combat battalions are deployed right now. Eight of the ten divisions are moving. We have a huge strategic threat from North Korea, from the Chinese to Taiwan, from the collapse of Cuba, which is going to happen in the next two years. The Army has shot its basic load. I went down to help say farewell to the III Corps when they left Fort Hood. Governor Rick Perry and I closed up the flag and farewelled LTG Tom Metz and his III Corps team, as they deployed for rotation three into Iraq. Forty percent of that rotation, now going is Reserve. Sixty-eight percent of the deployed CSS elements are Reserves.

One of the main things I did while I was at Ft. Hood for this farewell (2004) to have a conference with all the G1's and the G1 sergeants major. I give it as my fixed opinion, that the United States Army is going to start over the edge of a cliff in the coming year. Now the media always ask me the wrong questions -- they say "Oh, you mean the morale of the Army is low?" I say, "No, the morale of the Army is sky high. They are tough kids, they know they are fighting for their country, they know they are doing good for Afghanistan and Iraq, they are courageous, they are up to it --but there are too few of them."

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld says he is going to study the issue whether more Army force structure is required. When you are taking mathematics at West

Point -- if you're given a calculus problem and you set up the problem -- and you start working the solution, and the solution becomes obvious -- you skip all the remaining logic steps and you write down "QED" and the answer. That means in Latin -- words to the effect – "the answer is apparent and has been displayed". When you talk about Army end strength, it's QED -- it's too flipping small. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld refuses to face up to logic. The size of the Border Patrol when I started working their shortfalls in 1996 was 3,000 people. When I ended in 2001, it was 9,000 people. As the Drug Policy Director I said the right answer is 40,000 people. The Attorney General would say, "Where did you get that number?" I'd say, "I made it up, because you people aren't addressing an obvious problem, 12,000 miles of land borders with a 4,000 person force, it's crazy."

The same thing is true about the United States Army. We have four divisions in Iraq, with a division equivalent in Afghanistan, a division equivalent in Korea. We can't keep it up. It is possible that Swiss democracy is going to break out in Iraq and Afghanistan -- not likely, but who knows. The political leadership that caused us to have this huge situation of risk is flawed. Secretary Rumsfeld is going to tell John Abizaid next year "the Army is ready to crack. We didn't do the right thing three years ago, increase the strength substantially, so you got to defend your interests in Iraq with two divisions." General Abizaid will be forced to say "Yes, sir," and then try and hold it together with two divisions.

One of our aviation brigades just coming home had 13 captains and 13 letters of resignation. They were deployed to Iraq. They had been home 21 days from Afghanistan before they deployed. I tell the media – "don't misunderstand, they're proud of what they are doing, they're terrific in combat." However the troops are saying they have been on two combat tours. As they look out toward the future, they are going to be home six months and go right back. There are 300 million Americans. There are a half million soldiers in the Army. Their families will say let somebody else take their turn. So, I think in the coming two

years given the absolutely arrogant behavior of Rumsfeld and some of his team -- the Army is going to start crashing. The Apache pilots are going to take a walk on us, civil affairs officers, engineer captains, military policy staff sergeants The problem won't be the morale of the Army -- and it won't be the first timers. A lot of the lieutenants and the privates are going to go to war -- and stay in because of the war -- because of their pride in what they did. I think we are going to damage the Army and it's going to take us 10 years to fix it. We won't get a time-out for a decade. We are placing the American people at risk.

INTERVIEWER: Some of your respected colleagues, retired three- and four-star general officers believe that the Army should have another 50,000 to 80,000 soldiers.

GEN MCCAFFREY: The number I'm using is 80,000 and that's a low ball number. I personally think that's grossly understated. 80,000 more soldiers would give us enough lubricant, given a successful experience in Iraq, (which is not now happening) for us to maintain a couple of divisions there for 10 years. I think what we are doing now is a unilateral withdrawal from Europe. The Europeans are not reacting because of their anger at us over Iraq. We are going to walk out of Europe. Secretary Rumsfeld says we are going to reposition eastward -- and this is just complete nonsense. We are going to have only an occasional battalion show up in Poland – but we will no longer have two reinforced Army divisions in NATO.

I think the Army is in serious trouble and the prime shortcoming is inadequate manpower. The leadership is there to expand this Army in 18 months. You can go out there and pick any major battalion XO right now at random and immediately put them in command of a battalion. You can take a good number of your brigade commanders and tell them, "Hey, you are a two-star general, you're in charge of a division." Our captains, many of them could immediately command battalions. So the leadership is there to rapidly enhance this size of

the Army. What we lack is enough young people coming in so that we can create at least three more divisions. We need to activate about three National Guard divisions, put them in the active force structure. Tell the Guardsmen we're sending you back to civilian life in 24 months. That's the last time we're activating you for five years -- and then man those three divisions with active duty forces. Then maybe we can keep the war going. The Army is too small.

INTERVIEWER: What do you think of Army transformation?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I think it's pretty good. Some of the conceptual framework is pretty good. Rick Shinseki, the CSA, was coherent, long range. I'm not sure I wanted transformation to be a single program. I may have preferred to see it as a strategy to move ahead. I do not like the language of transformation. I thought the language was grossly inadvised – "the legacy force". Oh my God, who wants to fight and die for a legacy force. But more importantly that communicated to these poor civilians like Rumsfeld that we think the M1 tank and the Bradley are "World War II systems" -- that we have to put up with until we get a new force created. When in fact, our current Army is the most modernized high intensity combat force on the face of the earth.

I think General Peter Schoomaker is going to do a lot of good accelerating new technology and doctrine out of FCS [future combat system] and into the fighting forces. I like his idea of reorganizing 3rd ID and 101st on the run. TRADOC screwed around with it for five years and couldn't define what an FCS vehicle was. The Stryker Force is pretty good.

The one thing I would caution though, is a widely used term, from General Tommy Franks and others, "We're facing a world unlike any we've ever seen before." Rumsfeld frequently says this -- "Basically, I'm going to have to help these generals understand that nothing is as it was." That in my judgment, is sheer intellectual arrogance. The only thing absolutely new that we're facing now

is a serious terrorist threat to the homeland – perhaps one including weapons of mass destruction. So Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge has a huge transformational responsibility with the FBI and the Coast Guard, Border Patrol, etc.

From the armed forces perspective -- yes there is re-stationing, new technology, new command and control, UAVs, digital communications. Sure I get all that, but nothing is really new about the enemy threat, the Taliban, or a new phenomena of counter terrorism. Special operations is hardly some dramatic new idea never before seen in history. Fighting the North Koreans is going to be something unlike we've ever seen? Really? Fighting the war at sea is hardly a brand new phenomena -- the threat is two low-class submarines from the Iranian Navy and fast missile boats.

I do not think we currently have an outmoded World War II structure -- and a brand new threat. I think they're wrong on both counts. I'm not too sure the totally new threat applies to much of anything but the Department of Homeland Security.

This US military that Rumsfeld arrogantly claimed was completely incapable of thinking of the future, was the same armed forces that won the first Gulf War in four days, took down the Afghans in four months, and took down this current Iraqi Army (even with grossly inadequate fire power, which Rumsfeld constrained) in 28 days. I think the revolution in military affairs may be more gas bags in Washington -- than it reflects new realities on the battlefield.

INTERVIEWER: What are your thoughts concerning the cancellation of the Crusader and Comanche programs?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Let me stress that I'm a nonpartisan person. I've never been identified with either political party. I'm very supportive of much of what the

Bush administration tried to do in the foreign and defense policy. But we have a very serious problem. We are trying to create a giant new homeland security capability. We're fighting a huge world-wide campaign against global terrorism. We are operating with a seriously under-resourced Army, which we're shuttling around the world. Our defense costs have sky rocketed for ammunition, fuel, hotel rooms, medical care, etc. You name it and we're doing it.

Taxes have been cut back dramatically. There is a giant and growing deficit. We just sent a bill to Congress which includes a 400 billion dollar defense bill but includes not a dime for operating the armed forces, starting in January -- it's unbelievable. The Administration is waiting to get beyond the election. Part of it was they desperately need money to feed and to run the war. So they went after Crusader.

I talked to all the NDU CAPSTONE classes. I actually went to see Rumsfeld one-on-one about this. I wrote an article about "High Intensity Combat Operations" for Armed Forces Journal. I told him. "You know, Mr. Rumsfeld, I want you to read this article and consider it -- I said, "By the way my feet are not planted firmly in 1944, I'm a very bright boy and I'm concerned about national defense." I said the "very bright boy", because Rumsfeld mostly thinks the Army generals are stupid.

So, we need to modernize the force, yet there isn't one dollar right now in the FY 05 budget to modernize the Bradley, Abrams, Paladin team. It is unbelievable. We canceled Crusader, the most important artillery weapon on the mid- and high-intensity battlefield. That's not a World War II thought on my part, it's a reality of the nature of warfare. Some of these civilians like Rumsfeld don't understand fighting. I and others do -- and my argument has been that Crusader was going to quadruple the effectiveness of U.S. artillery which is grossly out ranged by present and former Soviet artillery as well as Iraqi guns. We need Crusader. It was on budget, on track, and would have had a giant impact on our

fighting capability. It was killed, I think for ideological reasons by the White House. I think the President, when asked in a speech at Citadel, "What legacy programs would you kill?" -- the only one he could remember was Crusader.

They say it was too heavy. Too heavy for what? Is a C17 transport too heavy? Is a carrier too heavy? The Army's high intensity combat force goes to war by sea. It takes the US a month to five months to make up their mind to fight. We have early arriving forces. Thank God we're putting Stryker in the field. But the 70 ton, M1 tank goes to war by sea. You can fly a few of them on C5s or C17s -- same with Bradley. Well, why would you suggest that a 50-ton Crusader is too heavy for the high intensity combat force? By the way, you could fly two of these Crusaders on a C17 and put them into Afghanistan. Put six of them on the ground and suddenly, completely change the situation of the Tora Bora Campaign. So killing Crusader artillery was ideological and stupid. They didn't understand the real world of fighting and killing.

Comanche was killed, I think primarily for funding. They needed to funnel money into an under-resourced Army aviation program. DOD had under- funded it for 10 years. DOD was diddling with it. The Army never put the money into it that they should have. Comanche was the most effective, revolutionary flying machine in the history of Army aviation. However, the electronics and avionics were under-funded for 10 years. There were some technical problems there -- but I think basically Comanche was killed so we could pay for the desperately required modernization of the Apache Long Bow -- and to single fleet and modernize the Black Hawks to the "M" variant. I'm not fighting either of these decisions -- but it's the first time in our history our modernization has nearly come to a complete stop. I don't see that the Chief-of-Staff now has much option for the next 24 months. We must stay on top of Iraq and Afghanistan. So on a range of things to worry about, the number one problem remains, the inadequate end strength of the United States Army -- not the end of Comanche and Crusader.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, you spent a lot of time over on Capital Hill and certainly Washington, D.C. Do you believe that certain individuals view the Army as relevant and ready today?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I'd think you'd have to be blind and stupid to think the Army is not relevant and crucial to our security today. The country's future is riding on the United States Army. So Rumsfeld and some of these guys came into office and said we're going to do away with irrelevant forces. Paul Wolfowitz, (who is a friend) recently gave a speech at AUSA and said, "Yes, the Army's still relevant." As if we need to be reassured by the Secretary of Defense that the Army, is the only thing keeping us from a disaster in Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea – or for deterrence and Cuban refugees, etc. For God sake, we don't need to be reassured that the Army is relevant. If you watch television -- try imagining U.S foreign policy and national security policy without a strong Army.

So I think again it's amazing to me watching Rumsfeld, who came into office saying all we need is a big special ops community and some stealth fighter aircraft. The future of the President he works for is going to be dependent upon the skill of the United States Army.

INTERVIEWER: "Saddam's SS," published in the Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2002, your intent?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I wrote three articles -- actually this is the fourth one dealing with Iraq. I wrote two of them prior to the war, "Saddam's SS," dealing with the pieces of the Iraqi Army that we thought we'd fight, and the other one was, "How a War Might Unfold". Then I wrote one right in the middle of the Iraq War for the Wall Street Journal talking about the current problem of having attacked with inadequate ground combat power. I said yes, we'd easily win the

ground maneuver phase, but that our outcome was entirely dependent upon how we did the second and third phases of the war.

I wrote another article when the war was over, and said -- here is how we ought to interpret the results. I think these articles are going to stand the test of time. "Saddam's SS" was an attempt to basically say, "Yes, it is true that most of the Iraqi armed forces aren't going to fight. They have been starved for spare parts, equipment and doctrine. Saddam's SS took their most talented people and shot them, ran them off.

But some pieces of the Army will fight. The Special Republican Guard, the Republican Guard, the intelligence services will -- and the Sunni Muslim quadrant of the country. So I tried to identify the real threats. I think one of the problems was -- I don't think the Air Force killed much of anything during the campaign, to be blunt. I get in terrible trouble saying that in a joint forum. Thank God for the United States Air Force -- they did a lot for the campaign -- but basically the Republican Guard took a hike on us. They decided not to fight (then). Instead, they went home with their guns, their money, their leadership intact. They had a cellular structure. They came together. They got their nerve back. And we're now fighting them. So "Saddam's SS" was an attempt to say "watch out" to Rumsfeld and his whole team for a year prior to the war. I was in periodic meetings with senior defense leadership leading up to the war. I told one of the most senior officials "You know, I think your assumptions individually may be correct -- but you have to do a sensitivity analysis. What if your assumptions are wrong? What if some of these guys do fight?"

I argued at the time for enhancing the ground combat intervention force. I told them the only reason I was eminently successful in combat -- a lot of what I learned about fighting, I learned as an untalented and undefeated West Point intramural boxer. I was undefeated, because first of all, when I got in the ring, I was scared to death in every fight, which is a good way to approach combat.

The second thing, our coach told us was to get across that ring and pop that guy and try to kill him with the first punch, then dominate the fight.

So I wanted Saddam's SS slammed to the ground, I wanted the Iraqi security forces dominated. I also didn't want the Iraqi army dismissed. I thought we all had an agreement in the US government before we started that war. We were going to say to the Iraqi Army -- put your tank turrets to the rear -- you're the future security of the country. Instead we threw them out of work with their AK 47's and their RPGs -- and we sent them home to become insurgents.

INTERVIEWER: You reaction to Saddam's capture? Did you still think he was in country at the time?

GEN MCAFFREY: Oh, yes, sure. I'm glad we finally got him. Incredible bunch of young soldiers and young officers in the G2 section of 4th Infantry Division. Our tactical intelligence right now in Iraq is the best in the history of the United States Army. It's amazing what these kids have figured out. Complex Arabic language, no street numbers, etc. They did a terrific job. I think capturing Saddam was extremely important to reassuring the Iraqi's that he wouldn't be back.

INTERVIEWER: You've traveled to Iraq, you've seen our soldiers in Afghanistan and other locations. How do you think they're doing?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I think they are doing great. Probably two clusters of observations about our presence in Iraq that I came home with. One end, the Army, its sense of courage and its ability to operate decentralized. We are taking artillery batteries and telling them to park their guns and go open the Iraqi school system. Incredible strength of their chain-of-command and what their capable of doing. I think the Army's confidence has never been greater.

I think the political assumptions in Iraq are going sadly wrong -- and it really bothers me. Ambassador L. Jerry Bremer is a brilliant man, an experienced guy, but there have been some fundamental misjudgments like dismissing the Iraqi Army. The transfer of authority on 30 June is a big ass mistake. These three factions, Shia, Sunni, Kurd fear and distrust each other with good reason. They're looking angrily at our presence. There is almost no "coalition" there but the U.S. and some Brits. The Iraqi's are saying these US guys are withdrawing – the US is trying to unhand this before their own presidential elections.

So, I think the political realities are extremely unsettling. We have the wealth, the resources, the military leadership to leave Iraq in a decent shape and no longer a threat to it's own people and it's neighbors and our oil supplies. But to do that requires patience, courage, and resources. I'm wondering if we have any of those three.

INTERVIEWER: It's been said that the Army doesn't have a bench of general officers, your thoughts?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I think it was the most outrageous thing I have ever seen. I went in and saw Paul Wolfowitz one-on-one and rebuked him. The three-stars in the Army who won the war in Afghanistan and won the war in Iraq, have not been promoted. Lieutenant General William Wallace, Lieutenant General McKiernan -- it is outrageous. You know, we've had some pretty good generals by and large over the years. You get 5,000 colonels, select 25 people a year for BG. We end up with some real talent. We spend an average of four to six years of full time post graduate schooling on our Generals during their first 25 years in the Army.

It's my own belief we went through a tough period there with the Vietnam vets in senior positions. I think a lot of us were wounded by our experience in Vietnam. We were hesitant to use military power, but we still did a great job. The division commanders of the first Gulf War were all Vietnam vets. They are all gone now.

I told Paul Wolfowitz that the one- and two-star Army officers I see now are the best generals we ever had in uniform. They are so incredible. Some of them jumped out at me when they were captains or majors. Petraeus probably is the most talented person I ever met in my life. Batiste is incredibly effective. When he was a major working for me at Fort Benning as the Assistant Commandant, I used to tell people that I wouldn't mind working for him -- just trading places.

We've got incredibly competent leadership in our general officer corps. I made the argument to Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz -- he went out and told AUSA how proud he was of the "one- and two-star generals" of the Army. You know by implication, he was insulting all the three- and four-stars. What an arrogant crew of civilians running our brave Army.

INTERVIEWER: "North Korea's Global Threat," published in the Wall Street Journal on December 12, 2002, your intent, sir?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, the number one defense challenge that we face today is North Korea. Some would argue it's Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. North Korea has got a substantial stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, probably got a couple of nuclear devices, got 300 some missiles that can range Japan, South Korea, U.S naval forces in the region. A year from now, two years from now, pick a study you believe, there will be a dozen or more nuclear weapons. They have a million man Army, 14,000 artillery weapons and armor. The guy running the country is a sociopath who murdered 2 million of his compatriots --- forced starvation and execution. The economy is imploding. We think the guy's judgment is suspect, we're not quite sure what he'll do. Thank God, we got Secretary Powell following in Secretary Bill Perry's footsteps. Perry had the lead for coming up with policies in North Korea.

I think there's a good argument that the six power talks are beginning to work. We've told the region, you cooperate or you're on your own and we'll consider

strategic withdraw, we'll go back to the sea, go back to Japan. We may see emerging from this -- Japan rearmed, Japan going nuclear. Japan already has the most powerful navy and air force in the region. None of the Pacific rim nations want to see Japan rearm, so I think the conversation is moving in the right direction. However, this is a huge problem for us. We've kept the peace there for decades. That peace has now gone unstable. Peace is basically built, around a small number of U.S. military forces -- 40,000 people forward engaged. The first minute of military action by North Koreans would engage the United States. Our huge global military has for 20 years backed up that 40,000 soldier presence. So the North Koreans know if they attack – we will destroy them. That deterrence worked right through 1994. Now, we no longer have a huge military -- the one we've got is heavily engaged elsewhere and the North Koreans know it. They've got some nukes. They are going to build more despite grain, or legitimacy, or fuel oil. They've decided they want nuclear weapons and they're going to do it.

So the challenge is enormous, and that article of mine was an attempt to publicly drive the attention of policy makers away from this bad "framework agreement". The "framework agreement" was coming apart. I wanted people to realize you can't ignore the problem.

You have to do something about it. I'm glad to see the Six Power talks. I strongly believe in the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System. I want to see us pour considerable resources in the Navy Ageis system trying to get a boost - phase interceptor. I want us to work the problem of the Air Force and the laser from an aircraft. I want to see us work the terminal ballistic phase out of Alaska -- perhaps North Dakota. I want us to tell the North Koreans unequivocally -- if you go nuclear we'll tell the Japanese to go nuclear. I think our current policy is going to end up with the North Koreans having 300 or more nukes and a missile system that can hit the United States. I want us to take any measure required to prevent that from happening to include pre-emptive strike -- to include potentially

the use of nuclear weapons. I think the world would be at huge peril and so will the American people, if we allow this government to have nuclear strategic strike capability. We simply have to prevent it. Better we prevent it now than 15 years from now, when the consequences maybe disastrous for our own security.

INTERVIEWER: You wrote, "There is No Easy Answer to the National Security Threat Posed by North Korea to the U.S. and Our Crucial Regional Allies." What should our interagency people be focusing on, since you have spent a great deal of your time in the interagency community?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I think the most important thing they are now focusing on, is to prevent this from becoming a U.S.-North Korean problem. It must be a problem of regional allies and the United States. If they don't see it that way -- we have a strategic option which is to withdraw, basically. Our message to the South Koreans must be that if you find our presence unhelpful to the dialogue between you and the North -- we'll withdraw. I think that will bring a dash of cold water into the faces of the international community.

I think the Six Power talks are vital. I think the ballistic missile defense has to be put in place, because I don't think we are going to be able to roll back totally their nuke capability. We shouldn't live with the possibly of a first strike by two, three, four missiles -- you know, killing a dozen million Americans. We simply can't allow them to have nuclear weapons and we've only got a short time to react, a couple or three years, before we've lost the bubble.

INTERVIEWER: Let's talk about your next article for a second, sir, "The Imperative of Ballistic Missile Defense," published in the July 2001 issue of the Armed Forces Journal International. You wrote, "It's no exaggeration to suggest that we may face the prospect of millions killed and maimed sometime in future years if we do not begin to act effectively and soon." Do you believe that our government can pass and build a credible missile defense plan?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I have been asking that question for years. I've been following it for better part of ten years or so. I think the public debate has been deliberately misinformed and politically mischievous on both sides. I don't trust either side on the debate. On one hand, you have the "Reagan Star Wars", which was as much a deception plan to crack the Soviet Union as it was a real missile defense program. Some solutions are politically never going to happen. You're not going to put your nuclear deterrent force in bunkers all over a ten state area -- and build underground tunnels between them -- and have a project that would be 50 times the size of the national interstate highway system.

We're not going to put into space -- brilliant pebbles -- and have live munitions in space -- that's another extreme. Another extreme says "don't worry about ballistic missile defense, destroy your nuclear weapons or have only a 100 of them, or one of them, and we'll be safer". I think that would place the lives of the American people at such risk that we will actually create nuclear arms proliferation. If you're in Iraq or in Syria, you would say, "Hey, the Americans have 100 nukes, we'll build 101". "We'll intimidate them, rather than vice versa, we'll do whatever we please and they'll strip away their nuclear capability as a useable defense mechanism."

The US must develop the technology to mount an effective defense against amateur, nuclear-equipped Nations – the North Koreans and the Iranians included. It might not work perfectly, but if, we make it so credible that we can say that "we have a ballistic missile defense -- you're building these systems -- and when you build them they're not going to work -- because we're going to be able to shoot them down as they take off the ground in mid-course and on impact."

Secondly, we have to state that we have a huge nuclear deterrent defensive capability -- if you fire one of your nukes at us -- we'll obliterate your military and

political capabilities. Third, we have to create the international legal tools and international consensus to try and stop this proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I don't think the latter works unless you have both ballistic missile defense and also maintain an assured first and second strike capability. I think you have to do all these things at the same time to deter the future use of nuclear weapons against the American people.

INTERVIEWER: We have spoken about Iraq, an article on Afghanistan – "Denying a Sanctuary to Terror," published in the February 2002 AFJI issue. Your intent?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I actually have two articles out on Afghanistan. I probably ought to roll them both into one. In writing about Afghanistan we should agree that the right thing to do was take down the Taliban, deny a sanctuary state, run the 5,000 Al Qaeda foreign fighters out of there, deny them a place to do training, recruiting, money laundering, rehearsals, political demonstrations. What we did was magnificent.

In a lot of my speeches, I tell people I'm very proud of being a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. On September 23rd after 9/11, I was in a packed audience in the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. 250 of the smartest people in America. The people that write the books on foreign policy. I told them I heard a lot of hand wringing that we can't do anything about Afghanistan. The Taliban are too far away, the mountains are too high, too cold, our boys can't find it.

I said, "This is not a military challenge. It's a political basing rights challenge, a logistics challenge, a communication challenge -- but it's not a war fighting challenge." "We are going to get in there with relatively modest forces and knock these people over." I said, "It'll take us 3-18 months and we'll eliminate sanctuary for terrorism and we'll never allow it to come back." I told them at the time, the

reason I believe that is the Special Operations Command (a small outfit, 45,000 people) are the most dangerous people on the face of the earth.

We talk about the elite Republican Guard. Elite Republican Guards? Are you guy's crazy? But these US Special Ops guys are unbelievable. At the height of the war, we only had 300 special ops people on the ground. That's what took down the Taliban. Two carrier battle groups. A few F15s. Some C17's dropping food.

Our most pressing need in Afghanistan was to end the sanctuary. I don't see how we maintain the sanctuary denial unless we create a viable state. So the take down may have been pretty good -- but the subsequent follow-on efforts has been grossly under resourced. Secretary Rumsfeld in his town hall meeting, I quoted in the second article on Afghanistan -- he walked away from the heroin problem. He said, "Well, you know its demand reduction problem – it's a European problem." In my view he is confusing what's going on. It's a 2.1 billion dollar crop last year -- skyrocketed with hundreds of millions of dollars flowing into the warlords. There are gross levels of addiction inside Iraq and Pakistan and Central Asian Republics.

We can't achieve our foreign policy objectives unless we confront the drug war. But we only have 11,000 troops there -- and 5,500 NATO troops. I think Rumsfeld's thinking was, if I take on the drug trade these Taliban guys are going to fight. It's much more sensible to fight over a 2 billion dollar heroin cash crop than something ideological.

I think the take down of the Taliban and Al Qaeda was vitally important, was brilliantly done, and thank God we did it. The follow on failure to use NATO in Afghanistan with us was a gross error in judgment. NATO was absolutely ready to join us. We said it's too much trouble to get political consensus among you guys. Your military capability stinks – (it does, so what). We ended up going to

Afghanistan with most of our NATO allies anyway. However we lacked the legitimacy of having engaged our international allies. So I think our current phase of operations in Afghanistan is shaky -- but the take down was superb.

INTERVIEWER: Where do you believe Osama Bin Laden is hiding?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I asked George Tenet and he said, in Western Pakistan – the Tribal Areas. I would be unsurprised if he was actually dead. He's dropped out of sight for a couple years at a time before. He stopped seeing delegations. He's stopped using his cell phone. He's stopped providing video coverage. If he sticks his head up, we will kill him.

I think the problem with the terrorism threat is that it's a chronic condition. Some terrorism is driven by the alienation of Islamic males who are unemployed and are dealing with grossly corrupt, incompetent, hypocritical governments. They buy into the extremist notion that if only the purity of Islam could be returned -- then the shame of the Arab Islamic peoples would be rectified. That's the problem.

So, there are many terrorist organizations out there. We identified 37 foreign terrorist organizations on the State Department website. They're morphing into a different kind of threat.

We have to think through what we are going to do about those other problems. But it's not the case that if had we ignored the Taliban in Afghanistan or ignored Iraq that we'd be better off. We'd have an overt sanctuary for terrorism and a sense of impunity.

INTERVIEWER: Your thoughts on how the military is doing as an element of national power?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Better than the rest of the elements of national power. There is a whole laundry list of national tools that we teach Cadets at West Point and the War College. Diplomatic effort, covert action, economic leverage, etc. The key players in the international affairs process now include the Attorney General, the FBI, the intelligence community, the Secretary of the Treasury, money laundering, etc.

The military is always the worst of all the tools to reach for as part of your first choice. There are these huge anxieties on what's really going to happen when you use the military. You're never totally sure how it'll come out. You always create secondary problems that you then have to deal with.

On September 12th and onward, I would argue that the administration initially did a terrific job. The Congress got engaged. The media got engaged. Suddenly we went, "Oh my God, they slaughtered 3,000 innocent people, we'd better get going." Now -- I think we've got some problems as the fear factor starts to go down. Will we maintain focus on this?

INTERVIEWER: Do you think we've become complacent as a country?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I think most of us have -- sure. There are three pillars to our international war on terrorism: the intelligence and law enforcement piece is going pretty good. The worldwide law enforcement community has arrested a better part of 3,000 people. They are penned up in Baghram and Guantanamo -- and a lot of them are talking. We've developed new mechanisms for cooperation. Even countries that despise us, their intelligence and law enforcement are cooperating. We did the military piece with brilliant effect, although I think it was badly under-resourced. We've grossly under funded the domestic security piece -- not only in money. Here in the US we must create new structures, new departments of government, new laws. We've got to be careful what we do. But we also haven't applied enough leadership. I think

eventually we're on the verge of another strike. Between now and 3 November, I'd be astonished if the Poles, the Brits, the Italians, or us don't have a major hit. The military here and in Europe can't protect the shopping malls, the subways – as well as the nuclear power plants. We've done a lot -- 40 billion dollars, 45,000 TSA employees, huge increases in border manpower. Even though we've done a lot -- I don't think it's been adequately resourced.

INTERVIEWER: How can the U.S. eliminate terrorist sleeper cells that lie dormant in the U.S., Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Asia, and Africa, and Do you believe disconnected states become safe havens for terrorist groups?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I don't think we'll ever be completely safe. There's no such thing as total safety. I personally argue against the "war on terrorism" as a metaphor. I think that we ought to call this a "cancer of terrorism". With a malignancy, the first thing you do is prevention. You try and mitigate the conditions. You engage the international community. The second thing you do is you have a holistic sense of treatment that you're going to do something about it. Part of that is domestic law enforcement, international law enforcement. We must bust up their courier system, their money laundering, arms smuggling. They're afraid of us. They think we've got even greater capabilities than we have. We've done a lot at the border now. We finally have a coherent force.

I just had lunch with Rob Bonner – the Customs Commissioner. Spent two hours with him yesterday. I try and stay in touch with these domestic security issues. There is no question we're at risk with the so-called sleeper cells.

The 19 terrorists that took down the Trade Towers, and the Pentagon, and the plane into Pennsylvania – 16 were educated Saudis, spoke English, had visa's, were competent to live in a foreign society, and willing to die for extremist Islam. Those characteristics are in pretty short supply. I think the thing that most surprised me about them was that many of them had been here for a year or two.

A lot of them were going dancing, spending their hard earned money on prostitutes, gambling, using alcohol. A lot of them are sort of flakos and we should have picked up on that. We had a guy here who was arrested. He was learning how to take a plane off -- but he said he didn't need to know how to land it. To me that's just incredible stupidity on our part that we didn't react.

So these sleeper cells, this isn't James Bond stuff. I think we've got a huge illegal influx of Arab population in this country. The overall majority of these Arabs come here (they are not being well assimilated) for the same reason your grandparents did. They want religious freedom. They want fear of the police to end. They want an opportunity to educate their children to include their girls. So the sleeper cells are pretty risky propositions for Al Qaeda. You may find your sleeper cell just got a job at a car wash and is taking "Saturday Night Fever" dancing lessons. Your boy may be no longer super keen on blowing himself up. But we're still at risk.

INTERVIEWER: The article, "War on Terrorism Protecting Americans Land in Maritime Frontiers," published in July 2002, AFJI issue. Your thoughts on U.S. border security and what can be done to protect the U.S. Homeland better?

GEN MCCAFFERY: Well, I started working on this issue in 1996 as the Drug Policy Director. I mentioned earlier 3,000 border patrol, no one in charge, most of our 12,000 miles of border are not even marked, 300 federal law enforcement officials on the U.S.-Canadian Border of 5,000 miles. 96,000 miles of sea frontiers and a 35,000 person Coast Guard with aging maritime capability and aging aircraft.

At the El Paso Bridge of the Americas – a 24 hours a day, 7 day a week operation -- nobody is in charge. There is no command intelligence system, no common communication system. You know a lot of people would say it's hopeless. That is complete nonsense. We've been able over the past two years,

to safeguard the aviation industry -- where the security has gone from zero to a B-minus. We can do many of the same things with the land and sea borders.

INTERVIEWER: You wrote that the Coast Guard needs help.

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, the Coast Guard needs to be doubled in size. It's a superb law enforcement agency but completely inadequate for current tasks. It is supposed to enforce a variety of laws, fishery laws, iceberg monitoring, import of prohibited tuna products that weren't cut in a environmentally sensitive way. Now it must do counter-terrorism, counter-drugs. It's inadequate for the size of its responsibilities and the Navy is structured to do a different mission.

Cuba is about to fall apart in the next two years. The Coast Guard needs to be equipped to operate on the high seas to save human life and to turn them back. We don't want 8 million Haitians up here in the United States – we want them to stay in Haiti. We need to double the size of this Coast Guard and give it a modern capability. We need to increase the Border Patrol to 45,000 people. We need to construct a very different National Guard -- not only with M1 tanks and F16 fighters. We need military police, field engineering, field communications, field medical -- so that the 54 state and territorial governors have the ability to handle consequence management of a giant nuclear strike. The National Guard must be there to help with that. They have their law enforcement structure. We need to build these new institutions and we need to get on with it. We are moving way too slowly.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, we were discussing the war on terrorism, protecting America's land and maritime frontiers. On 1 October 2002, U.S. Northern Command was activated. Your thoughts on how NORTHCOM is doing?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I'm about to go out and send a couple of days with General Ed Eberhardt here in a few weeks. I watch it as closely as I can with great

admiration for what they are doing. I think what was clear to me is we absolutely had to have a military headquarters that was empowered by law to take on the mission of DoD support to the nation in the event of domestic terrorism.

You know, we had a Joint Task Force down at El Paso that brokered requests for military support from law enforcement around the country. Now, we have a joint combatant four star commander who is bringing together Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine, planning to support the country in the event of a terrorist strike.

I personally would have rather seen us dual hat the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk. It wasn't clear to me why Joint Forces Command had to be only a doctrine command -- who ever heard of that?

NORTHCOM is going to do some great planning work. The country's got a real dilemma. Our Constitution, our political culture wisely says be skeptical of people with guns, badges and uniforms. We don't want the U.S. armed forces having any domestic law enforcement responsibility. We don't want them collecting evidence or being involved in the arrest process -- that's understandable. Having said that, the day there is a major strike on the United States -- tactical nukes, multiple places, chemical weapons, bio attack -- up until that point, the only person that will ever trust law enforcement responsibilities is the Attorney General of the United States.

But the Department of Justice is weakly structured by Congress -- they can't do large missions. They have 120,000 employees. They can't organize large events. Even their federal law enforcement agencies, the FBI, the DEA, the Marshal Service, aren't paramilitary. You can't get 600 of them in a battalion to move some place. You can get 20 of them to go TDY and live in a hotel some place. So, on that basis, the day before there is a major strike only the Attorney General will exercise authority. The day after only the Secretary of Defense is going to have the capability to help. So I want to see NORTHCOM get engaged

much more than the current Secretary is letting NORTHCOM act. They need to get plans and then rehearse their plans to protect us in the event of a strike or a national disaster. I think they are moving in the right direction -- but again too slowly.

INTERVIEWER: Your thoughts concerning the Patriot Act?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I probably don't know enough about it. I watch the issue as close as I can. It is appropriate for us to be concerned, to watch carefully. The thing we are most interested in protecting is the Bill of Rights -- it's not our enormous wealth. Our right to privacy, free movement, freedom of speech. We want the government constrained, we want the government to have to go to a separate branch of government to get a warrant to listen to our phone calls and seize our e-mails. We want to make sure nobody is arrested, unless there is a warrant for their arrest issued by a grand jury or judge. We have a reason to be skeptical of unfettered law enforcement. Human nature, it'll go out of control for sure.

However, we have a responsibility to defend ourselves. Only a foolhardy society would think that they could defend themselves without adequate laws. I don't know anything in the Patriot Act that in of itself is a threat to the American people. It's very carefully constrained in my view. There are good people in government. They must be carefully watched by Congress and the Judicial Branch.

You know there are a couple of things the Administration is doing right now that worry me. Bad cases make bad law. When they do something stupid, they stand their ground. This administration has an impossible time admitting any error for any reason, in any program. They stand their ground. They get forced into the court system and lose cases. Then we will set a precedent that may harm our ability to use certain measures.

For example, the ability to arrest terrorists and hold them detained is incredibly important to us. Foreign nationals living in this Country illegally without a visa card have absolutely no right to expect that they won't be seized and held in detention permanently and deported. They entered the country illegally. We must be able to find out if they are terrorists and put them behind bars.

However, we have arrested American citizens here in the United States. We've labeled them "foreign combatants" not entitled to Geneva protections. We've got U.S. citizens domestically arrested -- being held outside of the "writ of habeas corpus" by federal authority. That is insane -- that is going to get reversed. The country cannot tolerate setting a precedent for an Administration that can arrest an American citizen and say, "we're going to hold you for the rest of your life and not explain to the court system why we got you or what the charges are". These are misjudgments we are doing in Guantanamo.

Our legal fiction, which has been extremely useful to us, is that Guantanamo isn't on U.S. territory, so we can do anything we want there. "Where you are when you commit the offense" is where the law has power. We've held people without any notion of an administrative hearing at Guantanamo for way too long. We're going to get a federal judgment that we're not going to like -- so we ought to back off. There should have been some screening panels. We should have given them defense lawyers. We should have released some -- or explain why were holding the rest of them and put it in writing. We should publish all their pictures. Terrorists know who's there – do their families?

INTERVIEWER: Spain experienced a horrific terrorist act on March 11, 2004. How can incidents like that be prevented in the future, or can they?

GEN MCCAFFREY: First of all, they can't. If I was in charge of Al Qaeda, we'd have had a huge problem over the last three years. Again I think they have an over-vaunted belief in what we're capable of. We are going to remain at risk.

Terrorists have an option of striking wherever they want. We have a free and open society. We are not going to close the threat off. Over time if they continue to attack us we'll end up looking like the Brits who had to deal with the IRA. We are not going to ever be completely safe. I ride the Acela Amtrak first class train to and from New York and Washington all the time. I jokingly refer to it in speeches as a conspiracy of business guys who'd rather be blown up than hassled. There is zero protection on the train system. Our tunnels haven't been adequately protected. The Transportation Security Administration is not changed with only protect the aviation industry -- it is supposed to protect the entire transportation industry.

So we have not even begun in crucial areas to make changes. Many of these are not intellectually demanding challenges. They all are organizational and resource challenges. We're going to have a huge disaster at some point and I hope the people responsible for not acting are held accountable and run out of office -- unlike the last time they failed us.

<u>INTERVIEWER</u>: Your article, "Duty Honor and Country," published in the March 2002 AFJI [Armed Forces Journal International] issue. Mr. John Roos, the Editor of AFJI, asked you to address the contribution of West Point as it turned 200 years old on March 16, 2002. Your intent, sir?

<u>GEN MCCAFFREY</u>: Well, every two months, I have to produce an article. Hey I had to write something! But in this case it was an appropriate time for <u>Armed Forces Journal</u> to talk about West Point. I had been up there for a full year as the Olin Professor. I've spent actually a dozen years there now total -- as an Army brat, as a Cadet, back on the faculty as a young major, now back as an Olin Professor. So it's a lot of fun.

There were two parts to that article. One is, I'm asked to talk to the public bodies of groups about West Point. I substitute for the Superintendent. A lot of the old

grads think the Corps has gone to hell. Some have very skeptical view points. I tell them, "Look, let me just talk about what I see."

So, the first part of the article was "what do I see at West Point?" What do the Cadets look and sound like, what's their tone, what's the faculty like, what's the leadership like? That's a good news story. I tell people I've never seen such impressive young people in my life. They are fun to be around, they're courteous. The Cadets come from families and backgrounds where a lot of people loved them for 18-20 years before they get to West Point. They're terrifically self confident and positive. Coaches, and teachers, and mom and dad, and a bunch of people believed in them. Plus they are extremely talented. They are the most talented group we've ever had in the service academies. 15,000 qualified applicants. 1,000 get in.

They are athletically fit. Compare and contrast the Class of 1964, my West Point Class -- we had three black Cadets, a handful of Hispanic, few foreigners, no women. These young Cadets of today are tremendously diverse. They are just terrific. They are fun to be around.

My Olin seminar that I now teach at West Point are hand selected seniors and juniors, who compete to get in. Between 120-180 Cadets will apply. We take 20+. They write beautifully. They are incredibly poised. They have to write a major paper, they have to present an oral argument, they have a daily written exam when they walk in the class -- it's an objective true/false, fill in the blanks. They have to do the reading assignments.

They're extremely poised and articulate. The course is pitched at the Army War College level. I decided to construct a course that I wish I had before I left the War College. I'm pitching it to 20 to 22 year old -- who are very, very impressive.

In every seminar I teach, there are one, two, or three that could be commissioned as a major with a little coaching. You know, I've had most of the Rhode Scholars, Truman Scholars, Marshal Scholars, in the class.

Then there is the faculty, our Social Science Department. There were 12 majors promoted last year, and 11 of them were in the secondary zone to major. We had the only guy in the Army in the Transportation Corps promoted in the secondary zone to major – he was in the department. The faculty, the young majors are just very impressive. Brilliant, experience, great inter-personal skills.

INTERVIEWER: Many West Point officers depart active duty after completing their initial obligation unlike yourself and your peers that did a career's worth of service. How can we reverse that trend?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I don't know. It's a very sensitive topic at West Point. The superintendents, the deans get captured, I think they are very reluctant to admit failure. LTG Dan Christman used to say to his critics on that point, "What do you want us to do -- recruit stupider Cadets?" It's very difficult for West Point to say there is a problem, which is step one to thinking about ways of addressing it. I think there is a problem. Even getting data out of West Point – I'm never quite sure of the data because they'll come up with tricky ways of characterizing it. I think the retention problem is a huge challenge to us.

The answer out of West Point is always, it's the Army's problem, it's not ours. We send them out there brilliant and effective. If they don't stay in the Army it's the fault of their battalion commanders.

I went back to teach a small class of 20+ Cadets. It's a joy and I'm proud to be part of a department. I think we get the most talented kids in America we can find. We don't, as a general organizing principle, go find those who most plainly want to be an Army officer. To some extent, it's the problem of society. If a

World War II happens and 16 million men and women serve in the Armed Forces -- then lot of their boys desperately want to be soldiers like I did because of my Dad's enormous example of service and courage. As the active duty strength decreases, then you have to increasingly go out and explain to parents why we want their daughter or son to go to West Point.

INTERVIEWER: Some people in the civilian sector believe that the Academies should be pulled together and be at one location, your thoughts?

GEN MCCAFFREY: It's not going to happen. It's a stupid idea. There would be zero benefit from it and enormous harm. It's about as sensible as saying we ought to combine the Marine Corps and the Army, because they both do the same things. I can't imagine why we'd start over again. We've got a couple of hundred years working on West Point and the Naval Academy -- these cultures serve us well. People go down with their ship at sea, they take their crippled aircraft into a mountainside instead of housing -- not because they're generic GS-9's -- it's because they are a carrier pilot flying off the carrier USS America. They die in combat bravely because they're in the 7th Cavalry. So these service cultures are of enormous benefit to defending the nation -- and part of that is these service academies.

It's a kind of nitwit observation, that some civilian ORSA guy with no military experience might have coming into high office. Hopefully it'll never happen. It would weaken the country's defense if we did something like that. Could we defend America without West Point? Of course we could. Two of my three children are University of Washington ROTC DMG graduates. However, we want West Point as another source of officer leadership. We take them from the time they are teenagers -- and put them in a uniquely military environment. So it's another source of officers. We don't want to stop OCS. The bulk of America's defenders ought to come from ROTC. We ought to rename ROTC.

It's not a reserve officer training program. How long is it going to take us to get our heads out of the sand.

It isn't that the RA guys come out of West Point and the ROTC guys come out of the University of Nebraska. At 12 years of service, we pick the best people to keep on to defend America. Up to that point, there are different sources of commission, different sources of strength for the Army.

INTERVIEWER: Did it surprise you that your children didn't follow in your footsteps and go to West Point?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, two of them are girls. Being a colonel in the Army and paying for three kids going to college, I urged all three of them to look at ROTC or other forms of scholarships. My son and one daughter did ROTC at the University of Washington. This was an incredibly healthy experience. They both spent much of their time around the ROTC detachment. The sergeant major, the captains, the lieutenant colonel – all had a huge impact and not just from a military training. That's where they got a lot of their counseling. I'm proud of my son for the way he chose his access point into the Army. I'm equally proud of my two daughters, one of whom is a seventh grade teacher. Both of them are mothers.

INTERVIEWER: Your next article, "Columbia – Drugs, Terrorism, and Crime," which is published in October 2002 AFJI issue, your intent?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I have enormous respect for our inter-agency partners in the military and Foreign Service, law enforcement, and intelligence that I worked with throughout the region. I like the Latin-American culture, the food, the music, the language, the family structure. The Columbians have a special problem. This terrible internal war that has been going on since 1948 -- endemic violence, endemic corruption, ideological warfare. When you wake up in the morning, just

thank God you are not in Columbia. When you finish a combat tour in Vietnam or Iraq, you get to go home. You're safe at home, your family is not going to get murdered. If you are a young captain in the Columbian Army you can't say that – nor as a mayor or a police officer. I've been devoted to working as a partner with the Colombians in the drug problem for years. They are a democratic ally who deserve our strongest support.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, we were talking about Columbia and drugs.

GEN MCCAFFREY: The Under Secretary of State Tom Pickering and I were the key officers in the last administration that dealt with Latin American issues. He is one of the most admirable people I ever met – an extremely skillful diplomat. We helped put together support for the Columbians. They had a so-called Plan Columbia, now morphed into "Plan Escudo". I had a small handful of strategic planners, three of them were SAMS graduates out of Leavenworth. One of them, Mark Coomer, a brilliant, brilliant officer who had served in the Department of Social Sciences. I went to see the President of the United States and said, "Sir, Columbia is going over the edge. It's going to happen on the next President's watch. It's a combination of money, and narco guerilla units. There is a terrible impact of corruption on democratic institutions. The violence directed against the police and the mayors is terrible. I said, "You have to do something about it on a scale commensurate with the threat, and if you don't they are going to blame you for it."

Even though it would happen on the next guy's watch, President Clinton seized leadership on the issue. He stood behind me. We pulled together a plan. We went after a billion dollars each year for five years -- and we got $1.4 billion. I always hear about the controversial "Plan Columbia". We got $1.4 billion dollars for Plan Colombia out of Congress from a dead start in one year. Then we flew down to Columbia and had the two Presidents sign an agreement to cooperate.

We took the Speaker of the House, Republican Dennis Hastert. We took Senator Joe Biden, the Democrat. What's so controversial about that?

By the way it's working. They're a democracy and they deserve our support. Drugs kill 52,000 people a year in the United States and do unbelievable damage to our society. Columbia is three hours flying time away from the United States. A half a million have fled the country. There are a million internal refugees. I think we did a huge amount of good in support of Columbia. This article is an attempt to stay engaged in the issue, to keep an oversight of what's going on. I'm trying to be very supportive of Bobby Charles, who now is the Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics, Terrorism, Crime, and others.

INTERVIEWER: What progress has the U.S. made since your days as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Mostly what I say is "...imagine what would happen if we hadn't struggled back." I always hear people saying, "Well, it's a bubble effect, a balloon effect, production hasn't been changed," which I know, isn't true. Bolivia would be a narco democracy -- which could still happen. Peru might have been a narco democracy. Columbia might have collapsed with the elites fleeing the country.

The Columbians haven't backed off the issue, to their credit. They haven't quit. President A. Uribe Velez, the current President is trying to negotiate, but he also says, "We're willing to fight to protect our own country." So I think it's moving in the right direction. We have to stay engaged on a regional basis, interdiction, counter-drug eradication, cooperation with human rights monitors.

INTERIVEWER: Sir, your article, "Why We Must Say No to a Draft," published in the May 2003 AFJI issue, your intent?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, a stiff debate had grown up. I wrote this article prior to the intervention in Iraq. I was worried about the debate. I know and like and respect the people on both sides of the argument, but basically the democrat's Charles Rangel, who I think very highly of, and Senator Dennis Hollingsworth and others were saying, "Look, the Republicans don't have their kids in uniform. If we had a draft, then it wouldn't just be minority kids dying in combat, they'd be more responsible if their kids were subject to going to war." Their facts are wrong. The volunteer military is not disproportionately minority – nor are the casualties.

I had been involved in this as the Modern Volunteer Army. I had a lot of background on the nature of the draft and volunteers. My age group, you know, we all served in a draftee supported Army. My 7th Cavalry company in Vietnam combat that I spoke so highly of was all draftees. But the rest of the Army had huge problems from draft avoidance volunteers. You know -- disciplinary problems. Today's Army, because they are professionals -- because they stay for 5, 6, 7, 8, 20 years -- we end up with these unbelievably competent NCOs. If you ask my age group, "do you want to see a return to the draft", we might say "yes" for civic reasons. However, from a practical point of view -- we don't want to ever go back to that draftee Army. Look, there's not going to be a draft. So we should not get involved in a useless debate. We are not going to have a draft unless there is a very different environment facing America.

INTERVIEWER: "Joint Fire Power Wins Wars," published in the October 2003 AFJI issue. You wrote, "The effective and flexible employment of killing fires in the deep battle space by joint air ground forces is the key to future victory in high intensity combat." Can you please elaborate?

GEN MCCAFFREY: To some extent it almost speaks for itself. The unbelievable success of Gulf War I and II, and Afghanistan was in large part our lethal firepower with joint digital communications. The US was the first nation in

warfare to use close air support. We did it in the WWII Normandy breakout. We did it with huge effectiveness during the Korean War. I'm still here because of a Navy cruiser that fired all night with it's 8-inch guns on the DMZ in Vietnam.

We have always used deep killing fires and coordinated the air ground operations, but we have gotten immeasurably better at it in the last 15 years. Certainly the graduation exercise was this current war in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom. There are a ton of things air power can do. But maintaining order in downtown Baghdad is not one of them.

INTERVIEWER: Do you believe that the 11th Aviation Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, Air Assault, was rushed into combat to destroy the Iraqi Madena Republican Guard Division Northeast of Al-Hillah during Operation Iraqi Freedom? In your opinion what should have been done?

GEN MCCAFFREY: The 11th Aviation Regiment was not part of the 101st -- it was a corps unit. The 101st aviation did great. Army aviation did terrific. In the whole campaign, we lost six helicopters. So, the notion that the helicopter is too fragile to survive in the battlefield is nonsense. I've spent some quality time now with Lieutenant General Dick Cody. He is probably one of the best people I've seen in uniform, our Army G3. We have terrific leadership down at the Army Aviation School. The helicopter is part of every aspect of our air ground combat team. I just finished an article about the 11th Aviation Regiment. I got a lot of good, inside, frank talk out of the people involved in the operation.

Occasionally we screw up in combat. We get tired. We get confused. We get too aggressive. We have an uncooperative/noncooperative enemy. The 11th Aviation attack at Karbala was a disaster and had almost no impact on the enemy forces. Only half the aircraft got off the ground. The logistics preparation hadn't been done. Part of the reason was there was no security in the lines of communication. There was no armored cavalry regiment. No Military Police

brigades. There was inadequate ground combat power, so the entire logistics effort was screwed up for the entire Iraqi Freedom.

The 11th Aviation tried to attack at An Nasyriah in terrible weather, dust conditions. They couldn't do it. They thought they'd screwed up in Kosovo and desperately wanted to get into the battle. They saw their window of history closing. They said, "If we want to take part in this war, tonight's the night." The logistics weren't there. Half the aircraft took off. There was no intel picture of the enemy force at all. It was stupid tactics to attack in single file, single column, an attack at low level. They set out to find armor and kill it with no effective artillery support, no support from the Air Force, no jamming aircraft. It was ludicrous. Twenty-eight aircraft severely damaged. Two were shot down and crashed. There was no impact on the target.

The 101st listened to what happened and did it completely differently. They employed excellent tactics. The 3rd ID Apaches had huge impact on the enemy. They didn't have a problem.

I told the Aviation School you have to get this out in public or people will think you don't know what happened. They told me, "well were taking care of it internally". We should have relieved the regimental commander on the spot. I know he's a good guy and I know him personally. Everybody loved him, but he screwed up. "If you do this at the NTC, you'll fail. You do it in combat, you'll fail and people will get killed."

The only good thing that came out of it, we found out the Apache helicopter can take some ground hits. My God, one of them I think had over 40 hits up through 23 mm. So it's one tough aircraft. Great courageous pilots. You have to make sure you put them in the battle the right way, as part of a joint team.

INTERVIEWER: Much has been read regarding jointness, Do you advocate joint interoperability or joint dependency?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I cannot imagine the Army effectively fighting any campaign except as part of a joint team. We can't get there.

The first hour on the ground in combat -- it's all air power. At initial intervention the only thing we have going for us in the US Air Force and Navy. You can't prosecute any significant campaign without control of the seas. So at the start of it, I'd say the Army is absolutely fundamentally dependent upon the Navy and Air Force -- without which you can't begin to prosecute a conflict.

We'd be foolhardy to ever fight where the air power wasn't integrated into every aspect of our operations. In 24th ID during Desert Shield/Desert Storm -- C130s landed in the division support area with spare parts. AC130 gun ships were in the enemy rear area, A10's were killing tanks out in front in conjunction with Apaches. Air Force intelligence, Rivet Joint and the ELINT birds painted the battle picture. Air Force intelligence gave me the center of mass of every tank and mechanized infantry and artillery battalion in the Iraqi force facing me.

The fact that the Air Forces is a terrific deep battle killer and can take part in the tactical battle doesn't mean we don't want 120 mortars at battalion level. It certainly doesn't mean we don't want 155 artillery and modernized MLRS and ATACMs. Yes -- we're dependent. Yes -- we're interoperable. That doesn't argue for saying, "Oh, I see the Air Force will do all this stuff, don't worry about it, they'll be there for you. We still want a combined arms ground combat team."

INTERVEWER: When you served in Vietnam, you did not consider the Air Force timely in responding to your engagements/fire fights with the enemy. Has your opinion changed today of them performing that role?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, I don't think I ever said the Air Force wasn't timely in responding to engagements in Vietnam. My first tour in Vietnam was with the Vietnamese Airborne Division. Every time we deployed to the field, we had our own "Red Hat airborne FACs" with us flying 01's. They'd move into the nearby strip, fly these 01 or later on the 02 or 03 FAC aircraft. We knew their call signs, their names. We partied with them on the ground back in the rear. They'd bring in Vietnamese A1E Sky Raiders. They'd bring in US AC130's. Many times, my life has been saved by the United States Air Force.

We had a huge fight in the DMZ with multiple regiments of North Vietnamese trying to overrun our Vietnamese airborne brigade. An AC 47 ducked under the clouds -- we'd lost a bunch of helicopters trying to get us out. An AC47 banked right under the clouds and caught an entire North Vietnamese battalion forming up for the attack and hosed all of them – killed most of them. Later as a 1st Cav Division rifle company commander, I can't even tell you the number of times, (30 or more times) air power has come in and put bombs on target 100 meters from my company -- particularly when we were dug in on Night Defensive Positions. I've had Napalm come over my head 10 feet up and land 30 meters in front of me and roast dozens of North Vietnamese soldiers.

However, I still carried one 81mm mortar in the field -- and over 100 rounds of 81 mortar ammunition. Everybody in the company, including me, had an 81 round. I kept a 105mm artillery FDC mission going all the time -- because when you make contact, if air power isn't overhead in a deliberate battle – then your life depends on artillery. Today with digital communications artillery is immeasurably better. On the other hand, it depends on the nature of the conflict. During phase I of the campaign against the Iraqi's -- OIF airpower couldn't serve a huge role in downtown Baghdad. Artillery is still a crucial tool for the Army.

I have a very high opinion of the Air Force. Their courage and their professionalism and the complexity with which they organize is incredible. They

keep their machinery flying, they train their people. That hasn't changed. But I darn sure don't want to see the 10th Mountain Division climbing up in the Tora Bora Mountains with no artillery in country -- because some civilian dictated that the Army is going to keep a minimal footprint on the ground. Completely nuts.

Then we have General Franks, who to my astonishment says, "Well, you know if Crusader had existed, I wouldn't even want it in Afghanistan."

I called the White House during that period and talked to a senior official in the White House and said, "You guys are on the edge of a flipping disaster, you had better get some artillery in country."

INTERVIEWER: Sir, your article, "Rumsfeld in Denial," published in the Wall Street Journal on November 28, 2003. Your intent and your assessment of how Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is performing as the Secretary of Defense?

GEN MCCAFFREY: I am not an admirer of Secretary Rumsfeld. I think he's brilliant, he's a patriot, he's experienced, he's energetic, he's a dedicated public servant and he's a tough cookie on top of that. During some aspects of post 9/11 -- his personal and moral courage was a great asset to the United States. He's an anomaly in one sense. The only common characteristic of all senior people is that they surround themselves with good people -- and they empower them -- and that's how they ended up as senior people.

I think Secretary Rumsfeld has a hard time listening to people. He's arrogant. He thinks he's got all the answers and he doesn't. I actually think he is wrong 45 percent of the time -- which is way too high for this business. He is so self-assured that he won't brook opposition. He has intimidated most of the military leadership. I think he is politicizing the general officer corps. There is a war on, Congress is fearful of interposing their viewpoints on a serving wartime Secretary. He's intimidated the other branches of government.

He's gotten us in terrible trouble, with an inadequately resourced intervention on the ground in Iraq. Now he is dissembling in public when he'll say, "Well, in no way did he have anything to do with the shape of the anemic ground forces that entered Iraq" – this is complete nonsense. He actually, originally argued for only two Army brigades and one Marine division to intervene in Iraq. The level of stupidity of that judgment is almost unbelievable to me -- and he's persisted in it. I think he's getting the President and the country in trouble and they need to get rid of him.

I think his worst decision was going into Iraq with an inadequate force. He didn't shape the Air Force presence in that battle -- or the Navy presence and say, "You can only take the following kind of aircraft." He didn't even shape the Marine presence. We had one Marine division and 75,000 Marines, so they took their entire normal doctrinal force – which included a huge Army component.

I was asked by senior Army officials who contacted me throughout the war to call Rumsfeld because he was sitting on the TPFDD. He was preventing deployment of a lot of the Army units. He personally caused a near disaster by refusing to agree to deployments. He wanted to argue over each 42-man unit. Why can't it be 10 guys? By the way, this senior official said he passed my viewpoints onto Rumsfeld, who said, "Thank General McCaffrey, I found him very helpful." I told them, "You can't redesign these units on the fly." Some major or lieutenant colonel designed that unit 20 years ago, maybe you could do a better job – I doubt it. But they organized the unit, equipped it and trained it and practiced in that configuration. If you pull the thing apart, you are going to ruin its combat effectiveness."

I think many of his decisions have been unbelievably bad. Finally, I watch his public announcements. It would be interesting to give him a polygraph on what

he actually believes. You know, he gets up there and says there is "no guerrilla war going on" -- and "no insurgency going on".

Rumsfeld makes stuff up. It's outrageous. He got us in trouble in Iraq, we have insufficient force in Afghanistan. I say this sadly, because I swore an oath to the Constitution, not to the Secretary of Defense. I took a lot of heat for being critical of him in public but you know, I thought it was a responsibility -- I had to speak objectively to the situation.

INTERVIEWER: I do have one final question, How would you like to be remembered?

GEN MCCAFFREY: My dad who is such a terrific example, can talk about real combat. World War II -- going from 2nd lieutenant to colonel in three years and surviving World War II. I came home from the first Gulf War -- the country was so proud of us. They were so relieved that we pulled this off. They had been so scared. We were just bathed in congratulatory feedback from the Country. God knows the soldiers deserved it.

I remember, my dad grabbed me and he said, "You're being greeted on your return from Desert Storm as a real hero and you weren't ." He said, "In Vietnam, you were a real hero and nobody cared -- so don't ever forget this."

He was right on the money. I was in the company of 26,000 heroes in the Gulf War. A lot of how you are remembered is in the mind of the country.

When I was in senior general officer positions, particularly in the interagency community -- I really liked that part of my service career. I'd tell people, I'm not running for national office. I'm not trying to be remembered in Washington. I'd like to be remembered at Fort Benning.

I think the way you get remembered in the Army is -- your good works live on. So one of the things I'm most proud of is -- I think I had some small measure of taking many, many superb majors and captains that have flowed through my hands -- and told them how good they were -- and taught them 150 tricks that I had picked up over the space of 32 years. So when I see Rick Sanchez, John Batiste, John Craddock, John Van Alstyne, John LeMoyne, Jason Kamiya, Rick Olson -- this incredible group of soldiers who are running the current defense of America -- in small measure -- that is my reward.

My wife says all the time -- and I don't think she's far off -- it's a miracle I got to be a general officer. It's not that I wasn't good because I was. I worked real hard and was very fortunate. I was a great company commander and a very good battalion commander, too. I've tried to be extremely objective in analyzing problems and getting things moving. I'm not as hard-nosed as some who influenced me. I actually have a reputation of being a blowtorch, but in 32 years in uniform, I actually fired only two people.

So my personal mantra was get as much out of people as you possibly can -- but never push people into situations they can't handle. However, I'm pretty demanding. I'd like to be remembered as someone who speaks frankly to the issues. I'd like people to say he was hard on his officers -- and he takes care of his soldiers. He keeps them alive in combat.

I don't know how long I'm going to be remembered. You try and do as best you can. That is how I like to be remembered. "When he was on watch -- he did his job."

INTERVIEWER: Sir, is there anything that you'd like me to enclose in the McCaffrey files at the Military History Institute?

GEN MCCAFFREY: Well, one of the things you can do, is send a copy to the National Defense University. The librarians are terrific people. The last President of the NDU asked me to bring all my papers over there. So most of my papers from 24th Infantry Division Command are there. They have my papers from 24th Infantry Division, service in the Office of the Chairman; service as J5; service as CINC, SOUTHCOM; and then finally, service as the Drug Policy Director. They did a terrific job. They categorized all my documents and put them in acid-free boxes. They did an organizational file.

We have several trunks full of memorabilia over there that my wife collected. She was very much an important part of our home front effort at Fort Benning, Hunter Army Airfield, Fort Stewart. All that material is over at NDU. So I think you ought to include the organizational scheme. If people want those documents, they are certainly available.

A friend of mine did an oral history during our year at the Army War College on "Company Commanders in Vietnam" -- and that's probably worth putting in there.

This oral history that you've done -- I thank you Buzz for your enormous patience and skill and investing time in this effort. I hope some use will come out of it either in the coming 5 years or 500 years.

The other thing, Lieutenant Colonel John Craddock, now Lieutenant General John Craddock -- then my Division G3 -- and Major Jason Kamiya, then the G3 Ops -- when we got back from the Gulf War, they put together a terrific four-volume set black bound beautiful work that captured the after-action report and the division operation orders taking us into combat. Those ought to be with your file. There aren't many copies available so it's going to be hard to find all four volumes. We shipped them out to all the military libraries, the Library of Congress. We shipped them out to post libraries. We had Saudi oil money pay for it! Those two brilliant young officers drew it together. Then there was also a

yearbook we did, complete with pictures. All the soldiers got them, and they still walk up to me and stop me after speeches and ask me to sign their yearbook. We must have sold 30,000 of them because they sent them off to families.

Then finally, my current staff has pulled together a compendium of the latest publications I've done since I left Director of National Drug Policy. Essentially, there were many articles about national drug policy as well as articles relating to national security affairs. (*Armed Forces Journal*, *Wall Street Journal*, and other magazines -- *Joint Forces Quarterly*) So that book of publications might also be helpful. Then finally, I think I'd go to company command.com and include either a link or a video of the company command.com interview, which might be useful for somebody down the line.

And on that note again, thanks for your skill and professionalism and friendship in pulling all this together. I congratulate you on your service. Good luck in Iraq. I'll include you in my prayers in the future.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, in closing I thank you for participating in the United States Army War College Oral History Program and I thank you for allowing me the singular privilege of recording your military experiences and accomplishments.

Section 4:

Division Command Lessons Learned Program

Interviewed By Lieutenant Colonel

Lawrence S. Epstein, 1992

U.S. Army Military History
Institute

DIVISION COMMAND
LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM

PROJECT 1992-N

Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA
Commanding General 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Interviewed by

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence S. Epstein, USA

1992

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA. 17013-5008

PROJECT 1992-N

Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA
Commanding General 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Interviewed by

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence S. Epstein, USA

1992

FOREWORD

"This transcript has been produced from a tape-recorded interview with Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence S. Epstein, USA, as part of the Academic Year 1991-1992 US Army War College/US Army Military History Institute's Division Command Lessons Learned Program.

The Division Command Lessons Learned Program is the result of a June 1984 memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans directing that a technique be developed to glean lessons learned from division commanders as they approached the end of their command tours. In that memorandum the Deputy Chief of Staff expressed an interest in obtaining insights into the specific areas of training, doctrine, organization, equipment, leadership and ethics, and family action issues.

Users of this transcript should note that the original verbatim transcription of the recorded interview has been edited to improve coherence, continuity and accuracy of factual data. However, statements of opinion and interpretation have not been changed substantially. The views expressed in the final transcript are those of the interviewee. The US Army War College/US Army Military History Institute assumes no responsibility for the opinions expressed, or for the general accuracy of the contents of this transcript.

This transcript may be read, quoted and cited in accordance with common scholarly practices and the restrictions imposed by the interviewee, the commander of the US Army Military History Institute and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by any means whatsoever, without obtaining the written permission of the Director, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5008, or the permission of the interviewee.

Interview with Major General Barry R. McCaffrey,
Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword ... i

Introduction ... 1
Question 1: Most Surprising Aspect of Division Command ... 2
Question 2: Preparation for Command ... 2
Question 3: Readiness and Readiness Reporting ... 3
Question 4: Preparation for Command in the Area of Readiness ... 4
Question 4: Helpful Training Techniques ... 4
Question 5: Techniques Used to Reduce Training Detractors ... 5
Question 6: Reinforcement of Professional Development ... 6
Question 7: Doctrinal Concerns ... 7
Question 8: Thoughts on Field Operations ... 8
Question 9: Division Capabilities Limited by Logistics and Support ... 9
Question 10: Thoughts on Installation Management ... 10
Question 11: Differences in Leadership Techniques at the Division and Brigade Level ... 12
Question 12: Significant Leadership Problems Encountered Upon Assuming Command ... 13
Question 13: Guidance Provided Subordinates Concerning Leadership ... 13
Question 14: Techniques Employed to Evaluate the Leadership Abilities of Subordinates ... 14
Question 15: Anticipated Techniques for Establishing Ethical Climate Within the Division ... 15
Question 16: Family Action Issues Presenting Greatest Challenge Upon Assuming Command ... 16
Question 17: Suggested Changes to Questionnaire ... 18
Question 18: Concluding Remarks ... 18

APPENDIX A - Questionnaire ... /

APPENDIX B - Biosketch - MG Barry R. McCaffrey, USA ... I

APPENDIX C - Biosketch - LTC Lawrence S. Epstein, USA ... (

UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
and the
UNITED STATES MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE
INTERVIEW
"Lessons Learned in Division Command"
11 February 1992

MAJOR GENERAL BARRY R. McCAFFREY
Commanding General
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

and

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAWRENCE S. EPSTEIN
United States Army War College
Class of 1992

INTRODUCTION

LTC Epstein:

In June 1984, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the DCSOPS to begin a project to capture lessons learned in division command. I will ask you questions about your experience in command. To make your remarks most useful to your successor and other prospective division commanders, please reflect on what you have learned in your time in division command rather than only on what you currently do. Information about an initial idea that you modified may be a useful lesson learned that can be passed on. I may ask some follow-up questions during the interview. Please keep your remarks in an unclassified form.

At the end of the interview I will ask your opinion of the questions, how they could be improved, and any additions or deletions you may suggest. You will be able to revise the text of the transcript of this interview. The completed transcript will be treated as FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and will be distributed as the DCSOPS directs.

Sir, do you have any questions? I will now begin the tape.

This is a Division Command Lessons Learned interview. I am Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Epstein, interviewing Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech). The date is February 11, 1992. The interview is being conducted at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

INTERVIEW

LTC Epstein:

Reflecting on what you expected as opposed to what you found as you assumed command, what was the single most surprising fact about division command?

MG McCaffrey:

There was no single most surprising fact about division command. I came to 24th ID(M) having made the rounds and having a good picture of the status of maintenance and training. 24th ID(M) had a tremendous reputation for being the best trained of those armor/mech units rotating through the National Training Center. Materiel readiness and maintenance were superb.

LTC Epstein:

I would like to know what you have learned about preparation for command. What would you have done differently in preparing for this assignment? Were there any subjects or activities you could have been better versed in? Any courses you wish you could have taken? Books or manuals you should have read? People you should have talked to?

MG McCaffrey:

It seems to me that I have been extremely fortunate. I spent my entire life getting ready for this command. Everything I have done were building blocks to this job including five and a half years in a Mech division in

Germany. It reminds me of Henry Kissinger's book where he talks about government service. When you enter government service, you have to enter your position having already accumulated intellectual capital along the way. Once you enter the job, you are going to start depending upon prior experience immediately.

I was very appreciative of the support that I received from Fort Benning, Fort Knox, and Fort Leavenworth. I visited four to five places and spent three and a half days at Fort Benning and Fort Knox. I asked the Commanding Generals to put together a battalion/brigade/division overview and some very narrow substantive reviews for me. These included information about mortar platoons, scout platoons, etc... They were very helpful because mental grasp of a lot of this subject matter is perishable similar to knowing how to assemble a 9mm pistol. If you haven't done it for 180 days, you probably can't meet the standards. In essence, I designed my own pre-command course. It was very useful to me.

LTC Epstein:

Please focus on the readiness of the Division. When you first assumed command, how was the readiness in terms of actual and what was reported?

MG McCaffrey:

The Division was actually more ready than what was reported. This included the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) from the Georgia Army National Guard. By and large, Unit Status Reports (USRs) reveal micro MOS shortages and equipment trivia. You can miss the point that what is really being portrayed is an 18,000-soldier mech division with 1,400 armored vehicles and 3,500 wheeled vehicles. 24th ID(M) was ready to fight at "A minus" efficiency at battalion task force level. The tank, mech, and artillery battalions were really solid. They knew how to move and live fire at night at the NTC. Collective skills were really solid. The things that were less

well trained on were primarily at division level - intelligence, command and control, logistics, and cavalry operations.

LTC Epstein:

If you were just coming into command and had some time to prepare yourself, what would you study about readiness, or who would you talk to about the subject?

MG McCaffrey:

I would visit Fort Knox (Armor School) and Fort Benning (Infantry School). As mentioned earlier, I spent about three and a half days at each one. I would increase it to five days. You don't want canned briefings. Instead, you want to sit down with the real thinkers and go through battalion, brigade, and division tactics all over again. In addition, you want to get recertified on the basic pieces of combat equipment. I had the opportunity to regain some hands on experience on the Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, had a mortar platoon lay out and conduct a live fire, and got updated on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) equipment capabilities. A week at Fort Leavenworth for the Tactical Commanders' Development Course (TCDC) may have been useful. The bottom line is that preparation for division command depends on where the incoming commander has been before and whether his background is really in the kind of division he is going to command.

LTC Epstein:

I would now like to address the general subject of training. What techniques or methods have you personally found helpful in training your Division?

MG McCaffrey:

First of all, I use published training doctrine. Over the last 15 years, the Army has created a body of literature and doctrine that works. Majors understand it. If we combine these tools with training experience at our combat training centers such as NTC and JRTC, we'll stay well trained.

I would underline the importance of a master training calendar. It is essential to plan major training events 24 months out. These events require dollars, transportation asssets, fuel, and ammunition. It is a commitment that battalions plan and execute. Training focus should be at crew, squad, and platoon level. There has to be a top-down driven training concept for this. In 24th ID(M) we call it VICTORY FOCUS. (In 8th ID it was CARDINAL POINT.) The concept calls for a 5,000-soldier brigade combat team to spend 14-21 days in the field doing training at small unit level.

LTC Epstein:

What techniques do you use to reduce training distractors?

MG McCaffrey:

As I stated earlier, training must be driven from the top down, not bottom up. There is a misperception that the squad leaders' assessment of training shortcomings becomes the battalion training schedule. Nothing could be further from the truth. What we are really doing every 90 days is recapturing the individual and collective skills required to fight at crew, squad, platoon levels. In addition, we simultaneously tack on multi-echelon training opportunities at battalion, brigade, and division level. You hear people talk about slowing down the training and that we should focus only on a few things. In fact, you have to focus on <u>everything every 90 days</u> (day and night operations in a chemical/non-chemical environment, etc...) or you begin to lose your edge. You don't have to do it to "A plus" standards. A battalion's major training events must be on the master training calendar. Otherwise, it is not going to happen. For example, you've got to put down

a 21-day VICTORY FOCUS FTX with a start and end date that is at least 12 months out. Then you've got to ensure that other units within the brigade's VICTORY FOCUS exercise are programmed to participate as well. This includes integration of supporting installation agencies. If you do this, training distractors will not overwhelm the process.

In the course of a year, if a platoon and a company take part in two VICTORY FOCUS exercises, an NTC deployment, four Level 1 or Level 2 gunnery periods, an external company evaluation, and a battalion deployment exercise, about one third of the year will be filled. If the company commander knows what he or she is doing, and most of ours do (especially if they are coached properly), they will use another large portion of the year doing enabling training getting ready to do these high quality training experiences. Right now there are about 5,000 soldiers in the field with 2nd Brigade. They are involved in high quality VICTORY FOCUS training for 21 days. Later this year, they will go out again for 14 more days. In a few weeks, 2nd Brigade will be going to the NTC for 21 days. If a company commander is ready to take his company through all these significant training events, his company will be well trained.

LTC Epstein:

What techniques or programs did you find necessary to establish in order to reinforce professonal development of your chain of command?

MG McCaffrey:

Most of the Army training literature focuses at crew, squad, and platoon levels. General Wes Clark wrote a tremendous article in the Artillery Journal. The bottom line he says is that officers can lose battles, but brilliant officers can't do anything without well trained platoons. He says it in a much more persuasive manner than I just stated but I think it is fundamentally correct. This article underscores the fact that if you don't train your platoons so they can operate day and night, you are programed for failure. The other piece to that is that we have a responsibility to train

our staff and commanders at battalion, brigade, and division levels on a lot of very sophisticated collective skills. In order to do this, we have a very elaborate system of: map exercises (MAPEXs), orders drills, command post exercises (CPXs), and officer leader training (OLT). Some are orchestrated by Division, others by brigade, and some by battalion. I think this is as important as running a tank gunnery program. We spend a lot of time on it and it is hard work. It is like climbing a mountain every 90 days. It is unsettling to some people because two days of a division MAPEX is intellectually draining. I've been doing this all my adult life. I never go though one of these where I don't personally learn something from it.

We are currently working both the defense of Kuwait/Saudi Arabia and the defense of South Korea scenarios - different terrain, different enemy forces, and two different deployment challenges. We spent two days recently on the Kuwait scenario. It is not enough that Epstein knows his job and McCaffrey knows his. We have to go through periodically (quarterly), in my judgment, some exercises in which the two of us work the same issues together. The result will be mutual understanding of each other's functional focus - artillery, armor, intelligence, logistics, etc...

LTC Epstein:

The next questions deal with doctrine. Were there any particular doctrinal areas that you found troublesome during your command?

MG McCaffrey:

The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine is superb. It sees a deep battle and has a focus on maneuver and the principles of war. It capitalizes on our enormous technological advantage over any other army in the world instead of brute strength. It took us 15 years to develop. We finally have a doctrine that matches our tables of organization and equipment (TO&E), and which also mirrors what is being taught at our branch schools. We have NCOs who have been trained on AirLand Battle through the Non-Commissioned Officers' Education System (NCOES). Our doctrine allows us

to talk to one another and have a common understanding of the battlefield and associated graphics. The doctrine is so effective and widely understood that it was more important to us in the DESERT STORM victory than was the Bradley, the Apache, the Abrams tank, and the MLRS.

LTC Epstein:

We are interested in your thoughts on field operations. What was the single most limiting factor in exercising effective command in the field? How did you go about overcoming that? If you were promoted tomorrow and your replacement came in here and asked your advice about divisional field operations, what would you tell him?

MG McCaffrey:

I don't know if you've heard this story before, but prior to the ground attack into Iraq I had to brief the Secretary of Defense. At the conclusion of my briefing he asked what I was worried about. My answer was that I was not worried about a thing. I thought we were going to pull the Iraqi Army apart in fairly short order albeit with more casualties by far than we actually incurred. I underestimated the power of the U.S. Army organization. We overestimated Iraqi capabilities. Binnie Peay (LTG J.H. Binford Peay, III - former Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)) was more right than most people in his appreciation for what the Iraqis were going to do. I was probably next best. Having said that, I think all of us underestimated the power of the Army battle force. The quick and most useful answer to an incoming division commander as to what is the single most limiting factor in exercising effective command in the field may be his own imagination and understanding of the power of the force. The capabilities of this Division is just awesome. Right now we have an Immediate Ready Company (IRC) consisiting of a tank platoon, mech infantry platoon, two armored personnel carriers (APCs) mounted with MK-19 auto grenade launchers, and communcations equipment staged for immediate launch at Hunter Army Airfield within 18 hours of notification. The entire Division can be out by sea within 10 days. The bottom line is

that our capabilities are just incredible. The 1,400 armored vehicles, 3,500 wheel vehicles, 90 aircraft, and 18,000 soldiers are superbly trained and equipped. They are a disciplined, smart, and lethal force.

There are several improvements to make regarding force structure. We need to retain heavy division LRSD. We need more GPS to include every aircraft, tank, Bradley, scout, and command and control vehicle. We need MK-19 automatic grenade launchers in all CS and CSS battalions and on the M-113 series of armored vehicles. Our Cavalry TO&E needs to be looked at. We must have an armored cavalry squadron in this Division consisting of three ground cavalry troops with tanks and an air cavalry troop. We need more single channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios. We've got to streamline command and control - there are too many people involved in it, particularly in the intelligence analysis arena. We absolutely must keep dedicated OH-58D aircraft to support the artillery force. We must have dedicated command and control aircraft for the division commander, assistant division commanders, brigade commanders, the DISCOM commander, and the signal battalion commander. We have to practice division/corps operations better and more effectively so we can employ multiple brigades of artillery. Our USAR and National Guard structure must be better postured to support the active Army at division and corps levels.

LTC Epstein:

Do you think the only thing that limits division capabilities would be logistics and support?

MG McCaffrey:

We need to remain worried about the readiness of our combat divisions. The NTC is going to stay good. Local training at Fort Stewart and at other installations throughout the Army, given the continued support of people like GEN Sullivan and GEN Powell, is going to stay good. We are going to stay well trained at platoon through company level. NTC is going to give us the battalion and brigade pieces.

As exercises like REFORGER and TEAM SPIRIT recede into dim memory, and as the DESERT STORM experience fades, it concerns me that our Majors, who I consider the lifeblood of making the Division staff work and who actually run the battalions and brigades, won't have had any real-world "time distance" experience. They won't have seen what a huge complicated machine our Army is if you haven't learned to issue simple orders and if you don't have drills and training for battle staffs. If I was going to worry about anything down the line, I would worry about the fact that 15 years from now, there won't be anyone in the Division who has ever been on an operation that was above the limited brigade operations possible at the NTC. BCTP will be our only large-unit training experience. It's a superb program but it can't substitute for the heart-pounding experience of large-unit field operations.

LTC Epstein:

The next questions deal with the subject of installation management. When you first assumed command of the Division, what did you see as the largest installation or facility concern that faced you?

MG McCaffrey:

I don't have any problems managing the installation. I have $145 million a year, 4,000 civilians, a solid infrastructure, and some very knowledgeable military installation leaders who listen to what the divisional (tactical) side of the house is doing and support us.

One thing bothers me. I am sensitive to the possibility that we will lose military officers as the key directorate staff at installation level. It seems to me essential that the garrison commander, the DEH (Director of Engineer and Housing), the DPCA (Director of Personnel and Community Activities), and the DOL (Director of Logistics) all be military officers. There has been a move afoot to civilianize a lot of these positions. During DESERT SHIELD/STORM, several of these positions flip-flopped. Civilians were put

in charge of them. I reversed all of those decisions when I got back and have received a little bit of a reaction to it.

Let me use the DPCA for an example. The officer who serves as the DPCA has to have been a brigade executive officer or a battalion commander. Fort Stewart supports about 22,000 soldiers, 30,000 active duty family members, and about 21,000 retirees including their families. The question is who is going to set the tone? An analogy we might use is General Motors, Ford, or Chrysler. Are the executives in charge of these organizations guys who spent most of their lives in the production of cars or are they people with only a financial management background? In my judgment, one of the reasons why the car companies have been having such a problem is they forgot that the only reality that exists in life is quality output of the car production line. That is it. The rest is nonsense. If you don't produce a better product, you are not going to be competitive. In Fort Stewart's case, does the whole world revolve around our units, training, soldiers, and families or not? Over time, it is the green suiters that must control our installations. The civilian work force here at Fort Stewart is very stable and dedicated. They are wonderful dedicated people. When we deployed to Saudi Arabia, two of them worked so hard that they had heart attacks. In the South they are even more patriotic and supportive than most Department of the Army civilians. But the key leadership of the installation must be combat oriented lieutenant colonels. If they are not -- I think the whole tone of the Post changes for the worst.

This is a fundamental challenge to the Armed Forces. I reviewed all the hours of operations of our many facilities - commissaries, PXs, swimming pools, clubs, etc... I would just offer an assertion that over time on a military installation, each activity will sub-optimize to make it a decent operation they are running, but one that is run primarily for the efficiency and comfort of the management and employees instead of the customer. These activities work better when I have a guy running it whose motivation is idealism, not employee comfort. I feel very strongly about this. I think we will make a fatal mistake if we take key installation positions and place a civilian work force in charge. They go home at a decent hour each night. They are not part of the military culture. We have a wonderful civilian

workforce here at Fort Stewart. They are able and loyal. However, we must keep the key installation leadership in uniform.

LTC Epstein:

The next question will deal with leadership. What are the differences between leadership techniques and methods at division and those at brigade level?

MG McCaffrey:

The most useful insight that I share with pre-command classes is that there is more in common between being a great company commander and a great division commander than there are dissimilarities. Simple orders -- issued early -- for decentralized execution. Lead from the front. Demand excellence. Figure out your <u>purpose</u> before you get moving. These principles pertain to all levels of the chain of command. The logic of getting things to happen at each level is not a lot different either. The only clear difference in division level leadership is the distance you have to see out in front of you. It gets farther out at each level of command. The techniques through which you implement your concept get more complicated at division level. There are more levers to pull. But the central notion of leadership all is pretty much on track.

I am convinced that a division commander has a lot he must offer the division. Somebody has to have a vision on where you are going and articulate it. If you get all wrapped up in the subtleties of the grand office and forget that what you are really being asked to do is to sort out where the division is going and get it ready to fight, things will get screwed up. The bottom line is to get a notion of your purpose, conceive a vision of where you want to go, articulate your intent, and then get moving.

LTC Epstein:

What was the most significant leadership concern you found in the Division when you initially assumed command?

MG McCaffrey:

I don't think there were any significant leadership concerns. Right now 24th ID(M) is as good as when I took command, plus 25%. I say plus 25% because we have been modernized with new M1A1C Abrams Tanks, M2A2 Bradleys, 5-ton trucks, GPS, etc... There are some awesome equipment enhancements that are taking place. Additionally, there has been an increase in the confidence level in the Division since they beat the fourth largest army in the world in 72 hours. But having said all that, the Division was pretty confident when I assumed command. There are just a lot of things that have to be continued to be knit together with a sense of purpose and energy. If you stop doing that for three to six months, the division would not be ready to fight.

LTC Epstein:

Have you found it necessary to provide leadership instruction to your subordinates?

MG McCaffrey:

Yes, and vice versa. They do a little leadership instruction on me. We have a lot of both formal and informal instruction. The biggest leadership instruction is continuing a good sense of the teamwork. By this I mean knowing in a professional sense how we knit together. I spend a lot of time directly involved with brigade and battalion commanders. I get directly involved in all field training. On top of that we get to know each other in a social sense.

I had a rule as a father until my last child left two years ago. Sunday was family day and we were all going to be together. I've spent 15 years reminding teenagers that there was nothing that was going to interfere with Sunday togetherness - trips to museums, church, brunch, etc... You have to do that. The leadership responsibility of a division commander includes all leaders knowing one another and treating each other with a relative sense of charity. If you did a popularity poll on me, I don't know what you would find. You darn sure wouldn't find anyone on this post that doesn't think he knows me very well.

I have also personally given some leadership instruction - several sessions just talking about the subject and being explicit. I would recommend doing this twice a year. I am supposed to "see battalions and command brigades" but I have also tried to get involved with company commanders. I've had several pre- and post-deployment sessions with all the 24th ID(M) company commanders to talk about what we are up to and explain what we are doing. In DESERT STORM, I tried to talk to every battalion in the Division periodically. I probably talked to each battalion at least twice, if not three times. This was a leadership attempt to make sure soldiers could see that there was a coherent intellect giving them orders. Soldiers need a sense of confidence in senior leaders. Leadership has been a focus for a lot of us.

LTC Epstein:

Have you found any particular technique or method to determine in your own mind the probable combat success or failure of a subordinate's leadership?

MG McCaffrey:

I think that "expert power" in combat will end up being the most important source of leadership leverage. In other words, if you really know what you are doing in combat, you will get a payoff in the leadership dimension. I use MG Terry Scott, now CG, 2nd Infantry Division, as an

example because I think he is one of the best combat leaders I have ever seen. He is not a big stand-up comedian although he is a lot of fun to be around. His real trick is that he knows exactly what he is doing. His judgment is great. That is probably the most important thing for me to look for in my subordinates is that they know what they are doing. Soldiers want their lives to be preserved. They want to have their unit succeed. They have high demands on their leadership.

LTC Epstein:

The next question deals with ethics. Reflecting on the period when you initially assumed command, what thoughts do you have about techniques or methods you employed to establish or maintain an ethical climate within the Division?

MG McCaffrey:

I think ethics have come up in a very practical way several times in this Division. Some of them are sensitive. I would say that there is a very strong ethical climate in this Division. It is based on following the law and knowing to do the right thing. Prior to going into combat, I passed out my last instructions to the Division. It contained the following ten points: Security; Violence; Artillery; Risk; Maintenance; Safety, Sleep; Casualties; Protect your honor, and; Pray. I took those ten points in writing to every battalion in the Division, sat down and had an hour class with the leaders.

I find it preposterous that I could ever be a mercenary. If you told me that for $1 million you wanted me to take down the armed forces of Iraq, I wouldn't touch it. I wouldn't put up with the physical discomfort and danger. I would find it ignoble to hurt somebody for money. Ethics is part of our profession. Honor is part of what we are up to. There is a lot of things that are not ethics - people's individual failings - alcohol, women, etc... I think ethics are more a question of if our leaders and units focus on doing the right thing. Can leaders be trusted to take care of their soldiers in the broadest sense of the term. That is what ethics is all about. What you

say to your commanders in private is important to the ethical climate. I had to deal with a few ethical issues for a couple of battalion commanders. I have worked with both of them. Neither one of them got relieved. I think they were both good people before the incident and they are good people afterwards. I don't think ethics is a black and white issue - that you are out and gone.

LTC Epstein:

What family issue or issues presented the greatest challenge or were a limiting obstacle to your command? Also, what methods or techniques have you found to be successful in overcoming any obstacles? Lastly, if you could speak to a group of prospective division commanders based on what you have learned, what would you tell them about family action issues?

MG McCaffrey:

The soldiers of this Division are older, 22 years rather than 19 year old teenagers. Half of them are married. You have 4,600 sets of family quarters on post. The caliber of the young men and women in the Army is so much higher than in any other period of our country's history that it is just mind-boggling. We are seeing a major military cultural change that I am watching with interest. 24th ID(M) is having all ranks social functions. It has become the common way to do things. At the Headquarters Company Christmas Ball last December, my wife and I sat at a table with: a Major and his wife, an unmarried female Staff Sergeant, a buck Sergeant and his wife, and a Private First Class and his wife. I can't imagine doing something like that 15 years ago. Most battalions now have all ranks dining outs. Girls all put on beautiful dresses. There is not too much drinking. They are just beautiful young people.

We have great young Army families compared to what you would find if you took a similar population in civil life. During the deployment to Southwest Asia, families here were under enormous pressure. They came together back here and did a beautiful job. We thought we were going to take 500-2,000 casualties. They stepped forward and collected blood.

They got wills done and were really braced for war. They acted in a very responsible manner. It was mostly the battalion commanders' wives who pulled it together. Sometimes it included the Executive Officer's wife or even the battalion Command Sergeant Major's spouse. When we deployed I decided to not leave one soldier in a rear detachment at company, battalion, or brigade level. I placed an officer in command of this post. He had an excellent post staff. We had a tremendous family support agency. There was a chain of concern among the family support group leaders. they took care of each other, loved each other, and were supportive. I told battalion commanders two or three times in the desert that they were not responsible for <u>one thing going on at Fort Stewart nor for the families</u>. Their sole purpose was to pay attention to their soldiers and get them ready to fight. I feel very strongly about that. The President of the United States visited Fort Stewart during the deployment and asked Secretary Cheney to tell me how much his spirits had been buoyed up by his visit with our families.

Having said all this, about 5% of American military families are spoiled rotten. We do more for Army families than IBM does. Some wives picketed the Post Headquarters during DESERT SHIELD. Some women demonstrated against the war and claimed that their husbands were dying in the desert without food or water. The complaints would start overwhelming some family support group leaders. I called my wife every week or so to tell her what was going on in the field. She was able to help reassure families that we were taking care of soldiers. I strongly believe that family support group leaders are not responsible for every problem of every family. We really have to watch what we are doing on this. We started to get into an implication that Mrs. Battalion Commander or the rear detachment commander was supposed to solve all family problems. I don't believe that. When we deploy out of CONUS posts to defend the country overseas, the chain of command has one purpose - that is to take care of soldiers and fight. We are not leaving our families in some third world country. They must be responsible for their own affairs with the <u>assistance</u> of the Family Support Groups and the Installation Staff.

The bottom line is that Army families today are really healthy. We don't have a ton of problems. We pay a lot of attention to the ills of our own

society and we help a lot of people. Army families are in pretty good shape. In peacetime, commanders are absolutely responsible for their soldiers' families. But once they deploy, it is over. We lock barracks. We move people into consolidated areas when we go to the NTC... I don't want battalion commanders calling back to Fort Stewart changing their training or wartime focus.

LTC Epstein:

This concludes the required categorical questions. Concerning this program, would you recommend either adding or deleting any categories of questions? What would you recomend as to how to improve this program?

MG McCaffrey:

I read a couple of these when I took command. I hope mine is useful. My predecessor, Pete Taylor, had a great debriefing for me. He spent a full day with me, was very well organized, and there was no one else in the room. We had some overview briefings, but he spent at least a day one-on-one walking through the issues that he thought were important on personnel, training, etc... That was the most helpful thing I received. This program is also useful. I would suggest that you include an executive summary of about four or five pages. A person may be more interested in hearing somebody elses thoughts on family support groups and not interested in hearing any more on training. A lot of us don't need a whole bunch of help with training.

We ought to consider doing anonymous studies where you don't identify the division commander. Get two or three War College students, interview the division commander and his battalion commanders. These are the kind of things the Center for Creative Leadership does. Pick some varying leadership styles and see how various techniques work.

Command of the 24th ID(M) has been the high point of my entire life. People ask me what I want to do in the future. I tell them that I don't

know. I may just want to quit, fade away. If somebody told me that I could either have the last two years and retire at the end of it immediately, or not have had the last two years and be a four-star general, I would without question not surrender the experience I just had. It has been absolutely incredible. It has been the most enjoyable and rewarding period of my life. These soldiers are an honor to serve.

When I took command of a brigade, Binnie Peay (then 9th ID DIVARTY Commander) told me just before the ceremony started that brigade command was going to be the easiest job of my life. There was a lot of truth to that. Much easier than being a battalion commander. It was fun too. It was just as much fun being a brigade commander as a battalion commander, but it was a lot easier. You were dealing with a different group of people. Command of a division is even more rewarding. You work with such an incredibly talented and experienced group of people.

As a division commander, I dealt with several congressional groups. During a congressional visit during DESERT SHIELD, a Congresswoman asked me what I worry about. It was the same question that Secretary Cheney asked me after I briefed him on our ground attack plan. I told her that I didn't worry about much. I had a tremendous sense of confidence in the division chain-of-command with the caliber of people I was dealing with. I was dealing with subordinates whom I greatly admire and in whom I have much confidence. I had majors around here who were smarter and had better judgment than I did -- a bunch of them--as an example Majors Bob Dail, Jason Kamiya, Bob Tezza, Walt Holten and Wanda Rogers. Most of them are now lieutenant colonels. There were a whole bunch of people you could admire and stand in awe as you watched them operate. I had one cavalry squadron commander who suffered from combat fatigue and had to be medically evacuated, but except for that, there hasn't been a bad battalion commander that I have dealt with. Some of them are smarter than others. Some will be General Officers. Some will not command brigades. But they are an incredibly powerful, confident, honest lot. Division command has been a truly rewarding experience.

APPENDIX A

DCLL QUESTIONNAIRE

INTERVIEW GUIDE AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DIVISION COMMAND LESSONS LEARNED PROJECT

Opening Comments

"In June, 1984, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the DCSOPS to begin a project to capture lessons learned in division command. I will ask you questions about your experience in command. To make your remarks most useful to your successor and other prospective division commanders, please reflect on what you have learned in your time in division command, rather than only on what you currently do. Information about an initial idea that you modified may be a useful lesson learned that can be passed on. I may ask some follow-up questions during the interview. Please keep your remarks in an unclassified form.

"At the end of the interview I will ask your opinion of the questions, how they could be improved, and any additions or deletions you may suggest. You will be able to revise the text of the transcript of this interview. The completed transcript will be treated as FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and will be distributed as the DCSOPS directs.

"Sir, do you have any questions? I will now begin the tape.

"This is a Division Command Lessons Learned Interview. I am ______________________, interviewing Major General ______________, Commanding General of the ____________________ Division. The date is ______________. The interview is being conducted at __________________________."

General

1. Reflecting on what you expected as opposed to what you found as you assumed command, what was the single most surprising fact about division command?

2. I would like to know what you have learned about preparation for command. What would you have done differently in preparing for this assignment? Were there any subjects or activities you could have been better versed in? Any courses you wish you could have taken? Books or manuals you should have read? People you should have talked to?

Readiness

3. Please focus on the readiness of the division. When you first assumed command, how was readiness, in terms of both actual readiness and reporting?

4. If there were things that needed improvement, how did you handle them?

5. If you were just coming into command and had some time to prepare yourself, what would you study about readiness, or who would you talk to about the subject?

Training

6. I would now like to address the general subject of training. What techniques or methods have you personally found helpful in training your division?

7. What would you tell future division commanders about what you have learned in training your division?

8. If you were just now entering command and had a month or so to devote to preparation, who would you see, what would you read, or what would you do with that time?

9. What have you found to be the best guidance to your subordinates to enhance the level of training in the division?

10. What techniques did you use to reduce training detractors?

11. What techniques or programs did you find necessary to establish to reinforce professional development in your chain of command?

Doctrine

12. The next questions deal with doctrine. Were there any particular doctrinal areas that you found troublesome during your command?

13. What would you tell a prospective division commander about doctrine? What techniques or methods would you pass on to make his duties easier?

14. Have you found it necessary while in command to study doctrine?

15. Have you found it necessary while in command to teach doctrine?

16. If you were just about to enter command, is there any particular doctrinal area that you would devote time to?

17. Since you have been in command, have you tried to change doctrine? If so, what and how?

Field Operations

18. We are interested in your thoughts on field operations. What was the single most limiting factor in exercising effective command in the field?

19. How do you go about overcoming that?

20. If you were promoted tomorrow and your replacement came in here and asked your advice about divisional field operations, what would you tell him?

Organization

21. The next questions deal with organizational issues. Have you found it necessary to modify any of your organizations, either temporarily or permanently?

22. When you first assumed command, did you have any surprises about the TO&E of any of your units?

23. What would you advise an incoming division commander to do about any of the divisional TO&E's?

Equipment

24. The next questions will deal with equipment. Thinking back to when you first assumed command of the division, what was your biggest equipment concern?

25. How did you resolve that concern?

26. What techniques or methods have you found to be successful in introducing new equipment?

27. What was the most significant maintenance-related concern that you found when you assumed command?

28. How did you resolve this concern?

29. If you could provide guidance to prospective division commanders about equipment-related issues, what would you say?

Installation Management

[INTERVIEWER: These questions are optional for those division commanders who have minimal installation management responsibilities· such as the 82d Airborne Division commander whose installation is managed by the XVIII Airborne Corps commander. However, in any event provide the division commander the opportunity to comment on the subject.]

30. The next questions deal with the subject of installation management. When you first assumed command of the division, what did you see as the largest installation or facility concern that faced you.

31. What actions have you taken to resolve that concern, and why did you select those particular actions?

32. If you were to design a short course for future division commanders who will have installation management responsibilities, what would you have them read or study? Who would you have talk to them?

Leadership

33. The next questions will deal with leadership. What are the differences between leadership techniques and methods at division and those at brigade level?

34. What was the most significant leadership concern you found in the division when you initially assumed command?
35. What did you do to resolve that?

36. Have you found it necessary to provide leadership instruction to your subordinates? If so, please describe the nature of the instruction.

37. Have you found any particular technique or method to determine in your own mind the probable combat success or failure of a subordinate's leadership?

38. What have you personally learned about leadership while in command?

39. If you could provide leadership guidance to a group of prospective division commanders, what would you tell them?

Ethics

40. The next questions deal with ethics. Reflecting on the period when you initially assumed command, what thoughts do you have about techniques or methods you employed to establish or maintain an ethical climate within the division?

41. Have you found it necessary to provide instruction in ethics? If so, please describe the nature of the instruction.

42. What obstacles or impediments to ethical behavior did you find in the division?

43. How do you overcome them?

44. If you could provide some tips to prospective division commanders about ethics at the division level, what would you say?

Family Action Issues

45. What family issue or issues presented the greatest challenge or were a limiting obstacle to your command?

46. What methods or techniques have you found to be successful in overcoming that obstacle?

47. If you could speak to a group of prospective division commanders based on what you have learned, what would you tell them about family action issues?

Concluding Comments

48. This concludes the required categorical questions. Concerning this program, would you recommend either adding or deleting any categories of questions? What would you recommend as to how to improve this program?

49. Finally, is there anything else that you would like to say?

"Thank you. As soon as we transcribe your remarks, you will receive the transcription for correction or alteration, as you wish. Following your action, your remarks will be printed and used as the DCSOPS directs."

APPENDIX B

BIOSKETCH - Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA

BARRY R. McCAFFREY
MAJOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY
(As of 30 October 1991)

Assumed command of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) and Fort Stewart, Georgia on 15 June 1990. Deployed the Division to Saudi Arabia in August 1990 and led it during subsequent combat operations in Iraq during Desert Storm, February-March 1991, for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Graduated from Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts in 1960 and the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1964. Master of Arts Degree in Civil Government from American University. Military education includes the Armor Advanced Course (Distinguished Graduate), the Army Command and General Staff College (Honor Graduate), and the Army War College. Professional schooling includes: Harvard University, National Security Program; National Defense University, General Officer Course; Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, Management and Strategic Studies; and Defense Language Institute-Vietnamese (Honor Graduate).

From August 1989 to June 1990, served as Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, and Joint Affairs at Headquarters, Department of the Army. During 1988-89, served as the Deputy U.S. Military Representative from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the NATO Military Committee in Brussels, Belgium, for which he was awarded the Defense Superior Service Medal. Was Deputy Commanding General of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia (1986-87). Assigned to the 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington as Division G-3 Operations, Division Chief of Staff, and Commander of a Motorized Infantry Brigade (1982-86).

Initial Army assignment in the 82d Airborne Division from 1964 to 1966. Deployed as an Infantry platoon leader to the Dominican Republic on combat operations. Next served in combat as a Parachute Infantry Battalion Advisor with the Vietnamese (1966-67). Assigned in Panama as the Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General from 1967 to 1968. Returned to Vietnam to command an Air Assault Infantry Company in the 1st Cavalry Division during 1968-69. Following extended hospitalization for wounds received in combat, assigned in 1971 with the Office of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. Served at West Point in the Department of Social Sciences teaching American Government and Comparative Politics (1972-75). Subsequent service in Germany for five years (1976-81) with the 3d Infantry Division (G3 Operations, Battalion Executive Officer, and Commander of a Mechanized Infantry Battalion).

Decorated for valor twice with the Distinguished Service Cross. Received two awards of the Silver Star, the Bronze Star with "V" Device with three Oak Leaf Clusters, and three awards of the Purple Heart for wounds received in combat. Awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge, Ranger Tab and Parachutist Badge.

Married to the former Jill Ann Faulkner. They have three children: Sean, an Infantry Captain at Fort Benning, Georgia; Tara, a Second Lieutenant U.S. Army nurse; and Amy, a sophomore at the University of Washington.

APPENDIX C

BIOSKETCH - Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence S. Epstein, USA

Epstein, Lawrence S. (Larry)

LTC MI 116-38-4328

DOR: 03 Jun 89 (USAR)

BORN: 01 Apr 49, Brooklyn, NY

EDUCATION:

Dates	Name, Place	Study	Degree
1965-1969	Long Island Univ, Brooklyn, NY	Public Speaking	BA
1977-1979	Brooklyn Col, Brooklyn, NY	Performing Arts	MFA
1980-1987	City Col of New York, New York, NY	Theater History	PhM

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:

Dates	Position, Organization, Location
Jul 70-Apr 73	CI TM CH, 710TH MI DET (CI), 500TH MI GP
Apr 73-Aug 76	IRR
Aug 76-Mar 77	CI RESOURCE COORD OFF, 228TH MI DET (CI)
Mar 77-Oct 80	PLT LDR, C CO, 826TH MI BN
Oct 80-Jul 82	PLT LDR, 339TH MI CO, 353D CIVIL AFFAIRS CMD
Jul 82-Jul 83	INSTR, OFF ADV COURSE, 1150TH USAR SCH
Jul 83-Jul 84	INSTR, MI OFF ADV COURSE, USA INTEL CTR, FT HUACHUCA, AZ
Jul 84-Apr 85	OPFOR CDR, G2, 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT), FT CAMPBELL, KY
Apr 85-Sep 85	INSTR, MI OFF ADV COURSE, USA INTEL SCH, FT HUACHUCA, AZ
Sep 85-Dec 86	CDR, SPEC SCTY DET, FT CAMPBELL, KY
Dec 86-Jul 87	OIC, AIR-LAND BATTLE EXERCISE, MI OFF ADV COURSE, USA INTEL CTR, FT HUACHUCA, AZ
Jul 87-Feb 89	SR MI EVALUATOR, JT EXER CNRL GP, FT RICHARDSON, AK
Feb 89-Mar 90	SPEC PROJ OFF, SPEC SCTY GP, FT MEADE, MD
Mar 90-Aug 90	SSO, THIRD ARMY, DUKE FIELD, FL
Aug 90-Jan 91	DEPUTY CDR, SPEC SCTY CMD, FORSCOM, FT MCPHERSON, GA
Jan 91-Jun 91	SR INTEL STF OFF, J2, FORSCOM, FT MCPHERSON, GA

SERVICE SCHOOLS: USACGSC (Corres), 85

INSTRUCTOR EXPERIENCE: Mil Intel, USA Intel Ctr, Jul 83-Jul 84; Mil Intel, USA Intel Sch, Apr 85-Sep 85

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS: CI (35E); HUMINT (35F); Instr; EW; AASLT

AWARDS: ARCOM; AAM-2; NDSM-2; ARCAM-2; ASR; OSR; PRCHTBAD; AIRASLT; Israel PRCHTBAD

FOREIGN LANGUAGES:

Language	Read	Speak
French	Fair	Fair

FIELDS OR AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: Computers

PUBLICATIONS: "Vietnam Veteran's Ensemble Theater", (Master's Thesis), 79; Your Future in Performing Arts, Rosen Press, 82; A Guide to Theater in America, MacMillan Press, 85; Careers in Computer Sales, Rosen Press, 90

ORGANIZATIONS & SOCIETIES: [illegible]

Section 5:

Company Command Oral History

Interviewed By Lieutenant Colonel

Edward Broderick, 1982

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL BARRY R. MC CAFFREY

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Edward Broderick

Today is 4 February 1982. This afternoon I will interview LTC Barry McCaffrey who will discuss his actions as a company commander in Vietnam. At this time I'd like to introduce LTC McCaffrey.

LTC McCaffrey: My name is Barry R. McCaffrey. My current rank is Lieutenant Colonel. I commanded a rifle company in Vietnam in 1968-69 as a captain. My source of commission is from West Point in 1964. I'm an Infantry officer. My specialty in command is small unit Infantry leader with my alternate in Operations and Force Development. I commanded B Company, 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry in the 1st Cavalry Division. My unit was initially located in I Corps. Just prior to TET of 1969, we moved down to III Corps where we operated the remainder of the time. Unit mission varied. When I joined my company in I Corps, the division was guarding the line of communications along Route 1 from DaNang up to Hue. When we arrived in III Corps, the division mission was called "Reconnaissance in Force"...it was actually a division screen along the Cambodian border. Now, dates in command... I arrived in Vietnam in October of 1968 and left about eight months later when I was wounded. My previous combat experience was as a Rifle Platoon leader in the Dominican Republic. Then I went to RVN as a Vietnamese Airborne Division advisor. Then went back again as a Company Commander in the 1st Cavalry Division. Finally, I went back for a partial tour doing studies on combat leadership in USARV.
INTERVIEWER: Would you discuss your unit, how it was organized, the type weapons you had and anything you can say about your soldiers, your officers, and your non-commissioned officers.
LTC McCaffrey: The organization of my company was standard, I believe, throughout the division. We had three rifle platoons, a weapons platoon and a company CP. Our weapons were M60 machine guns, M16s and M79 grenade launchers. We also carried LAW anti-tank weapons. For some misslions for one period of about a month, when we had enemy armor across the border in Cambodia, we also carried the 90mm

recoilless rifle. I made attempts to get 50 caliber machine guns on our firebases, and we attempted to employ flame throwers without any success in getting them into action. We had an extremely heavy reliance on explosives...demolitions and claymore mines. We carried a lot of demolition, both for creating Landing Zones(LZ's) and also blowing bunkers. We frequently carried bangalore torpedoes and we relied very heavily on hand grenades. We would employ anywhere between 100 to 500 grenades in a typical heavy action.

The nature of the troops was probably not that unusual for Vietnam in that time-frame--'68'69 --very young. There were two people in my company who were over 23 years old and who had over four years in the Army...that was me and the 1st Sergeant. With the exception of a couple of SFC's(E-7) that floated through the unit, we were a 100% draftee company. When I say 100%, even the officers were draftees that had gone to the OCS option after being either drafted or threatened with the draft. They were very young kids...absolute fantastic soldiers. The NCOs from E-6 on down were "instant NCOs" out of Fort Benning. Although all of them were young, I say they were fantastic because they rapidly learned the nature of the job they had to do and were extremely competent at what they did. They were disciplined but not in a traditional Army way. They hadn't been around the Army long enough to have learned a lot of our habits and customs. They were extremely friendly because they learned it from their families. Unlike some of the soldiers I dealt with from my last tour as a battalion commander, they tended to come from stable homes. Many of them had one or two years of college and they had learned discipline from their fathers and coaches. They were a pretty good quality of soldier...the best I ever have seen in the Army.

INTERVIEWER: Will you describe for us what a typical day was like for you as a rifle company commander?

LTC MCCAFFREY: I commanded a company on my second tour in Vietnam, and actually my third time in combat. I started off in sort of an unusual way, and I'll tell you an anecdote to express what I mean. I got command of a company a day after we arrived in III Corps. I'd been the assistant S-3 up until then. We had been flown into Quan Loi in III Corps by C-130, and then moved up by Chopper to establish a series of battalion firebases along the Cambodian border.

I guess there were four or five battalions in line, each four or five kilometers apart. My battalion, brigade and I think most of my division promptly got eaten up by the NVA. I can honestly say in retrospect that we got our butts kicked. In about two weeks, then ran all of our firebases off the border. When I took command of a company, I got it from a fellow than was killed. I took command about 2200 at night. The next morning I assembled all the officers and told them that based on my experience the biggest problem was going to be fighting boredom and that during their one year in Vietnam they should expect to be in major conflicts probably five to ten times. The rest of the time the big challenge was to keep your act together so you didn't get torn up when it finally occurred. From the day that I stated that, for the next 12 days, we were in one continuous battle that ended with us being run off the firebase. At the end of that 12 days, I was the senior company commander in the battalion by length of time in command. All the rest of them had been killed or wounded, and I think two of the companies had gone through two company commanders.

At one point during my command tour we went 31 days without being in contact. There was no way to characterize Vietnam, but I would say that a good percentage of the time, we were in contact on a weekly basis. The 1st Cavalry started started up on the border and then fell back with the NVA as they built their logistics bases in an attempt to carry off TET '69. The enemy offensive fizzled primarily because of the efforts of the 1st Cavalry and the 1st Infantry Division in the border areas.

There was a division policy when I took command that three days out of every ten a company would be on a firebase. Once every six weeks you were supposed to be in a brigade base for a standdown. In the eight months I had command, we were in Reserve for three days. Essentially, it was continuous field operations only broken by your turn at being "Palace Guard" on a battalion firebase.

We were frequently involved in air mobile operations but less than I had anticipated. Basically, we went out on a battalion air assault and then tracked off into the country we were operating in. It was generally all heavy jungle. We attempted to locate trails and roads that came down from Cambodia headed toward the populated

areas of South Vietnam. When we found one, a US battalion would move in and we'd attempt to clean out the logistics depots, hospitals, and staging areas of the North Vietnamese Army. We operated at night a good deal of time with limited success. I say limited success because the country was so thick that movement at night was almost impossible unless you were on the NVA trail networks.

You asked me if I used "stand-to". I always objected to that idea except as a method to get people up, shaved, and squared away for daily operations. It annoyed the pants off me when at night I'd get FM radio traffic from my battalion commander stating that he wanted me to go to a higher level of alert. I never really understood because it was obvious to be that I was on maximum sustainable alert 24 hours a day and seven days a week. Therefore going from 50% to 75% alert, did not mean a thing to me. We were as scared at 10:00 o'clock in the morning as we were at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. Most of our security was really oriented around the squad. Every squad had at least one or more soldiers who were fully equipped, behind a machine gun and prepared to take action.

I might add, that my company was really organized around machine guns and mortars. Essentially, I saw myself as commanding nine squads that were built around an M-60 machine gun, and a weapons platoon that was built around one, two, or three 81mm mortars. I never went anyplace without at least one 81MM mortar and frequently would have two, or the full complement of three, if I could get them in by air.

I guess the bottom characteristic of the whole experience was unending physical labor and exhaustion, which I'm sure was common to all rifle companies. Just carrying the amount of gear we had... people were averaging possibly 70 pounds. Everybody in the company carried a mortar round including me. Everyone had at least one block of C-4 explosive plus an entrenching tool. Everyone in the company had at least two fragmentation grenades. Everyone in the company had at least one smoke grenade and radio operators frequently carried as many as six. Everyone carried at least one CS grenade. Everyone had their gas masks. I didn't like daily air resupply, so we would normally be carrying three days of food. Everyone carried two "half-gallon" bladders of water plus two additional one-quart canteens.

Finally, my troops carried whatever personal effects, paperback books, candy, or whatever they wanted. We were laden down like pack-mules. In addition, every squad had a "D" handle shovel and a pick-ax, and everyone of us was carrying five to ten sandbags.

The daily routine would be that well before dark, I'd look for a night defensive position and then put out good security far enough so that the sound of digging couldn't be heard. Then we'd dig in. We might dig in "light" if I was convinced I hadn't been spotted and didn't want the noise of the digging to carry. However, in general every night we all went underground. All crew serviced weapons and the company CP ended up with overhead cover. Then we'd put out LP's, booby traps, and trip flares. We'd all be up prior to dawn...not as a "stand-to" but to get the day started so we could move out promptly at first light.

INTERVIEWER: You were talking about your M60's. Did your soldiers carry, or did you bring in at night, your tripods for your M60's? Did your soldiers wear protective vests or protective armor at all during the time you were a company commander? What was your policy on helmets and soft caps?

LTC McCaffrey: That's a good series of questions. I didn't like bringing equipment in every night and so we generally wouldn't use M60 Tripods unless food was coming in or I thought I was going to be in the same place for more than a day. In that case we definitely used tripods. I might add that we always used range cards and the classic things you are taught in the basic course and advance course.

My policy on body armor and helmets was influenced by my first tour. I had been shot up by a lot by rockets and artillery and to this day I have an absolutely deathly fear of indirect fire weapons. I initially told my company that we were all going to wear helmets with chin straps fastened and protective vests. My First Sergeant persuaded me to wear a protective vest on the first operation I went on. It probably wasn't a good test because I wasn't adequately acclimatized, However, I damn near became a heat casualty. So my final decision was that anyone who thought he was strong enough ought to wear a flak jacket. A goodly number of troops who were machine-gunners or mortarmen did wear protective vests partially because it helped them carrying loads. When we were on battalion firebases, I'd

try to get flak jackets issued.

The thing on helmets used to amaze me. If the troops didn't get shelled for two weeks, they would go right back to the point at which I would have to threaten them with their life to get them to dig in, wear helmets, and obey the common-sense rules. I finally got to the point where I started to threaten them with an automatic Article 15 for anyone that I caught without his helmet on, an M16 rifle, a bandolier of ammunition and his chin strap fastened. It was a constant struggle. Yes, we wore helmets, we wore chin straps fastened and those who were strong enough wore flak jackets. I personally wasn't tough enough to wear a flak vest while moving in the jungle with the amount of gear we were carrying.

INTERVIEWER: If you would, I'd like you to discuss casualties, both casualties within your company, as you remember the, and also NVA or VC casualties.

LTC MCCAFFREY: I talked to every soldier that came into my company the day he arrived. Normally it would be the first night, I'd sit down and talk to them for anywhere between an hour and four hours depending on his rank. All of them got a poop session in which I explained how we operated and what to look for. It sounds macabre ten years later saying this, but one thing I told them that was I could almost guarantee that sometime during their tour, they were going to get hit. They were probably going to be only slightly wounded but if they followed every one of my rules, that they would almost without exception go home alive. At the same time, I would tell them that if they didn't follow the rules then their chances of getting killed were almost guaranteed. I didn't see too many people that evaded that law during the time I had command of the company. One lieutenant, who ended up as my XO went the entire time with me. I would say as a general rule that everyone knew they were getting killed or wounded but probably only lightly wounded sometime during their tour. That seemed to be true throughout the rest of the battalion. You just weren't going to make it. I don't think it bothered anybody, because they saw an awful lot of people getting evacuated who they knew basically were not screwed up for life. Most contacts would end up with about 15 people hit. I normally operated between a low of 80 to 90 men and a maximum number of 120 plus. During most fights, I would have 15 people hit. I don't mean a bad fight, just a normal

engagement that would go on for two to six hours.

Enemy casualties were more difficult to judge. In the 1st Cavalry with General Forsythe there were no fake body count numbers. I think the majority of that is the credit of that two-star general. Of course, every infantryman understands this, but if you could only count bodies that were left in your position then the enemy would have assumed that in the eight months they opposed me, that they never killed anybody because I never lost a body. In fact they were inflicting a significant number of losses on us. It was my estimation, that no tactical fight that I experienced as a company commander did we ever come near to suffering worse casualties than the people we were fighting. I would guess that in most meeting engagements, where we eventually ran them out of the area we would inflict 15 to 30 casualties. Occasionally we did horrendous damage to them, particularly if we forced them out of positions and in the process they were exposed to artillery. I think we clobbered some units significantly. There were a few times when I could see many of them being hit and going down. However, at any one time, the most NVA bodies I ever saw personally couldn't have exceeded more than 15. Generally, when they pulled out of their positions, they were extremely good about policing up shells, weapons, bodies, etc.

Our consistently best tactic that we used was a real lesson to me. We would look for major trail networks. We know there was no way they had spotted us coming into the area then we would get on the trail network with a point squad out in front of the company and walk down the trail until we made contact. The trails were 20 feet wide and corduroyed with bamboo, with bridges and with bunkers every 20 meters on both sides of the trails. You couldn't walk more than an hour until you walked into one of their waystations or one of their base camps. I would guess we did that successfully 30 times. Not once did the NVA fire first. Normally, every fire fight would start with one or two or and as many as 10 to 15 NVA getting gunned down by the point squad as the opening exchange in the fight. From then on the number of casualties we were causing was more difficult to determine because, as you well know, it's a mass of confusion and gunfire and artillery. Basically, that's the way it was.

INTERVIEWER: In regard to casualties. Can you tell me about what you did with your casualties, both wounded US soldiers and wounded enemy soldiers?

LTC MCCAFFREY: That's a good question. I wrote an article for Infantry Magazine about three years ago and they took that part of the article out. I felt very strongly about US casualties. First of all, we had a rule which was part of my in-briefing for every soldier that we would never leave a body, a wounded soldier or a weapon on the battlefield. Every soldier in my company would get killed, including me, before we'd leave anyone. I made this a personal promise between me as the company commander and every soldier. I told them that,"if you're hit we're not going to take another 15 guys casualties in the first three minutes to come get you. Just lay where you are and remember that before any of us leave, everyone's going to get killed rather than leave you in there". They believed it. Casualties are still an enormous problem. In most fire-fights it seemed that the casualties were extremely high among the platoon leader/platoon sergeant leaders.

Normally, I would fight with two platoons up, one back and the weapons platoon would open up a firebase, set up their mortars, blow down trees and we'd start in automatic packages of resupply. The wounded would then be collected in the weapons platoon area. It was a problem to keep the wounded stabilized until they could be medevac'd. The company joke was that helicopters were five minutes away. They never were. If you were hit, you needed to be dragged out of the firefight, and then hauled back over the trail by a carrying party from the reserve platoon. Then you needed an LZ or enough clearing so that a jungle penetrator could get to you. Finally, assuming that it wasn't already dark or that you weren't still in contact, your chances of going a significant amount of time without medical care in a hospital was excellent.

The other thing we did (and I had a constant fight with my battalion surgeon over this) we carried a lot of medical supplies in the field. Every platoon had to carry a stretcher. I'm talking about the wooded handle stretchers, not the light jungle foldup.type. The platoon medic carried it and that's where the battalion surgeon and I got in the initial disagreement. Every platoon medic also

carried morphine and had taped bottles of blood-expander. The battalion surgeon at one time tried to tell me that I wasn't going to be allowed to carry any more morphine because shock would protect my casualties from the pain. He didn't know what the hell he was talking about. As you well know when you end up with 10-15 guys screwed up, the trees are all blown down and it's a tangled mass of vegetation. You've got these kids laying there screaming whenever you touch them, "Put me down, Leave me alone. Don't touch me." So you needed morphine, and you had to have stretchers and you had to stabilize them.

The other problem we found was names. Everybody was known by nick-names. You might serve with a kid for 90 days and still know him only as "Old Hooknose" or by his radio call-sign. I'm sure half of my troops didn't know what my real last name was. They know me by my radio call-sign "Outlaw". We were rarely 100% complete in dogtags. This sounds macabre in retrospect, but every soldier in my company, when he in-processed into the battalion rear, had to fill out a casualty evacuation tag with all the blocks filled in. The casualty evac-tag was kept in a plastic bag in his left fatigue shirt pocket. Everyone had two copies. The First Sergeant's job at the weapons platoon as they were finally medevac'd was to get one copy of that casualty tag and collect his watch, rings and money unless he was fully alert and knew what was going on. We personally got all that stuff from him. I don't say this with any disrespect to the medical evacuation chain, but they were losing their money and their valuables when they hit the hospital. So my First Sergeant personally got their effects. Then I knew who was hit and we had their proper name.

Enemy wounded was partially a function of where we were fighting. We were fighting North Vietnamese Regulars the whole time, not VC and we were fighting against main force units. They were not too keen on surrendering so I personally say that we took few prisoners while I was a company commander. We took some wounded NVA that had been left by another company for me to pick up and evacuate. Most of what I know about prisoners, I'd learned from my first tour when we captured a lot more of them. We treated them cautiously until the shooting stopped. If the shooting had stopped, we were happy the [illegible] Nobody was going to give him any trouble.

We'd give him little plastic cartons of milk if we had them and cigarettes. I'd talk to him in Vietnamese and ask him if he was in good health and ask him what unit he was from. They would always tell me. There certainly wasn't any brutality at all toward the NVA. However, I came away with a very strong impression that I sure wasn't going to ever risk trying to surrender. They were equally eager on not being captured. Basically, it was worth your life to try to surrender in the middle of a firefight.

INTERVIEWER: Did your operations in III Corps have a particular name? Do you recall the name of the major operation? And following that, would you please describe the most difficult battle that your company participated in?

LTC MCCAFFREY: I don't remember the name of the actual operations, whether it was Total Victory "4" or "11". We conducted a screen along the Cambodian border that gradually dropped back for a total distance of 70 kilometers to the outskirts of the rocket belt around the Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex. Then the NVA offensive petered out. TET '69 never got off the ground except for one NVA battalion that got through to the gates of Long Binh. They were all slaughtered by the 11th ACR.

A lot of these things blur together now. You asked me earlier about my battalion commanders. This is a good time to tie this impression in. I had three battalion commanders, one of them only for a couple of weeks.

There was a guy named Lieutenant Colonel Davis, a Citadel grad, absolutely fantastic soldier. If he had two companies out in contact, he'd be with one of the company CPs. Then I had a second battalion commander that died. I only saw him twice during the entire time I commanded under him unless it was on a firebase. I remember this because he commanded during the most desperate moments that I personally felt.

We had gotten in a series of contacts. We were told that the 5th NVA Division Headquarters had been located by an electronic intercept. I think there were supposed to be a couple thousand NVA in the headquarters. The whole battalion was put on stand-by on a series of LZs. One company went in...D Company. They got on the ground and two of us company commanders were following the fight on the radio. There was something odd about what was going on out there.

Everyone knew they were in contact but real communications wasn't taking place. Finally, the First Sergeant of this company flew in by helicopter and suddenly came on the radio. He said, "They're all dead except for a few of them. NVA medics are wandering around in our company position. Most of the wounded have been burned to death when the grass LZ caught on fire, and you've got to get us out." My company got flown in immediately and landed about 500 meters away in another little clearing. The other company walked in some six clicks, arriving there at almost the same time I did. It was a sight. They weren't all dead. Actually one platoon was recovered almost intact except for a few wounded that had been in the tree-line. The First Sergeant didn't realize they were in there. But, they had taken horrendous casualties, approximately 60 or 70% of the company had been killed or wounded.

When our two new companies came in, boy, were we scared. We dug in six feet underground within an hour. Then we started to feel a little bit better because we figured they'd pulled back. They hadn't. Actually they were right in the tree-lines. I don't know why they let us get dug in. The battalion commander still hadn't appeared. The other company commander, a guy named Al Christenson, was an absolutely fantastic soldier and had been around longer than I. The two of us sorted out our tactical plans and started to probe out of the perimeter to find out if the NVA were still there. They were. We went three days in almost continuous contact and barely hung on to the LZ

We never saw the battalion commander. The two of us would get up every morning and we'd figure out what we were going to attempt to do that day. We saw the division commander a couple of times--General Forsythe had come in. We saw the brigade chaplain. He came in and spent a day and a half with us. He was severely gassed in the process because he didn't realize we were using CS. Christenson's company finally was down--he lost all of his officers. I loaned him a lieutenant one night. I made him take my best lieutenant so he'd have an XO in case he was killed that night.

Christenson's company finally got pulled out. They put in another company with me commanded by a super eager captain who just came in from the advanced course. We decided that we were going to go back in there again and attack. At that point, the Battalion

Commander landed and picked the two of us up. At 3,000 feet we looked over the terrain and decided to attack the next morning. I was trying to tell the battalion commander that I wanted a third company in there, and I wanted a coordinated battalion attack supported by air and artillery. I said, "They're still in there and there are more of them than there are of us." The other company commander said, "Barry, you've been in here for I don't know how many days now and you've had all the glory. I'm going to lead this attack and your company can follow." At the time I felt a great sense of relief sweep over me because I was getting sick of it all. I told him, "You've got it, Jack. Go ahead and do it."

The Battalion Commander put us back on the ground. He did not stay and did not put a ground CP in. The next morning at first light (we got mortared all night long by the NVA)--my eager fellow company commander attacked out through my company's side of the perimeter. I had guys up in the trees as snipers who were telling me that they could see cooking fires going in the bunker complex in front of us. We told the other captain and he said, "No, I'm going to move in a column of platoons", and off he goes. The last soldiers of his company were still in my position when they hit him. The NVA promptly just shot the hell out of his people. He had led the attack with a Psy-War team of two division staff guys with tape-recorded messages going in Vietnamese saying something like, "Come out with your hands up. We've got you surrounded". He also had a dog team out there, a tracker dog team! Well, you know, you could smell the rice fires going from inside the company perimeter. It just struck me as ludicrous. They lost the Psy-War team in the opening volley plus the dog team.

We went out there and finally got his company out. They were totally disorganized because they lost their leadership. The battalion commander still didn't come in. I've still not forgotten it. I thought we were going to get over-run in there.. General Forsythe came in again. We got extracted. Both companies came out and he put an "Arc Light" on the area. I guess that was my lowest feeling about a fire fight. Part of it was a sense of isolation. We were too far out. We were right on the fringe of the 105mm fan of coverage. I remember we were getting a lot of crap over the air about "Angle T". I wasn't quite sure what "Angle T" was, but I knew darn well that we

had to have artillery support. We had other fights as good, but none that made me feel as badly.

INTERVIEWER: During that particular battle, did you get reinforced with a third or any other additional ground units? Can you tell me something about the support--artillery support, tac air support and also, maybe something about your re-supply during that time? How re-supply worked to your company in such an extreme situation. Maybe you can discuss something about your lift pilots, your medivac pilots and discuss how they reacted to that kind of a situation under extreme conditions.

LTC MCCAFFREY: Well, I'm certainly a believer in artillery. First of all, we were carrying mortars. Our SOP was to carry one or two mortars and 100 rounds of mortar ammunition...essentially a round per man in the company.

To reinforce our SOPs, we trained frequently. If we had time on an LZ waiting for an air assault to go, we would walk through SOPs for movement to contact, for assault of a fortified position, for night-time defenses and for ambushes. We'd do it live-fire. We'd walk through it at a diminished range and talk the leaders through it. We had a rule that the artillery called a "round on the ground" 24 hours a day. You know, I was told recently as a battalion commander in Europe that we couldn't do things like that anymore. I didn't believe in H & I in Vietnam. However, I did believe that I wanted an artillery battery plotting me on their map and with a continuing fire mission. If we were getting close to contact, we'd start an artillery mission 2,000 meters off on our flank. I wanted to know that I had an artillery battery concentrating on me.

When we made contact, the weapons platoon automatically started a drill on setting up a mini-firebase behind me. A rifle platoon was the rear guard back to the weapons platoon. The artillery FO immediately started to do his own drill. I served with two artillery officer FO's during the time I had command. They were both extremely fine officers and technically competent to do their job. They were good map readers. The FO was my right arm. I say that and still mean it.

Let me just talk about the command structure a second. The company XO's job was to stay in the battalion firebase with his

signature authority and his ability to get logistics forward. The First Sergeant's job was to stay with me in the field. Immediately on making contact, the First Sergeant was in charge of the weapons platoon, resupply, wounded, dead, prisoners, etc. My job was to run the two firefight platoons and to maneuver the reserve platoon. The artillery FO's job was <u>not</u> to stay with me. I had an enormous company CP. By the time you included the three soldiers in the artillery FO party, the medics and attachments, there must have been 12-13 of us. I'd move forward with two radio operators. One of them was a radio operator and one was a body-guard. We were the only ones who would get involved in the firefight.

I forbid the FO to get wnywhere near me. He would normally set up with the reserve platoon. The FO would have heard my orders. He knew my SOP's. He knew exactly where I was on the ground. His job was to bring in firepower. If we were in close contact, I would tell him to put it 200 meters beyond the contact. Artillery needed to come in just for the noise suppression value. Eventually, we'd kick their butts(NVA) and they'd have to move back through that artillery fire. I believed that if my company was together in supporting distance, if we had our SOPs intact and acted the right way, and finally if we were within 105mm artillery range, then it didn't matter what size unit I was in contact with. They couldn't overrun me...not given American artillery. If the NVA were above ground, the artillery was going to clobber them. I normally felt we could move into an enemy bunker complex and kick their butts out of it in a two to six hour firefight without taking unacceptable casualties.

We used all sorts of other fire support. Armed helicopters, I preferred only when we were going in on an air assault or getting extracted. We used Air Force Tac strikes all the time. I must admit--and I say this cautiously, I'm not a big believer in it. The problem was that every time I'd make contact and asked for Tac Air, they wanted to know the nature of the target, grid coordinates, etc. Then the Air would arrive 30 minutes to five hours later. In the meantime, my higher commanders would tell me to stay in place rather than staying in contact. I would try to refuse Tac Air. The only time that was not true was when we were dug in. Then the Air Force [illegible] in spooky gunships and they were

fantastic. But in a meeting engagement, I didn't want to have a thing to do with Tac Air support because they were too slow to show up on station.

Resupply was a function of the First Sergeant and the company XO. I got into trouble on this a couple of times. The minute we made contact, my SOP called forward a package of ammunition, medical supplies, additional stretchers, water, hand grenades.

On two occasions, I tried to get flame-throwers flown in as part of an automatic resupply package. That's sort of an amusing story. On one of these occasions, I couldn't get the chemical NCO to come off the LZ. The second time we were in a major contact, two flame-throwers came in with a chemical corps EM from division. I was forward with the two rifle platoons in contact when the First Sergeant called. I told him, "Well, get them up here." He said, "Well, this chemical NCO is trying to get back on the chopper. He says all he does is deliver them." My response was, "Hey, I haven't fired a flame-thrower since I left the 82nd. I don't even know what they look like anymore.. You tell that SOB that we'll carry them, but he's coming up here as an advisor". The end of the story was that the chemical NCO discharged the pressure from the two flame-throwers and ruined them so they wouldn't work.

My resupply would come in with the XO automatically. Sometimes we'd tailor it, but normally it was automatic. In most contacts we would shoot more than 50,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. The lieutenants in my battalion in Germany found it hard to believe that level of ammo expenditure. We carried two machinegun barrels for each M60. We'd normally burn up three or four of the nine M60's. The company XO would bring in new M60s and back-haul the ones that we'd burned up. He'd bring in lots of grenades. He'd bring in more demo, and hopefully, he'd start bringing in replacement leaders. The personnel resupply was fairly effective in the 1st Cavalry. I'd expect to get in more troops and leaders the same evening to replace the people that had been hit.

Now, I sometimes got in trouble with automatic push re-supply. The company XO would hear I was in contact and he'd come in and deliver it to me on the ground. A couple of times, the contact didn't turn into a major fight and there I'd be sitting with boxes of ammunition, water, etc. On at least one occasion, I had to blow

the stuff because my battalion commander was telling me to get going. Property accountability wasn't a big thing at the time.

INTERVIEWER: In summary it sounds to me like you had no trouble being resupplied. I'd like you to comment your own personal viewpoints on how you thought, or how effective or ineffective the use was of aerial rocket artillery and your experiences with that. Also, any experiences you had with Air Cav personnel and if you used them, how effective you thought they were and any comments on the aviators themselves, the pilots whether they be medivac or lift-ship pilots.

LTC MCCAFFREY: We used Aerial Rocket Artillery and Cobras all the time. I guess I'd make two observations. If the North Vietnamese were above ground and the ARA got in, they were done for. That stuff was absolutely ferocious but not against an enemy that was dug in. Even then it had some value in terms of making them keep their heads down, so it was super valuable on air assaults. However, if I was in a fight in a bunker complex, I really didn't want ARA (particularly in heavy jungle) because the stuff would go off in the trees and you couldn't bring it in close enough. The chopper pilots seemed to have trouble identifying the forward edge of my company. I guess it was because they were slow aircraft and were trying to get in close.

Army aviation, in general, can't ever get any better than it was during those periods, particularly in the 1st Cavalry. We knew their radio call signs, since they didn't change in those days. We knew they were going to come get us no matter what happened. Whether it was medivac, resupply, or air assault...if you were in trouble, those guys were coming in no matter what was happening. I cannot believe their courage. They'd fly into an LZ, knowing it was under 12:7mm fire and still come in to get wounded people out, dump off ammunition or whatever they were up to. They were also fantastic at picking me up in the middle of firefights to let me recon the area. The LOH would come in (frequently under fire) back at the weapons platoon where there wasn't aimed enemy fire. One of the pilots would jump out and they would let me look over the terrain in front of me.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever conduct any operations with ARVN soldiers, or Korean soldiers?

LTC MCCAFFREY: I didn't operate with any Korean units. The ARVN Airborne did have a battalion operate with my brigade. I guess I only saw them a couple of times. Since I had served with them, I knew one of the captains in the battalion that was up there. But, no, we didn't have any joint operations. This was a totally different area. We were way out from inhabited areas. Except for the Vietnamese Airborne and the Marines, the ARVN were generally back behind us. We did operate with Special Forces units on two occasions. Real unusual characters. There was some tribe, Rhade, with a couple of US E-7's who showed up out of the bush to link up with me. They were fantastic. They all slept in one enormous pile of hammocks, talking and screaming and yelling at each other. Then the next day they all picked up and I'd arrange with the two sergeants where we were going and these characters would take off to the woods at a dead-run and would run for 10 clicks to the point we'd agreed on meeting. They were evidently good in fights, too. We never got in any contacts with them but a very different kind of operation, but the quick answer is, no. We operated with US units, sometimes in other battalions, frequently in other brigades. Normally, we operated only in the division. We got traded around a lot in the 1st Cavalry. Half the time, I really didn't know what brigade we were in. We'd get passed back and forth. However, it was US operation.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever have any interpreters with you, or some of the Vietnamese "Kit Carson" scouts?"

LTC MCCAFFREY: Yes, I did. I had three interpreters plus a Kit Carson Scout, the night I took command of the company. We were getting rockets intermittently. In my flawless Vietnamese (I say flawless only to a US soldier who didn't realize how poor it was) I have them this big speech about how glad I was that they were with the company and that together we would kill many VC. The next morning all four of them got on helicopters and deserted.

Eventually, we got a Kit Cartson scout that stayed with me. Actually, he was killed in the same firefight that I was wounded in, He was awfully good at interpreting what had been going on in an area in a bunker complex. He taught us a lot about camouflage. We started to look more like the North Vietnamese than they did. I'm convinced that's part of the reason we had so few causalties.

INTERVIEWER: While we're still talking tactics, would you discuss your tactical missions and orders that you have to your soldiers ... that you were a company commander?

LTC MCCAFFREY: One area bothered me. Frequently you'd hear troops or officers say, "Hey, this is combat...we don't do that hokey kind of stuff." Whether it applied to chin straps on helmets or whatever. It bothered me because I thought that the techniques we learned at Fort Benning and Ranger School were exactly what we were supposed to be doing in combat. As an example, I think of field orders. It was obvious that many of our missions had to be conducted through Frag orders and SOPs. That's why company SOPs were intensively talked through with all newcomers and rehearsed whenever we had an opportunity. On big missions where the battalion would be going on an assault I would use a five-paragraph field order. I made every one of my lieutenants and Sergeants carry the Infantry leaders' troop card in his pocket. That's the way we gave orders,...enemy situation, friendly situation,mission, concept of operations, etc. If there was plenty of time, I'd explain the SOP all over again. If we only had a few minutes to react, than all you would need to state was the situation, mission, and a concept of the operation.

We did use five-paragraph field orders. Every lieutenant had to carry in a plastic bag; a green Army notebook, a pencil and a grease pencil. He had to have a map in a mapcase.

Planning a day's operation would take up all available time. Every night- under a poncho with a flashlight, my first sergeant and I would go through the exact same procedures that I had learned in Ranger School. We'd plot distances between turning points, where we were going to cross streams, etc. If the time was available, (and it always was) the orders had to go out through a platoon leader to the squad leader, and then from the squad leader to his men.

One of the points on your questionaire was how much time do you usually have to plan an operation? Anywhere from three days (once when the entire brigade was moving to conduct a sweep) to as little as 16 minutes. That happened once when the battalion commander had gone out and joined a firefight from a distance of two or three clicks...tracers were bouncing up in the air. My battalion commander came on the radio and said, "You've

got 15 minutes". All I had time to do was call the lieutenants together, point to the horizon where we could see the firefight going on, and say, "That's where we're going...Order of movement is "1st platoon, 2nd platoon, 3rd platoon, weapons," and what was it. I guess the bottom line is the old Army standard, "Use all time available to plan for and rehearse what was coming up."

INTERVIEWER: About your soldiers. Tell us something about the adequacy of the soldiers as they came in as replacements. Do you feel that they were well-trained, back at Fort Polk or Fort Benning, wherever they were coming from propr to their arrival in Vietnam? Besides the training that you've already mentioned that you gave in your own unit, did they ever get any other type of training. Did they ever get any other type of training at a division level before arrival at your company?

LTC MCCAFFREY: Generally, I thought they came in from the States pretty well-trained. I didn't have any problems with them. They knew how to operate M16 rifles. They know how to wear their web-gear. They were disciplined, scared and enthusiastic. I thought they were pretty good. When they got to the 1st Cav Division, they were given a week in-country training. They were oriented on booby traps, methods of operation, and rappelling from helicopters. The biggest thing they had to learn was actual methods of combat. They had to understand that digging was as important as shooting. If the soldier was going to end up being an M60 machinegunner(which he eventually would), it took a lot of coaching in his squad to make sure that he knew how to keep that machinegun in operation. Somebody in the training base(and it still bothered me as a battalion commander) told M60 machinegunners that it was proper to wear machinegun ammo belts slung around the chest. I wanted them to keep 7.62 ammo boxed to make sure the guns wouldn't jam.

A major deficiency was that no one ever showed up who knew anything about demolitions. This includes the engineers. The first thing I would do with attached engineers was train them on how to blow trees down and destroy bunkers.

There were some short-comings. However, I think the training base was turning out a first-class product.

INTERVIEWER: Would you please comment on the status of morale in your unit?

LTC MCCAFFREY: The status of morale was unusual. That was '68-69... a lot of US troops in Vietnam and a lot of casualties. Many of my troops would ask me why we were there. My response was that the real reason they were fighting in Vietnam was to keep their buddies alive, to keep themselves alive and to attempt to kill some North Vietnamese. I guess if you track morale by gauging whether there was a great patriotic feeling about fighting the war...there wasn't.

On the other hand, their morale was pretty good in almost every other way. They treated each other extremely well. A major characteristic of our troops was that they'd lay down their lives for each other in a flash. They were scared a good bit of the time but they were young, tough, and they kept their morale up incredibly well.

We had a good R&R program. We'd get them out and they'd go off to Thailand or Japan and come back in love. All of the would have a hi-fi set and expensive movie cameras in the company rear. I would have liked to have seen the R&R program by company stand-down. We needed to go on R&R to a beach someplace for four or five days.

Drug abuse--racial strife...that was'68-69, before a lot of the bad problems started happening. We had racial and drug problems. The problems were centered in the brigade firebase...our rear area at Quan Loi. There was almost a zero drug abuse in the field while I commanded that company. The troops had to depend on each other. We had some alcohol abuse situations. I was initially too naive. I didn't understand the danger of bringing in one beer for every soldier in the company. At least half of the company didn't drink beer at all and preferred cokes. A few kids would get all of the beer and end up drunk in the field. I cut off all alcohol for a month or so until we got an understanding.

We had some racial problems. We had some black soldiers who were bums. They were all back in the brigade rear area. I hate to say it, but I'm glad I wasn't back there with them. It was a very hostile environment in the rear area. In the field, I would guess 25% of the company was black or Hispanic Americans. We didn't have a racial problem out there. Part of it may be an

inevitable law of history in our country. The best combat soldiers in the Army were disproportionately blacks. The black soldiers were part of the group that was keeping the unit running. In the field, there was absolutely no separation by race. There were no racial epithets. There was no racial hostility. None of us were different. We were all living the same rotten life and in the same danger.

INTERVIEWER: While we're still in the people problem area, would you comment on health of your soldiers. Not talking about combat woulds but, basically, malaria, fungus, dysentery. Were there many of these type cases among your soldiers and how did they bear up under that?

LTC MCCAFFREY: Thats a good question. Part of the in-processing briefing was to tell new troops that, "You're going to live like an absolute animal while you're out here in the field, particularly if you want to stay alive." With the amount of ammunition those troops were carrying, with the 70 pound loads, digging in every night, with night operations, thrashing their way through that undergrowth, with the physical exhaustion, with the interrmittent meals, with the lack of sleep, they'd soon feel sick. They'd stay able to function the whole time they were there. However, I had to make sure they understood that within a week, "You're going to want to go on sick call and go see a doctor, and that's just the way you're going to feel until you leave country. You're always going to have a wrenched muscle, a stick hit in the eye, you'll have skin cuts all over your hands." (by the way, I made them wear gloves to attempt to reduce the number of smashed knuckles and ripped hands) The new troops would go through a predictable period where they would feel bad about the fact that they were constantly in pain.

On diseases...we had good preventive programs. The platoon medics and the company medic were absolutely first-rate. They had an enormous respect among their peers as part of the company. They were constantly doctoring us. I'm sure it would have raised the hair on the head of a medical doctor. If we closely watched my soldiers' eating habits, if we made them dig cat-holes for latrines, if we were careful about frequently getting fresh fatigues,

if we made them wash in streams, if we forced them to take the malaria prophylactic pills then they were ok.

I remember I had a frantic radio call from my battalion commander one day. He said, "Oh, God", one of the assistant division commanders had just flown over my company and seen a bunch of my guys splashing around in a creek. The general was outraged and wanted to know if I was having some kind of a party out there. To this day it absolutely amazes me. He didn't understand that we permanently lived out there. As frequently as I could pull it off (if I did not think we were in imminent danger of contact) we would mount a company operation to set up a perimeter around a piece of creek. We would dig in. All soldiers would wear a helmet with chin-strap fastened, a rifle a bandoleer of ammunition, boots and no clothes. They would hop into the creek by squad and take baths. I would have a huge pile of fatigues brought in.(socks,etc)

Company level leadership is basic. My lieutenants would inspect soldiers to make sure we reduced the number of skin injuries. We made the troops use body powder. We also forced them to use mosquito repellent.

By and large, my soldiers stayed in pretty good shape. If we had fresh food in, however, we weren't able to wash hands and my soldiers would get bad cases of dysentery.

If troops weren't in good physical condition, they would also have heat-stroke problems. Normally, if a new guy on his first day passed out as we moved away, it indicated to me that he wasn't in good enough condision. My soldiers were in constant pain from multiple problems that bothered them all the time in the field.

INTERVIEWER: Barry, how did you handle awards, decorations and promotions with your soldiers?

LTC MCCAFFREY: Promotions are sort of hazy in my mind. I promoted with absolutely no problem to buck sergeant, and occasionally I'd get a guy promoted to E-6. My buck sergeants were promoted soon after I selected them as squad leaders. If I put somebody in control of the squad, he ended up as a sergeant almost immediately. If I put somebody in as platoon sergeant, he would end up as an E-6 pretty soon. That was easy to do because all of us--troops and the leaders would normally agree on who the best people were. I guess I had to recommend approval for promotion to first lieutenant.

My awards program was a little more sensitive. I'd tell my troops, "Look, while you're here, you can be guaranteed two other things. If you do your job, if you're a decent soldier and 99% of you are then you're going to go home with an award for valor and a purple heart." I didn't miss too many times on either one. There's a lot of apparent controversy on this question among old Sergeants and senior field grade officers. All of it is bullshit in my impression. There were very few people carrying rifles, living that kind of nasty brutish life. In the regular course of doing their duty, all of them earned awards for valor. However, I had them turned down all the time. There seemed to be some kind of a quota system. I once put five soldiers for Silver Stars in one fight. They were absolutely fantastic. One of the recommendations came back "disapproved". The rejection said, "You don't get a silver star for killing people." That just blew me away. That's exactly why I was giving awards for valor. I wasn't too keen on giving awards to soldiers for recovering wounded under fire. I tried to encourage them not to do that. I wanted to give the awards for valor to soldiers who got up without being told and attacked. Impact awards were my decision. I'd just remember all the debts that had piled up over the last few weeks and pick the good soldiers. There was universal agreement within the company on who was getting the medals. It was an important morale booster.

It bothered me that I didn't do very well with the soldiers who were getting wounded. They were going out, 10 to 15 guys in a firefight. I would get letters all the time from some VA hospital in Michigan, or Walter Reed or someplace back in the world. They'd say,

> "Outlaw six"...how much we miss being in the company. What a good deal this hospital is. By the way, where's the Bronze Star with "V" that the first sergeant said I was going to get.

I'll bet there are a lot of troops who were wounded that never got the recognition they deserved. It bothers me ten years later just thinking about it.

INTERVIEWER: Barry, there is a subject that came up in Vietnam from soldiers who were there later on, it was called "fragging".

What do you know about this and did you have any experiences with that in your unit?

LTC MCCAFFREY: When I had a company in "68-'69 --no bums stayed in the field. They all ended up back in the rear areas. There is no way you can force an American soldier to fight. In our brigade rear base at Quan Loi, about 15 of these bums got all stoned on "hash" one night and "fragged" the officers' dining room in the brigade rear base. They only wounded most of their targets--the battalion surgeon and a bunch of other guys. Evidently they had planned on using claymores at breakfast the next morning, which would have gotten them all.

That kind of thing was going on in the rear areas. If you wanted to retain control in the rear you had to do it at the risk of your life. Out in a rifle company, if you were a poor leader you weren'tgoing to get fragged, you were going to get out because you knew you were inadequate.

For most combat leaders it was a powerful feeling knowing the kind of incredible affection between soldiers and leaders. We were sharing life and death matters. Generally, fragging didn't exist in the field at all. However, in the rear areas and it was worth your life from '68 through '71 to try and maintain law and order.

INTERVIEWER: Do you have any comments on the maintenance of weapons in that kind of a jungle environment there? Was there anything that you can recall that--some lessons learned peculiar to either weapons or equipment that you think might be valuable?

LTC MCCAFFREY: Yes. The motivation to maintain your radios, your gas masks, your weapons, and your ammunition was strong because it was worth your life. Each squad and platoon taught their newcomers. If you weren't sleeping, eating, digging or standing OP, then you were cleaning your weapons and equipment. Whenever we'd get back on a firebase, the division would fly in contact teams.

The only problem we had (particularly on the M60) was to ensure the soldiers knew how to assemble and disassemble their weapons in the dark. You've got to know how to take your weapon apart, clear it and put it back together, blindfolded. If you screw it up,

its going to jam on the first round and you may get killed because of it. There was no problem on motivating a person to take care of his personal or crew-served weapon. The same went with the mortars. They were absolutely gleaming all the time. Soldiers watched ammunition. They knew if they left an 81MM mortar round in the mud, it might land on their buddy's hootch the next morning.

INTERVIEWER: What were your greatest satisfactions and, possibly, dissatisfactions while you were a company commander in Vietnam?

LTC MCCAFFREY: The greatest satisfaction was that I felt so fortunate to command a company in combat. I had the feeling that everything I'd done in my entire life had led up to that point. That was my third time around in combat. I felt that I knew what I was doing and the troops knew it. I could operate, keep my troops alive, and carry out the mission. That's a pretty powerful feeling.

The dissatisfactions were that I was scared a good bit of the time. I'd been wounded twice before. I was positive I was going to get hit again. If I made a mistake, I was going to get a lot of people killed. That got to me over time.

The battalion commanders seemed to know what they were up to. The division commander, I saw all the time, and I had total respect for him. However, there seemed to be an awful lot of nitwits back there floating around who didn't have the faintest clue as to what we were really doing at rifle company level.

Other than that, it was a very powerful feeling. I'm sure that everyone who was in company command in that war felt the same way.

INTERVIEWER: If you could go back 10 or 12 years and you had an opportunity now to do it over again, would you do it any differently? Would you change anything? Would you do it, basically, the way you did it? Do you have any comments about this?

LTC MCCAFFREY: That's a hard one. The first thing I'd say would relate to command in a company today in peacetime. I just finished spending five straight years in an infantry division in Germany. Command of a peacetime mech infantry company in Germany now is a lot more complex and demanding than the company command tour I had.

However, if I had to go back and do it in combat in the same kind of environment I probably wouldn't do it much differently.

We worried about whether company commanders should have stayed longer than six months. I stayed longer than any company commander that I knew of in my brigade. That was simply a function of time. I didn't get shot until later in the game then the most of them. A company commander has a short and dangerous career.

INTERVIEWER: Do you have any advice for future company commanders and future battalion commanders which you can relate to your experiences?

LTC MCCAFFREY: Many of us here at the War College have just turned over command of a battalion. What I did most of the time was to talk to captains and lieutenants about what we need do in combat. Obviously we're not going to fight the same kind of war we did in Vietnam. However, a lot of it will be the same.

The bottom line is that we've got to learn our jobs in peacetime. The lieutenant's got to go through the equivalent of Ranger School, either at Benning or in his first assignment. The company commander's got to learn his job cold. That means the whole gamut of how to control fire power. I'm concerned that our peacetime training must approximate combat. I personally made a major effort to do that throughout the time I commanded a battalion. Every soldier must do night live-fire attacks. (which includes supporting overhead live-fire) We must make sure that every soldier uses hand grenades in realistic field training. I want to make sure that companies and battalions get a chance to integrate all of it under pressure.. with no sleep during four and five-day operations.

Everybody that's been in combat says the same thing--- Rommel, George Patton--peacetime training saves lives once the shooting starts. I think sometimes we tend to forget that. Company commanders and battalion commanders in peacetime are not playing games. It is how well you're prepared to fight that matters.

INTERVIEWER: Barry, we'd like to thank you for your comments, for your experiences and we hope that this information will prove valuable to other company commanders, battalion commanders and soldiers in our Army in the future. Thank you very much.

Section 6:

Oral History Interview

“Military and the Media”

Interviewed By Lieutenant Colonel

Lawrence S. Epstein, 1992

UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
and the
UNITED STATES MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE
ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW
"Military and the Media"
11 February 1992

MAJOR GENERAL BARRY R. McCAFFREY
Commanding General
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

and

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAWRENCE S. EPSTEIN
United States Army War College
Class of 1992

LTC Epstein:

During your experience during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I would like to ask you some questions about your relations with the media. There are two sections to this. The first would be pre-deployment and how you worked the media here and the local media concerning your division, then experiences you had with the media over in the area of operations.

MG McCaffrey:

A comment to sort of lead into that, particularly in a tactical sense. Our battalion and brigade commanders rarely run into a situation where they haven't seen those situations before and we don't already know one way that will work. We may know a hundred ways to foul it up and only ten ways to do it right. Give me a situation and boom, I'll give you an answer that will be a way that I am sure will work. So my instincts, and the instincts of most Army officers, on a whole range of subjects are rarely off the mark. I really believe that.

Tell me a big maintenance problem, select a battalion commander at random, and he'll probably come up with a really sensible answer. The only place I think this is not true is when Army officers deal with the news media. I think the instincts of many Army officers, particularly the Vietnam generation, are

definitely wrong. In general, we don't like their value system, we think that they are dishonest and that they are going to make trouble for us. There seems to always be a downside, no upside in dealing with the press. We therefore think a reasonable way of dealing with the press is though the minimalist approach. If forced to, we will give them some information that's true, and then we will get away from them. We have one of our "agents" deal with them, etc... We sort of thnk it is cheesy dealing with the press - that it is self-serving and egotistical besides being stupid and dangerous.

I think we have a problem. In don't think most Army officers are on-the-mark when dealing with the media. I do think that a large majority of reporters have a very different value system from the majority of Army officers. When they come up on the net, there is frequently already a divisive, antagonistic and confrontational aspect present.

This Division has dealt with the press very effectively.

LTC Epstein:

Who was your Public Affairs Officer?

MG McCaffrey:

We had a series of them. Young majors, some more effective than others. Our last PAO, Major Kevin Bergner, was probably the best I have ever seen. You could make him a full colonel right now and he'd be a good Deputy Chief of Public Affairs.

LTC Epstein:

Do you think that a person at the division-level, in today's environment has to be sure that they have the correct support at the PAO level?

MG McCaffrey:

Sure. You need an honest, poised guy who is very intelligent and can write well to be the division/installation PAO. Since returning from Southwest Asia, Fort Stewart has been inundated with national media - Washington Post, New York Times, NBC TV, live interviews. We've had 200 satellite antennae around the headquarters building. We've experienced very sensitive allegations of post-cease fire violations. We've had a lot of attention from the press.

We have three basic guidelines when it comes to dealing with the media:

First: We never lie to them. We absolutely treat them with honestly.

Second: There is nothing mystical about people who work in the media field. They are just working guys and gals - not ideologists or artists. We treat them as such. Most reporters only have a limited amount of time before he's got to submit the story. He'd like you to be accurate. If you help him move to the place where the story is breaking, take care of any physical needs, tell him the truth, and show him what he can write about, you're doing the right thing.

Third: The Army can withstand pretty close scrutiny. When I was the Assistant Commandant of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning a few years ago, the press and many in Congress were trying to kill the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Program. It was unbelievable especially when you consider that on a scale of 100, the Bradley is a 97 and the M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier is a 12. The Bradley is an enormous order of magnitude increase in effectiveness over the M-113. However, we experienced a few training mishaps where we sank a few Bradleys. I was in a meeting with 14 people in the room. An article had just been released that had been critical of these mishaps. Everyone was angered and discussed strategies to "curl up in a ball" and protect the Infantry School and the Bradley program. I was astounded. My position was to openly admit that we did have a few training accidents where Bradleys were sunk. Focus

should be on explaining to the media how these training mishaps occurred instead of concentrating on penalizing the person who initially reported them to the press.

A more recent example is a media's request to visit Fort Stewart to discuss the effects of 24th ID(M)'s extended deployment to Southwest Asia - broken marriages, how the strain of the desert war is wrecking internal family structure, etc... Admittedly, I may be overstating the case. At any rate, the PAO recommendation was to deny the request. I took the opposite approach and told the PAO to approve the media visit. My guidance was to have them talk to people like Linda Craddock (a battalion commander's spouse during the war), Pat Cooper Thomas (Division Command Sergeant Major's spouse), the chaplain we left behind, the hospital sociologist, and Dr. Cora Duprell (head of OBGYN). We put together a panel who could describe the vitality of 24th ID(M) and Army programs to help the families of soldiers deployed overseas. In the end, media focus turned from gloom to babies, happiness, and the future. This is where the idea of Operation Desert Stork originated (increase in pregnancies that resulted from the deployment).

We had soldiers in this Division accused of murdering a man in Savannah recently. CNN picked up on the incident and desperately wanted to come here and do a story. Higher level PAO guidance was to deny access. I insisted on a press release where we could present the facts as we understood them. When CNN came down, we were going to have them interview a knowlegeable spokesperson who could talk about the racial climate on Fort Stewart. Why shouldn't we play open book? The Army's Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA) called and expressed concerns that we were going to talk to CNN. Why? If we didn't provide somebody for them to talk to, who would? I told OCPA that it was a local situation and that I would do the best I could locally.

During DESERT STORM I gave a lot of strong advice concerning dealing with the media. I talked to every battalion in the Division. I told them not to talk about anything except what you personally knew to be ground truth - subjects that were in your areas of expertise. In one instance, we encountered a reporter who dishonestly reported something a group of soldiers said. He may

have planted the idea in their heads or took their comments out of context. Twenty of the group wrote the ombudsman for the newspaper in question. The reporter was censured by his own organization.

LTC Epstein:

I'd like you to address one other thing. During the DESERT STORM campaign, were you accompanied by any reporters?

MG McCaffrey:

Yes. We had a pool of them come in. NBC, US News and World Report, Stars and Stripes, AP, USA Today... a bunch of them. I briefed each one of them on the upcoming operation and told them not to report three essential pieces of information - where we were going, what was our purpose (mission) and when we would attack. It had to remain unclear to the Iraqis if we were going to hit the Euphrates River Valley, turn east, and move in to destroy remnants of the RGFC in the Basrah pocket, or hit the Euphrates and turn northwest toward Baghdad. The lives of US soldiers were at stake. Additionally, I told them that they could not take a photograph of any non-cooperative US casualty (dead or wounded). They could interview someone only if he was coherent and agreed to appear on TV. Other than that, the media could go anywhere they wanted to in the Division. They could write any story. We would not censor it and would facilitate getting the story out to their respective home offices in the States.

The most effective way of dealing with the media was to allow them to look at 24th ID(M) at close range. It was an incredibly brave, competent combat team doing what they were supposed to be doing superbly. That is why we had no problems with the press. As a matter of fact, the media was a great help to us.

On 2 March 1990, we had a post-cease fire battle. The first thing I did was to fly in the AP reporter assigned to cover 24th ID(M) directly in to where the fighting had taken place. Additionally, we flew a UH-60 seven hours back to Dharan to pick up a CNN TV crew. At the time, they were focused on the

liberation of Kuwait and had lost interest in the XVIII Airborne Corps part of the Coalition attack. We flew them right back up to our combat zone and made myself and every battalion and brigade commander involved in the post-cease fire battle available. We told them exactly what happened and let them interview us right in the middle of 20 kilometers of burning Iraqi wheeled and armored vehicles the very morning after the battle occurred.

LTC Epstein:

Do you believe that the press, including radio, print, television, and photography were generally supportive of the Division's efforts?

MG McCaffrey:

We had a pretty good lot of media representatives. We took care of them. We told them that we were going to keep them alive, put them in chemical protective overgarments, give them training, and provide them transportation with escorts. We got some pretty accurate reporting which was laudatory of our soldiers. The reporters with us were just overwhelmed. The CNN reporter who interviewed me on 2 March said he'd never seen anything like it. A New York Times reporter wanted to get his picture standing next to me. Can you imagine this happening a few years ago? It was just incredible.

We did not manipulate the press. They had total access within the Division. I'm not the only division commander that had this approach. I know Binnie Peay (LTG J. H. Binford Peay, III - former CG, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) did the same.

An observation if we had to do this all over again. We were inadequately prepared to help media representatives get material back to their home office expeditiously. We need an uplink television terminal controlled by the division commander... <u>not reporters</u>. I permitted the media to use my International Marine Satellite (INMARSAT) telephone to call their home offices in the United States. We cleared their reports and news articles right there in the field. They need to be able to fax their material from the field through my communications systems to the United States. The same applies to TV material. We did very

poorly in this regard. The reason the Army got little if any TV coverage was not that we were holding reporters back. It was that it was a seven hour helicopter flight back from the combat zone to Dharan Airport.

Section 7:

Vietnam Letters

By Daniel P. Garcia and

Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA

Ret., November 1997

Vietnam Letters

By Daniel P. Garcia
and
Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA Ret.

Barry McCaffrey recently received a letter from one of his platoon sergeants in Vietnam. He shared that letter and his response with me and others who had survived Vietnam. These letters are powerful descriptions of the Vietnam experience, and I told him that I thought they deserved a wider audience. Eventually, he and Dan Garcia agreed to publication of these extensive excerpts in ARMY. Their experiences in Vietnam clearly had a profound impact on them and shaped their lives forever afterwards. The descriptions here are a consummate distillation of close combat. The drama and candor of these intensely personal letters portray a young NCO who accepted responsibility and served his country admirably under the command of a competent and compassionate young officer.

The lessons of leadership and trust have rarely been so clearly articulated. I hope that every sergeant in the Army, and every officer as well, will read these letters not only for what they tell us about Vietnam but also—and especially—for what they tell us about the meaning of leadership.

They also serve as excellent examples of the substantial contributions many Vietnam veterans continue to make every day.

—Gen. Jack N. Merritt, USA Ret.
President, AUSA

Dear Gen. McCaffrey,

For many years I labored under the delusion that you had been killed in Vietnam after I returned. The one letter I received to this effect was obviously exaggerated and the discovery of your survival, let alone your achievements, induced a nearly metaphysical reaction within the darkest corners of my soul. When Joe Galloway finally pieced together the fact that we had known each other and as I fully grasped that after all these years I might actually speak to you again, I suddenly realized that to do so I would need to walk amid the wreckage in my own memory to clarify my thoughts and tell you what it meant to know that you are alive and well. Upon reflection, I further realized that to effectively communicate my thoughts to you, without being overcome or distracted by the rush of excitement or reawakened pain and confusion, I would need to write to you first. This then is my meager effort to relate back to you some of what we lived through together, what it meant to me—all told to you in a way that I would never have told you as a mere enlisted man in your company.

Speak Memory.

(Thank you, Mr. Nabakov.)

I remember that the 2-7th Cavalry left I Corps at the end of October and took up residence at a base camp 300 miles south in the flat, forested area on the Cambodian border. As President Johnson stopped the bombing of Cambodia on November 1, 1968, we were there to await the anticipated movement of NVA [North Vietnamese Army] troops from their now safe havens across the border. And they did come. I remember clearly the pitched battles and firefights the first week of November. I remember your predecessor, shot through the head and hauled by us back to our base camp. On that gray day as I was returning from the hospital to rejoin the outfit, we had lost 30 men without having encountered a single enemy soldier.

It was in this state that you came to us, our new "Amber Outlaw 6." I do not remember the exact date, but I can see the place and feel the silent mixture of apprehension and resentment masked by an outward apathy borne of fear and hardship upon our first meeting with you. You told us that at the first signs of danger you would call in artillery fire or gunships and that we would proceed with caution, not with recklessness. You made a point of coordinating our movements with support fire. We heard, we listened, but along with the rest of our innocence, faith in the words and promises of another commander had long since perished. But even among those of us in whom the beasts of death and survival were most ferocious, a spark of a single human frailty called hope was rekindled by your words.

As fate would have it, within a day or two you had a chance to prove that you were true to your word. And you were. Not long after you joined us, I remember talking to one of the platoon leaders. Those of us responsible for our platoons acknowledged that you were different from our previous leaders, that you seemed genuine. After we left the border, we had a few skirmishes, or so it seems to me now, but after the intense fighting in early November we were okay until that day in December—the 16th or so. I remember very clearly that one or two platoons were scouting on recon. My platoon was in the lead and you were not far behind. I recall one of my machine gunners saw movement and blasted away, managing to scare away two chickens! We found a bunker; no one would go in. I went down and found the rotting corpses of two NVA soldiers, whom I shot, because I caught a flicker of rat movement from the corner of my eye. My shots burst the corrupt flesh. I recall that I was sick and disgusted and that I was in such a hurry to blow the bunker up that I barely gave anyone, including myself, time to scatter as I dropped the fragmentation grenade onto the bunker floor and fled. It was as though I could seal away the memory and disgust of that putrid bunker by burying its physical evidence.

One of my squad leaders rushed up and told me in the gravest tone that I needed to go ASAP to headquarters as something was up. I scrambled back and found you on two handsets talking to battalion command and someone else. You were dead serious. My RTO was in the cluster around you and he motioned to me. Over his frequency I heard the screams of the dying in Delta Company, and I knew at once you were ordering choppers for us to fly to their relief. They came shortly thereafter. I could see in their jerky, erratic flight movements that the pilots were scared, and it told me that we were headed to a place of death.

Alpha Company had gotten there first and, as I recall, the firing was sparse, but by the time we got there most of us knew that Delta Company had ceased to exist as a unit, that many had died and most of the others were wounded. As we moved to broaden their perimeter, we passed their remains: broken, bullet-hole-riddled equipment, a smashed helmet here, body parts there. We saw where the NVA had burned the tall grass and shot the men at close range. It was very hard. Some of my own men recognized a handkerchief or some other belonging from one of their friends and knew that he was alive no more. But we did not speak a single word to one another. I remember the fighting that followed over the next five days as we tried time and again to break out of the more or less surrounded position we were in. I remember an NVA charge at Alpha Company as I and others from Bravo came to their relief. I remember the bomb strikes sailing directly over our heads, exploding in front of our perimeter. Maybe I'm dreaming, but I recall your anger at the battalion commander who had failed to coordinate the artillery prep with the air assault so that the NVA had hours to set up their .50-caliber machine guns and mow down doomed and unsuspecting Delta Company. At least that is what I thought all these years.

I remember how on the third day or so of this engagement, the battalion commander showed up for an award ceremony in the middle of the perimeter. In fact, I think I received one—only to have it broken up by enemy rockets and mortars. It was folly and so we finally withdrew. I was the last one to leave the perimeter that last day near Christ-

mas 1968, and as I left, for the only time during my combat experience, I fired from the chopper as it left the ground a sort of signal of defiance mingled with respect for a grim, determined enemy who had taken much and given little.

During those five or six days, our casualties were comparatively light. Other units with us were not so lucky. I recall several wounded and a few men (ours or Alpha's?) lying on ponchos in a row while the snipers fired at them. I recall my rage at seeing them exposed and so I returned the fire above the heads of our own mortar crews, who were angry at me. But the sniper stopped and a chopper came.

That chopper pilot was scared out of his wits. He left so hastily he whacked a tree branch while taking off. We watched as the chopper lurched downward, but his main rotor held and he was able to limp away noisily back to base. We heard he made it and we were relieved, for nothing seemed worse to us than dying on a medevac chopper after being hit. In the main, however, as danger lurked behind every tree, every rock, you protected us. By the end of that week, those of us who had any powers of observation left believed in you.

We fled to mud and elephant country and some place I recall with the bizarre name of LZ Odessa. Somehow an R&R allocation came down for me and I left for six or seven days in Manila. But no matter what I drank or what woman I was with, the sounds of gunfire and the screams of the wounded and dying were, by now, as with all of us, permanently locked inside my mind and heart.

Sgt. Daniel Garcia

When I came back, I remember a few slow days. Then we encountered "the complex." January 18, 1969. This day was the turning point in my life, and you played a key role in it. I have played out these events through the lens of my mind's eye many times. As I write this, I can feel the celluloid strip of memory project each image on the screen of my consciousness.

It was late morning. It was hot, and the humidity was its normal low 90s. The second platoon was on point; my third platoon was next in line. The gunfire between Delta Company (again cursed with ill fortune) and the NVA, who apparently surrounded them, rumbled somewhere in the distance, vaguely in front of us. Our advance to relieve Delta had been slowed because of the growing sounds of machine gun and automatic weapons fire. We could hear the flutter of gunships running sorties somewhere above the jungle's triple canopy.

Suddenly, machine gun fire erupted in front of me. As I was third man in my column, I could see a few flashes and soldiers scrambling for cover. The second platoon leader had pulled his men up on a crude line, and I brought my platoon up alongside. Firing was heavy. Some of my men disappeared, hiding at the first sound of contact. The 2nd platoon's men were firing weakly, as were mine. A period of perhaps 10 minutes ensued, although it seemed like hours, while both sides exchanged intense fire to little effect. I could not find all of my platoon as I tried vainly to direct fire toward several bunkers ahead of us which were pouring hundreds of rounds into our ranks.

After much arduous screaming, one grunt pointed to a bunker we had passed perhaps 25 yards behind, saying that some of my men were hiding there. I realized that without my missing soldiers, I was immobile and unable to direct any movement or fire. The 2nd platoon had three or four men shot already, and they seemed desperate as they were receiving the sharpest fire and were closely pinned down. I took a chance and stood up, running to the rear, hoping to find my troops. As I ran, I could see bullets felling vines and perforating jungle leaves immediately next to and ahead of me. One bullet passed directly under my arm, slightly ripping my loose fatigue shirt.

The ground sloped slightly from the area where the main action was taking place. I reached the bunker and could see one figure in the half shadow below. I called twice but received no answer. Finally, I went down the steps and threatened to kill anyone who didn't come out. I didn't know if I meant it, for anger, adrenaline and desperation had driven me to the brink. Either way, I must have been convincing because five of my men quickly emerged, their faces filled with shame and fear. My own deep anger and contempt raged inside of me until I saw my best friend, whom I loved as a brother, come out. When I saw him, I thought my heart would break.

Our eyes met, but only for a moment as he hung his head. As he ran back to the line I could see his tears, and the anger that had built up inside me, its own separate

force, suddenly burst. I ran back to the center of the line. Once again the firing was thick and my body was tiring. Machine gun bullets were now close on me and I threw myself behind a large anthill. I can still see the brass-colored machine gun slugs slamming into the anthill I lay behind, spinning over my head, their lead sparkling in the pockets of deep azure shining through the gaps in the layered trees. These slugs began to form a pile between my feet as I lay on my back.

Eventually, the bunker in front of me and I exchanged many rounds until I think I killed the gunner and his ammo bearer. After that, I was able to find my RTO. Thus, you, I and the others were able to communicate. At your direction, the 2nd platoon leader popped smoke on the far right of his side of the line, my men on the far left of ours. We were so close in contact we did not throw the smoke to mark our positions in front, but rather a bit behind our positions. The gunships you had called were near and they streaked in quickly. Their first burst of cannons and rockets crossed into our lines and two of my men were hit, including a private who lay next to me, his cheeks and face riddled with shrapnel. I hollered to you over the net and you helped redirect the fire almost at once, saving our lives. Some time passed and under the cover of gunships and bunker support, you rallied us to an immense old bomb crater to the left rear of our ragged line.

By this time, I had seven casualties, none fatal. One of my squad leaders had been shot in the thigh, so I had made a corporal temporary squad leader. As we all scrambled under what was now irregular NVA gunfire, we reached the perimeter of the bomb crater. I was amazed that we all fit in one bomb crater, as if it were a company-sized foxhole. You had told us that napalm was coming soon—to be dropped on our vacated positions. When it came, we were to flank the contact area and circle around to link up with Delta Company. As I had the squad leaders report to me the presence of each of their men, we suddenly realized that two were missing.

From my vantage point I could see two men alone and 50 yards away—a machine gunner and his ammo bearer. I knew that if they stayed there, they were doomed. Time was fleeting and I wasn't sure what to do, so I resigned myself to retrieving them. I remember crossing myself as I got up to go back. One of my squad leaders saw me leaving and pulled at me, begging me not to. But I was cold inside now. In a detached way, I figured I wouldn't make it, but I was so determined not to leave two of my men abandoned that I shrugged him off and ran back to the contact area.

As I got within 10 yards of their position, I stopped, screaming for them to move out while I gave them covering fire. I stood up and began shooting at the trees and bunkers in front of us. As they began to scramble out of their frozen supine positions, I could see a flicker of enemy movement. It was an RPG crew, and we shot at each other simultaneously. I'm certain I got them, and their rocket exploded into the soft earth almost directly between my legs. The explosion blew me straight up, twisted my rifle like a pretzel and lacerated my pistol belt with shrapnel. When I landed I knew I was hurt, but I didn't know how badly as, I suppose, I was in shock.

I reached out and begged for help from the machine gun crew as they were running right at me. But I could see they were terrified. One soldier brushed my hand aside. They both glanced at me but continued running to the rally point in the bomb crater. I was now alone with no weapon. I pulled a piece of the rocket's tail fin out of my thigh with my fingers. I remember it was still hot, but it had not penetrated deep. Forty yards or so away I could see men from my own platoon watching me. I called out for help, but no one budged. By now the NVA had seen me move, so they began to open fire on me. Because the ground sloped a little where I was, their bullets seemed high. I was afraid, and felt more alone than I had ever felt in my whole life; more alone than I would ever feel again. I began to crawl back to the bomb crater.

I could see and feel the enemy's bullets whizzing over me and chewing up earth and foliage all around me. I could hear men screaming, but I did not know what or who they were screaming at. I have no idea how long it took me to crawl back; it could have been three minutes, maybe 10. It was a dark, pitiless eternity to me.

When I was a few yards away from the crater, I could hear our own machine guns firing to cover me. Finally my medic, the same one I had evicted from his hiding place in the bunker earlier, risked his life as he ran upright and dragged me in the rest of the way. As he quickly examined me, he shoved some ammonia up my nose and told me that I had shrapnel in my legs and hip and some superficial facial wounds but nothing serious. This woke me from my stupor and I found I could walk. Within the crater you were clearly in charge, your grim determination steadied me and gave me faith. Events moved quickly. We got set to move out. I distributed the remainder of my gear to my other men. Since I was walking fine and had no equipment other than bandoleers of M16 ammo, I agreed to be a human crutch for a sergeant, whose thigh was severely wounded by a machine gun bullet.

Our exodus then started. Two lieutenants from other platoons (and maybe you, too) stood firing machine guns as we began to stream out, single file, on the far side of the crater. Small arms fire rattled everywhere. The din was incredible. As we exited the crater on our way to Delta Company, I could hear the jets overhead waiting to drop their deadly bombs. I was near the end of the column and could see and hear the "woosh-woosh" of the first napalm canisters as they began to fall toward the initial contact area. At the first explosion, we could feel the heat from the burst and the air seemed to be sucked out of us for a moment. We could see panic-stricken NVA soldiers vacate bunkers and start to parallel our movements maybe 15 to 20 feet away from us. We began a steady exchange of gunfire, but

now we seemed to have the upper hand. We shot down several NVA soldiers during this retreat.

The march seemed to take forever. After a while, the level of gunfire gradually slackened, although I don't remember it ever stopping completely. Toward dusk we found Delta's position, such as it was. They seemed pathetic, shell shocked, disorganized. Their position on the return slope had few foxholes. I remember most of them were lying under or behind felled trees in little groups. They seemed exhausted and frightened to the point of near paralysis. They clearly did not have the same disciplined organizational structure that you had ingrained in us.

Finally, as dusk was settling in, you agreed to let me come in on the last chopper with some of the other ambulatory wounded. Only one chopper could land in the tiny LZ we had hacked out of the forest and it was a near vertical descent and ascent for the choppers, making them a great target. I was unsure of whether I should leave, but I was very tired. As my chopper lifted upward, I saw another sight still seared in my mind. There, on a scarred sloping hillside littered with fallen timber, debris and a few enemy corpses, 150 or so American infantrymen had set up a perimeter awaiting the next contact. The smell of cordite and gunpowder choked the humid air, and a cloud of white and black gunpowder smoke seemed to linger over the whole area. The earth, denuded now of foliage from the intense combat, was a pocket of brown surrounded by a forest wall of green. No animal or insect noises were apparent. Every minute a tracer round or two was shot aimlessly at our perimeter by hidden NVA snipers. As the chopper I boarded moved higher, the small circle of men, their dirty faces and sweat-matted fatigues became less visible, then smaller and smaller while the impenetrable jungle and forest around them grew. The scene reminded me of something...one of Bosch's visions of hell. That picture in the An Loc forest became the embodiment of hell to me.

What happened next in this endless day, you do not know. We finally reached our base camp and went to the MASH ward, I and six others from B Company, 2-7th. We waited a long time while the doctors were feverishly operating on what looked like an NVA soldier. I became restless and felt a surge of anger that my men were being ignored. I rose to do something about it when a male nurse glided up next to me and put his hand on my arm, which I found to be holding a weapon. He must have been watching. He said something to me and I finally looked at his kind eyes. He told me, "Sarge, there are only sick and wounded human beings here and we'll get to you and your men in a few minutes." His words deflated my senseless rage and I sat down, ashamed of what I had been thinking.

Later we were treated, released and sent, all seven of us, to a tent with a wood floor and canvas cots—luxury! It was apparently next to the officers' tent. Even in my enervated state, my sleep was racked with tormented images. I could hear conspiratorial whispering somewhere in my dream. Some animal instinct shook me awake. I bellowed with all my might for the men in my tent to get out, and pushed the last two down the steps and into the dirt outside just as the grenade exploded inside, ripping the tent apart. I found I had landed near the open urine pits and I vomited hard. It was as if by vomiting, I could purge my body and soul from the nightmare this had become.

By morning I had resolved to return to the unit even though my wounds were not healed. I figured I'd rather die fighting the NVA than stay behind and be fragged.

I came back to our company sometime that afternoon. By then our unit had discovered that the NVA had been protecting the evacuation of a huge underground hospital complex that we had inadvertently stumbled upon. The enemy had withdrawn; the crises had quietly evaporated. You and I spoke that evening. You told me that I was being put in for a Silver Star. It was then or perhaps a little later—but I think then—that you asked me to stay, offering me a battlefield commission. Could you possibly remember this conversation? I do because it created an immense conflict within me. I had long since ceased caring about my physical safety. In my own rough way I was dedicated to my men, and I was, for the first time in my life, being told by an adult male whom I admired that I was needed. Someone needed me.

But the events of the day before had taken away from me the last vestiges of strength. I feared what I would become if I stayed. I assumed I would die if I stayed. But it was not fear of anything that caused me to say no to you. Rather, it was that for the first time in months I suddenly found a will to live. The physical and emotional pain from my gunshot wounds in July 1968 no longer obscured my desire to live. And so I declined, and in doing so I did not tell you "no." I said, "I can't." You said you understood. During that conversation I remember looking at you closely and seeing your pain, your isolation, the humanity in your eyes and in the expression on your face. It was a powerful turning point in my life. I realized suddenly that our leader, a man we all respected, had simply become a human being to me, with all the strength and weaknesses of other human beings. It was there, in this moment, and through our other experiences, that great truths were revealed to me about the nature of leadership.

After this my memory becomes confused. I was wounded one more time in a small firefight and left shortly thereafter in early March 1969. Between the January 18th action and my departure, however, I remember that the other young platoon sergeants and I became increasingly worried about you. You seemed to be taking more personal risks. You were pushing yourself and, sometimes, us harder. It seemed to all of us that something had happened inside of you. We noticed because, you see, we cared very much about what happened to you.

One episode stands out—maybe it's distorted, maybe by now it's confused. About the last time I was hit, we found ourselves, once again, with 2nd platoon. We were in a dry

creek bed. A small, flat clearing lay in front of us. On its far side, up near the treeline 25 yards away or so, was an enemy bunker, a high one that was clearly visible.

The memory is jumbled now. The 2nd platoon leader is hit in the neck. We pour fire into the bunker; it falls silent. You begin to order some of us to move on the bunker. You change your mind. All of a sudden, you get up and charge the bunker holding only a pistol. We are all dumbfounded. I crawl out of the creek bed and stand ready to kill anything if you are shot. You reach the bunker. No one has fired. You throw a smoke grenade in the bunker. You go inside! Four or five others and I start running toward the bunker. We are all afraid for you. You emerge from the smoke. Your face is red. You are coughing. There is a baby in your arms. In a few seconds, an old woman also emerges. We are all silent. We have never seen a child on the battlefield.

Later a chopper comes to pick up the wounded sergeant and maybe me (why?). The sergeant has sort of gone loony. He is crying out—but for what? His neck is hurt badly, but it looks like he'll make it. The chopper lands. They put him in first on a stretcher. I hop in the other side. I have a pistol on me (why?). Someone gives the infant to the wounded sergeant. The door gunner nudges me and waves his head toward the sergeant, who is holding the child in his hands, arms outstretched. Is he mad? The medic outside the chopper is shouting something at the sergeant, and I start to panic, afraid that something terrible may occur. I reach for the pistol, realizing I may have to shoot. I pull it out of my holster. My heart is sinking. The sergeant then lowers the child to his chest, embracing it. He is crying softly. The crisis passes. We begin to rev up for takeoff. Someone plops a nine-year-old girl in my lap. I'm sitting in the doorway, as usual, my legs dangling out, and now so is she. She is scared. I can feel her tiny frame shaking. We begin to take off. She bites me, not hard, but firm. All I can think is that she is scared and believes that I'll throw her out of the chopper. Finally I stroke her and find a voice in me I've never had before, and it says, "I won't hurt you." We leave. I know not any longer if all of this happened. I think it did, at least most of it. Maybe the little girl wasn't real. Maybe she's a symbol of my guilt, our collective guilt. Either way, for years she visited my dreams. She is with me still.

This ends my story. The windup is tortured and long because these memories are so. But I tell you this in detail so that despite the differences of time and space and rank, and all of the later experiences of our lives, you will know what happened there, at least in my eyes. One of us has lived to tell you now directly, on paper, how important you were to us. You were the first company commander who cared about us. I think we would have done anything for you. It was not lost on any of us that despite the combat in these months and the awesome losses in our sister companies, our own losses were light. But more than that, we came to trust you and believe in who you were. In that way you allowed us to believe in ourselves, and in doing so you saved some part of each of us. This may have been your greatest achievement in that theater.

When I saw you last, I had great fear because I thought I saw death in your eyes. It seemed to me that your concern for yourself had ceased, and that you would continue to take risks and that someday you would be obliged. Thus, when I left Vietnam and was later written to and led to believe that you and others had been killed, I felt a great loss and believed that I had betrayed you all by not staying.

And now the essence of my message. From you I learned that leadership, particularly in times of great crisis, is a demanding and isolating experience. I learned that understanding and compassion must be combined with technical competence and strength to lead, and that selflessness, not selfishness, is required. I learned that through one leader the lives of many can be changed, and thus every human being has the ability to influence the behavior of the world in some small way. I learned that calm in the center of a storm is crucial, and that whatever the distractions, one must focus on the big picture. You taught me all this from your example.

War had caused me to watch everything in life with discernment. You removed much of the mystery of the human experience. In many ways, you taught me more about the world than anyone, including my own father. Yet we were not close. You were Amber Outlaw 6 and I, a simple platoon sergeant, was Amber Outlaw 3-5. Nonetheless, you were, and always have been, a powerful force in my life.

My experience in the military shaped the rest of my life. Having survived, I felt a special sense of obligation to live, in effect, for many who did not return. I dedicated and drove myself and my career in a way that I hoped would make some small contribution to the world beyond my own petty existence. While my personal life has been uneven and filled with mistakes in relationships, I've certainly wandered an eventful and diverse professional trail. If I have contributed anything to this world, much of it is attributable to your influence on a hardened, watchful 21-year-old platoon sergeant who once served, proudly, under your command.

I thought long about writing you this letter for fear that it could revive memories that you'd rather not have. But I chose otherwise and, once started, it assumed its own course. I hope that someday not too distant I will see you again. Until then, I hope that you and those closest to you are safe and well.

—Dan Garcia
Once "Amber Outlaw 3-5"

DANIEL P. GARCIA *is senior vice president of real estate planning and public affairs for Warner Bros. in Burbank, Calif. He has served on the boards of directors of the Kaiser Foundation, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the Rockefeller Foundation. He served with distinction in Vietnam where he earned three Purple Hearts, the Silver Star, two Bronze Stars and an Air Medal. A graduate of Loyola University, he holds an MBA from the University of Southern California and a Juris Doctorate from UCLA School of Law.*

Dear Dan,

Your letter of Vietnam memories was a treasure—a capsule of time that reappeared from 29 years past. The power and clarity of your letter make it one of the most profound pieces of writing on our war I have ever read. Dan—it seems like just yesterday to me, even now. I can see your face with film clarity—such a young man of integrity, courage and leadership under such enormous pressure, responsible for the lives of other even younger soldiers who were barely beyond being boys. You and the others were my family, my brothers, and my constant burden of worry during the eight months I commanded B Company, 2-7th Cavalry.

All that you have achieved with your life is a source of great pride to me. The discipline, sheer talent and energy you showed as a 21-year-old rifle platoon sergeant in combat has followed you. You did all that was asked of you and more. You were wounded three times. You took care of your soldiers. You were an example to all of us.

Your letter awakened some terrible sleeping memories. I have shared your letter with my family and some close friends—particularly the Vietnam vets who have stayed close throughout the years. I can see your memories as an out of body experience from your stark images. My recollections capture the same pictures from different angles and with other hazy, distorted and bloody perspectives.

A handful of soldiers—and particularly you—have stayed in my thoughts and prayers throughout the decades. I really loved all of you and desperately wanted you to live and go home intact in spirit. Our country did not treat any of you with the respect, support and compassion you deserved. It was a shameful blot on our history to send the country's young men off to this terrible conflict and then use our soldiers as objects of blame for the divisive political struggle that ripped the nation apart for a decade.

Dan, you are a superb example of a Vietnam veteran with life-long dedication to America when you returned to civilian life.

When I met you as I took command of B Company, 2-7th Cavalry, in November 1968, I was *five years older than you*. I was also on my third combat tour; had been wounded twice; had a wife, son and baby daughter whom I adored; was a West Point and Ranger School graduate; and was *an old man*. All my youthful spirit for adventure, for war, for glory was gone—ground out of me in the mud and artillery fire of the DMZ fighting as part of the Vietnamese Airborne Division.

Fresh out of West Point, I had volunteered for the 82nd Airborne Division as a new 2nd lieutenant in 1964 because I believed the division would go to Vietnam. We ended up instead in the Organization of American States intervention in the Dominican Republic. Our combat experience was minimal, but I got the shock of seeing American soldiers lying dead on canvas stretchers. Now I knew.

From the Dominican Republic, I immediately volunteered for Vietnam. After extensive language and advisor training, I ended up based in Saigon with the Vietnamese

From you I learned that leadership, particularly in times of great crisis, is a demanding and isolating experience. I learned that understanding and compassion must be combined with technical competence and strength to lead, and that selflessness, not selfishness, is required. I learned that through one leader the lives of many can be changed, and thus every human being has the ability to influence the behavior of the world in some small way. I learned that calm in the center of a storm is crucial, and that whatever the distractions, one must focus on the big picture. You taught me all this from your example.

War had caused me to watch everything in life with discernment. You removed much of the mystery of the human experience. In many ways, you taught me more about the world than anyone, including my own father. Yet we were not close. You were Amber Outlaw 6 and I, a simple platoon sergeant, was Amber Outlaw 3-5. Nonetheless, you were, and always have been, a powerful force in my life.

My experience in the military shaped the rest of my life. Having survived, I felt a special sense of obligation to live, in effect, for many who did not return. I dedicated and drove myself and my career in a way that I hoped would make some small contribution to the world beyond my own petty existence. While my personal life has been uneven and filled with mistakes in relationships, I've certainly wandered an eventful and diverse professional trail. If I have contributed anything to this world, much of it is attributable to your influence on a hardened, watchful 21-year-old platoon sergeant who once served, proudly, under your command.

2nd Parachute Infantry Battalion. Those were the days of wine and roses: air conditioned BOQs, jeeps, nightclubs, older airborne NCOs, and the cool beauty of the surf on the beaches at Vung Tau. The other reality was midnight alerts: the roar of C-47s and C-130s lifting us from Tan Son Nhut Air Base and heading out to some savage firefight on the frontier or a besieged provincial capital. Within days of leaving city lights, milk shakes and PXs, we might be involved in a massive battle with hundreds killed or wounded. In many cases the NVA would outnumber us and have overmatching rocket, mortar and artillery firepower.

After coming home, I went directly from Vietnam to Panama to be a general's aide. My poor West Point Spanish got me a wonderful year-long interlude of peace. My beautiful young wife and children shut the door on Vietnam. I worked for a wonderful old general who was a Bataan death march survivor. He treated me like his son. He wanted me to follow in his footsteps as an instructor in political science at West Point. I was to go to graduate school at Harvard and then join the faculty. In your letter you mentioned your feelings of abandonment as you left your friends upon departing Vietnam after your *third* Purple Heart. It is a common feeling among American soldiers who have survived combat.

In my case, I was still in Panama when the Tet Offensive started on Christmas 1968. The graphic news media coverage was on our Armed Forces Network television each night—ferocious scenes of combat. Our soldiers, *our soldiers*, were dying in great numbers. I was one of three infantry captains with a Combat Infantryman Badge serving among the 15,000 troops in Panama. My sense of guilt at seeing our Army fighting for its life while I prepared to head off to graduate school broke me within a few days. Without telling the general, I called the infantry assignment officer in Washington and volunteered for immediate return. I told my wife Jill, who understood. She was scared, but she always understood. The general was scared, sad and regretful. He wanted me to be a general; he wanted my friendship. He let go reluctantly.

When I left Jill with her parents in Corona Del Mar, Calif., I had a powerful sense of letting go. This was what I was supposed to do. My friends were dying and being maimed in massive numbers. There was simply no option but duty.

When you saw me take command of B Company at LZ Billie on the Cambodian border in III Corps, I had been the 2-7th Cavalry assistant battalion operations officer (S-3) for two months. The 1st Cavalry Division conducted an emergency deployment from I Corps to Quan Loi in III Corps in response to intelligence of a planned 100,000-soldier NVA offensive. The enemy's intention was to sweep out of Cambodia down the Surgess Jungle Highway to capture the huge American logistics complex at Long Binh. Long Binh was the biggest military installation in the world—destruction of its millions of tons of supplies, ammunition and fuel was to be a war-winning knockout blow. The garrison of 40,000 REMFs would be easy pickings. The emergency mission of our 1st Cavalry Division was to put a reconnaissance-in-force on the Cambodian border and then fall back in a fighting covering force to bring about the attrition of the enemy offensive. In the largest sense we succeeded admirably—Tet '69 was eventually stillborn. Only *one* NVA battalion ultimately survived the 100-kilometer meat grinder campaign offensive and stumbled out of the jungle a few kilometers from Long Binh. This one NVA battalion

/as then killed almost to the last man by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

We had done our job. But what a trail of tears the 1st Cavalry Division left behind during our bloody full-court press with the attacking NVA divisions and logistics troops. So many *Garry Owen* soldiers in green bags, so much suffering, so much blood, confusion, despair, courage, sacrifice and love. So many memories brought back by your powerful letter: Dan Garcia—handsome, poised, serious, intelligent. Your fellow platoon leader—one of the most gifted natural leaders I have ever met. The lieutenant who loved his soldiers and controlled his fear with enormous combat courage. The endless memories of the faces of teenage soldiers with their energy, respect, affection for each other and enduring courage. Our 1st sergeant was a rock to me. He helped shoulder the moral burden. He was also on his third combat tour and would earn his third Purple Heart with B Company. He had first served in 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, in the Korean War and had been badly wounded as a young private. For most of my command tenure, the 1st sergeant was the only other soldier in our company who was both Regular Army and more than 25 years old.

Our company ranged in strength from 73 to 125 men. We were essentially all draftees, ages 18 to 22—the officers, the NCOs, the soldiers. The 1st sergeant and I absolutely loved and respected all of you young men. We knew in our hearts that many of you would be wounded or killed while serving in the company. We also believed that if we could do our job properly—coordinate air and artillery; maintain tactical coordination with other battalion elements; ruthlessly enforce security, digging-in, helmets, noise/light discipline and use helicopter reconnaissance—most of you would go home alive. That was our abiding passion and purpose month after month.

I took command of B Company from a captain who was killed in action on LZ Billie after the company had been badly chewed up in our first III Corps firefight. One of the rifle platoon leaders had gotten aggressive, stupid and lost. (He survived to die of a tragic self-inflicted accidental gunshot wound 18 months later.) All of our brigade fire bases came under heavy NVA attack. An ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] firebase off to our east was overrun. Delta Company from our battalion attacked out from the firebase toward the frontier to try to push back the 107-mm rocket, 122-mm artillery and mortars that were pounding us. They promptly got stuck in close combat. The company commander (an old friend) and the company head medic were both killed and their bodies left. Alpha Company, which was commanded by another friend, then attacked out to link up with D Company and was also promptly caught in a buzz saw. Charlie Company was then in turn committed to the attack and barely got into the jungle line before the NVA machine guns opened up. Their company commander was also killed.

All day, as your brand-new B Company commander, I listened with growing dread on the radio to the sounds of D Company disintegrating and the mounting tragedy of casualties in A and C Companies. The battalion commander was a wonderful and brave man (later to be replaced by an honorable but incompetent lieutenant colonel who did indeed play a role in the later destruction of the same D Company during the Christmas fighting). In the very late afternoon, I heard the battalion commander give the orders to launch our B Company at dusk by helicopter to land directly on the remnants of Delta. When I received the order, the 18 helicopters were already inbound and were to land within 45 minutes. *Dan—I did not know any of you.* I assembled the B Company command group and platoon leaders and gave a simple five paragraph combat order. My hands were shaking but my head was clear. I then explained the attack order in Vietnamese to the "Kit Carson" NVA scout (turncoat) and the two Viet interpreters who served with us. (All three promptly deserted on an outgoing medevac chopper.)

The company XO was a shaken young man. He listened in anguish to my attack order and then said quite clearly to the entire command group, "Captain, these soldiers aren't going to go. They're scared and won't get on the choppers." I told him to get out of the company and report to the battalion headquarters. We also left behind one more of the platoon leaders—a young, frightened, stupid officer who should not have survived OCS. Finally, I told the 1st sergeant, "I'll go out on the first aircraft. You come in on the last helicopter and give me a closing report." Looking around the circle of officers and NCOs, I laid it on the line, "Our friends are dying—we need to help."

There was an immense choking swirl of dry season dirt from 18 landing helicopters. I jumped aboard the lead "Huey" with my CP element (whose names I barely knew). My RTO was holding on to my web gear as I hung out the side of the Huey, desperately trying to visualize the terrain as we roared across the jungle treetops. The sun plunged below the horizon as the choppers turned short on final approach. Heavy enemy gunfire erupted from the ground. A gigantic blow hit our Huey as a round tore through the floor behind the RTO; his eyes widened and he laughed and gave me a thumbs up. Then the LZ came into sight. Thirty or so D Company survivors lay flattened as enemy mortar rounds smacked into the ground. They were wraiths in the gathering dusk as they clawed their way onto our departing choppers and left. (They had been told to stay with us, but were leaderless, disorganized and scared.)

My CP group and I headed in the 12 o'clock direction on the LZ and set up our CP on a large recognizable mound in the deepening darkness. (It turned out to be an occupied NVA bunker.) The last of our B Company helicopters could be heard as they lifted off in a burst of suppressive gunfire. Then the 1st sergeant emerged from the darkness. "Captain," he said, "they all came. We have 123 soldiers on the ground." Dan, I had spent all of my 25 years getting

Capt. Barry R. McCaffrey was twice awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in Vietnam combat action. Here, Gen. William C. Westmoreland congratulates him.

ready for that night. I had buried my brother-in-law, who had been in killed in action in August of 1964. I knew my dad, an Army lieutenant general, would honor me in death. I dearly wanted to live to see my wife and children. But, Dan, that night three kilometers north of LZ Billie—with automatic weapons gunfire whipcracking across the LZ, with the ferocious roar of bamboo burning and exploding from the artillery strikes, with the stench and fear of death around us—I said a prayer that I could live up to the demands of commanding a company of brave young soldiers like you—soldiers who would fly into a savage night firefight because other unknown teenage soldiers from 2-7th Cavalry were dying and needed help. That night I was home in B Company.

The following months of combat are distorted now. I was so very proud to command such a group of soldiers. The memories of unending vigilance; ripped hands from constant digging; the shock of making contact as firing built up quickly in a crescendo; the acrid smell of grenades, cordite, C4 explosives, trip flares; the incredible stench of filthy soldiers, the sight of torn uniforms, the constant pain from bites, destroyed feet, pulled muscles from carrying 80 pounds of water, ammunition, weapons, packs; and the agony of seeing screaming, wounded soldiers and dragging the dead to helicopters. Thank God for our extremely low B Company casualties. Much of it was due to the incredible diligence of young NCOs like you. Much of it was due to the experience and cunning that the 1st sergeant and I had gained from surviving many years of combat between us. Some of it was luck and the hand of God.

I can remember all the images drawn so vividly in your letter. The terrible battle at Christmas which went on for a week and nearly destroyed D Company, A Company and C Company in sequence. We were fortunate to have no one killed despite our many wounded. I recall shooting two NVA soldiers at close range with a .45-caliber pistol and throwing dozens of grenades. I also remember calling in thousands of rounds of artillery and mortars—and bringing in dozens of armed choppers and tactical air strikes. The superb division commanding general—Maj. Gen. George Forsythe, who was a courageous and experienced World War II Normandy invasion vet—finally pulled us. He understood we were being ground up piecemeal by larger NVA forces.

I do remember offering to nominate you for a combat field direct commission. You were such a superb leader. I did understand that you could not do it. You were way beyond the limit and had to go. Death was waiting to harvest you.

Your other memories are also a common reel of film in my mind: The B Company fight in the complex—the huge bomb crater; your single-handed attack to recover your soldiers; my CP group and me pinned down behind a NVA bunker while two heavy machine guns chopped down bamboo inches over our heads; the shock when we first made contact, walking into a surprised group of 30 or more NVA soldiers; our brave point man with a stutter and a .38-caliber pistol yelling *"dung-lai"* (surrender) as the rest of us opened up on automatic fire.

After you were medevac'd from that fight, the battalion commander ordered us to attack at dusk to get an enemy body count to justify the enormous number of friendly air strikes. I argued with him to no avail. We had heavy leader casualties and little ammunition. Night was falling, and we were outnumbered and trying to get organized. New replacements and boxes of unopened ammunition were scattered throughout the company. The adjoining D Company commander reported an attack his company never made. In our B Company, my brave RTO, our huge company medic who was known for his courage, and one volunteer platoon leader and his RTO moved out with me, crawling forward into the enemy contact zone. I reported over the radio that B Company minus was across the line in an attack. We moved about 150 meters into the contact zone and then encountered bunches of moving NVA trying to withdraw. We froze—then the medic shot an M79 40-mm round at an NVA soldier on top of a bunker 20 feet away. The 40-mm didn't detonate, but it did kill him. The place then came alive with enemy fire. We were able to back out throwing hand grenades to cover our withdrawal. The battalion commander, miles away, could then report that his

attalion had continued the attack but had been repulsed.

I also remember the day both you and another one of our platoon leaders were wounded in an attack on what turned out to be an armed field support complex. That was a disgusting day. I shot an NVA soldier dead in the face while clearing a bunker. I also remember the company saving the children and their mother in the bunker, and our enormous relief that they had not been killed. I remember giving the children cartons of field ration milk when we put them on the chopper that medevac'd you and the other wounded platoon leader. The children were so terrified their faces were numb with fear. I cried—thinking of my own children and also because I was terrified that the other platoon leader might die from his throat wound.

After you "DEROS'd" home, B Company kept fighting nearly nonstop as the 1st Cavalry Division fell back on the final defensive rocket belt 12 kilometers out from the Long Binh Field Logistics Base—a series of violent skirmishes and meeting engagements—a constant drain of casualties. The lieutenants and sergeants were going out faster as casualties in other companies than in B Company because of our ferocious concentration on security, camouflage and digging. I was starting to feel the pressure. I desperately didn't want our soldiers to die. You are correct that I did became more uncompromising and demanding and started to take greater personal risks. My face had a giant twitch under the left eye. I was having combat nightmares that required my CP group to cover my mouth and slap me awake during sleeping breaks.

It couldn't go on—too much fighting, too many exposures. On my last day in B Company, we encountered a huge NVA assembly area and bunker complex. Our three platoons fanned out in a cloverleaf. The third platoon immediately made heavy contact with the enemy and was pinned down. The 1st sergeant, as usual, was with them and was reported wounded and in unknown condition. My heart was again frozen with fear for our soldiers. We got two rifle platoons on line and attacked under heavy fire through moderately open jungle and successfully linked up with the isolated third platoon. Then things turned nasty with heavy enemy fire. We managed to knock out all the NVA bunkers in close proximity. I called in a 105-mm artillery battery 6x6 shoot. The rounds shrieked in to smash the complex. Our one B Company mortar opened up. The armed choppers rolled in and then we attacked. Our company bugler blew the attack. (I still have the bugle.) One bunker in particular held us up. I snapped, and assaulted it twice with grenades and finally got it. Dan, to this day I can't understand how I lived through the attack. There was an enormous amount of fire directed at me during the two assaults. The NVA kept throwing their potato masher grenades. We'd scramble and roll in terror a yard or so away and then be blown sideways with splinters in our exposed skin.

Finally, we had the upper hand, I thought—heavy friendly fire outgoing, sporadic NVA fire incoming. The B Company assault line lurched forward screaming, firing M16s on automatic and throwing grenades. Then it happened. An enemy RPD machine gun opened up on our right flank almost under the feet of our assault line and knocked us down like bowling pins. One of our men went down as if a sledgehammer had hit his helmet. I had my pistol shot out of my hand and my canteen off my hip. My face kept grinding in the dirt—couldn't sort it out—sat up with the enemy machine gun hammering by my ears and saw two broken bones sticking out past my elbow—no apparent arm and my blood pumping a foot out with the frantic beating of my heart. A brave young sergeant charged forward to get the machine gun and was cut down dead. One of our platoon leaders finally stopped the slaughter by jumping on the enemy bunker and shooting the NVA machine gunner in the face with his shotgun. The incredibly brave and unarmed company medic then jerked me into defilade. The rest is a haze of me trying to organize and extract B Company while swimming through the shock waves of increasing pain.

The wounded 1st sergeant and wounded lieutenant finally got us out. I was medevac'd out on a helicopter jungle penetrator with our other 15 wounded and 3 killed in action. I left in physical agony but with an even more terrible pain in my heart that I was going to the safety of an Army MASH hospital. I would have gladly died there that day if I could have protected B Company from harm.

So, Dan Garcia, here we sit after all these years—alive with our memories and grateful that we both survived to write these letters on Vietnam. We have bridged this chasm of time and opened a door on the courage and pain we shared in combat. I'm proud of your enormous accomplishments: the law degree, the partnership in a famous firm, the high corporate office in an international company and your splendid record of public service in city government.

Mostly, though, I'm proud of the vivid image I have of the courage in ferocious combat of a 21-year-old rifle platoon sergeant in B Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. You were a superb soldier. You took care of your men. You led by example. I'm glad my prayers have been answered, with one more *Garry Owen* soldier home at last.

—*Barry McCaffrey*
Captain, Infantry, 1968–69
Once "Outlaw 6"

GEN. BARRY R. McCAFFREY, USA Ret., served as commander in chief, U.S. Southern Command, before being appointed by President Clinton in 1996 as director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. In addition to his combat tours in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, he commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. He now serves on the National Security Council and the President's Drug Policy Council. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he holds a master's degree from American University.

Section 8:

Award of the Distinguished Service Cross

16 January 1967

Headquarters
United States Army Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96307

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 200

16 January 1967

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced.

MCCAFFREY, BARRY R. 0F101587 CAPTAIN INFANTRY United States Army 2d Airborne Task Force, Airborne Division Advisory Detachment (Airborne), APO 96307

Awarded: **Distinguished Service Cross**
Date action: 6 October 1966
Theater: Republic of Vietnam
Reason: For extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam: Captain (then First Lieutenant) McCaffrey distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous actions on 6 October 1966 while advising a Vietnamese Airborne Battalion on a search and clear operation near Dong Ha. At 0315 hours the camp received intense mortar fire which severely wounded Captain McCaffrey in the shoulder. With complete disregard for his safety, he unhesitatingly ran through the intense automatic weapons and mortar fire to estimate the severity of the attack. He soon discovered that the senior American advisor had been killed, and all but one of the company commanders were seriously wounded. After rendering aid to the casualties, Captain McCaffrey took command and dauntlessly proceeded around the perimeter to direct the defense against the insurgent human wave assaults. Again he was wounded by mortar fragments, but ignored his own condition and quickly organized a counterattack which successfully repelled another Viet Cong attack. During the remainder of the 12-hour battle, Captain McCaffrey repeatedly exposed himself to the hostile fire and directed artillery and air strikes against the insurgent forces. Through his unremitting courage and personal example, he inspired the besieged Vietnamese unit to defeat four determined Viet Cong attacks and inflict heavy casualties on a numerically superior hostile force. Only after assuring that all the wounded had been extracted, and that a replacement advisor was with the battalion, did he permit himself to be evacuated. Captain McCaffrey's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

Authority: By direction of the President, under the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved 25 July 1963.

Section 9:

Award of the Silver Star

7 February 1969

Department of the Army
Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96490

GENERAL ORDERS
Number 1479

7 February 1969

AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced.

MCCAFFREY, BARRY R. 0F101587 (SSAN: 228-56-4971) CAPTAIN INFANTRY United States Army Company B, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 7th Cavalry

Awarded: **Silver Star**
Date action: 10 December 1968
Theater: Republic of Vietnam
Reason: For gallantry in action while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam. Captain McCaffrey distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous action on 10 December 1968, while serving as Commanding Officer of Company B, 2d Battalion (Airmobile), 7th Cavalry during a reconnaissance in force mission. When his unit became heavily engaged with a large enemy force, Captain McCaffrey exposed himself to the intense hostile fire as he maneuvered his men to the flank of the enemy. At this time two well concealed insurgents began throwing hand grenades at his unit. After, locating the enemy soldiers, Captain McCaffrey charged forward and killed the two adversaries with his pistol. With complete disregard for his own safety, Captain McCaffrey then led an assault on the enemy emplacements forcing the hostile force to flee. His gallant action is in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service, and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army.

Authority: By direction of the President, under the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved 9 July 1918.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT N. MACKINNON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

ROY M. TRAUGOTT
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

Section 10:

Award of the Silver Star

3 June 1969

Department of the Army
Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96490

GENERAL ORDERS
Number 7020

3 June 1969

AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced.

MCCAFFREY, BARRY R. 0F101587 (228-56-4971) CAPTAIN INFANTRY United States Army Company B, 2nd Battalion (Airmobile), 7th Cavalry

Awarded: **Silver Star** (First Oak Leaf Cluster)
Date action: 19 February 1969
Theater: Republic of Vietnam
Reason: For gallantry in action while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam. Captain McCaffrey distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous action on 19 February 1969, while serving as Commanding Officer of Company B, 2nd Battalion (Airmobile), 7th Cavalry during a combat mission. Shortly after an element of his unit engaged and killed two enemy soldiers, two platoons of the unit were taken under heavy automatic weapons fire from an enemy force concealed in bunkers. While leading an assault upon the enemy positions, Captain McCaffrey observed an enemy soldier with a machine gun entering a bunker. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Captain McCaffrey assaulted the bunker and neutralized it with a hand grenade. Because of Captain McCaffrey's decisive action, the assault continued and the enemy was driven from his positions with heavy losses. Captain McCaffrey's gallant action is in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service, and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army.

Authority: By direction of the President, under the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved 9 July 1918.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT M. SHOEMAKER
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

ROY M. TRAUGOTT
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

Section 11:

Award of the Distinguished Service Cross

2 August 1969

Department of the Army
Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96375

GENERAL ORDERS
Number 2905

2 August 1969

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced.

MCCAFFREY, BARRY R. 228-56-4971 CAPTAIN INFANTRY United States Army, Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) APO 96490.

Awarded: **Distinguished Service Cross** (First Oak Leaf Cluster)

Date of action: 9 March 1969

Theater: Republic of Vietnam

Reason: For extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam: Captain McCaffrey distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous actions on 9 March 1969 as company commander during a reconnaissance-in-force mission. When elements of one of his platoons came under intense fire from a well-fortified enemy bunker complex, Captain McCaffrey immediately moved forward to assault the hostile position in order to relieve pressure on the beleaguered squad. He quickly deployed his men for an attack and led the advance through the fusillade. When he had pinpointed the source of the greatest concentration of fire, he initiated a single-handed assault on the bunker. After several attempts; he finally succeeded in destroying the machine gun bunker and its occupants. Despite being wounded in the left arm, he continued to supervise the overrunning and destruction of the hostile bunker system. After organizing the evacuation of his casualties, he called in supporting fire on the enemy. Only after he was assured that all of the wounded had been cared for and after he had organized a defensive position, did he allow himself to be evacuated for medical treatment. Captain McCaffrey's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

Authority: By direction of the President, under the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved 25 July 1963.